






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# **PRESTIGE**

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ESTIMATES



# PRESTIGE

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL  
ESTIMATES

BY

LEWIS LEOPOLD

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“Then there arose a reasoning among them, which of them should be *greatest*. And Jesus perceiving the thought of their hearts took a *child*, and set him by Him.”—ST. LUKE ix. 46, 47.



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## BOOK I



“Est aut plane praestigii genus, ut id, quod sit, non videas; tum quod non est te videre putes.”—JOANNES WIERI, *De praestigiis daemonum* (Basileae, 1566), p. 127.

“Prestige ist etwas furchtbar lästiges. Etwas, an dem man schwer zu tragen hat und das man leicht satt wird.”—BISMARCK.

# PRESTIGE

## PART I

### INTRODUCTORY

§ 1. In this book the author's desire is to call the attention of thinking persons to the fact that *prestige* is not a logical, or moral, or aesthetic phenomenon, but a psychological, or—to be more precise—a socio-psychological one, which may be connected with the logical, the moral, the aesthetic, and the useful, just as it may with the reverse of the same. The author is of opinion that to derive it from mystical causes is to fail to get a correct conception of this peculiar, socio-psychological influence, and that this power of influencing, which reminds us of the dramatic *mise en scène*, is incidental or producible, not individual or the result of predestination.

It is in its logical, moral, aesthetic, and utilitarian neutrality and its democratical conditionality that is to be found the universal social importance of prestige. The former gives it its quality and peculiarity, the latter its quantity, permanency, and general character. Its neutrality, on the one hand, fits prestige for the work of spreading and maintaining true values, which, in the absence of prestige, would probably be unable to make any headway socially—just as it would be difficult to imagine,

in default of prestige, the popularity of innumerable moral prohibitions, logical exertions, and aesthetic criteria, and the absence of the corresponding contradictions. On the other hand, however, the logical, moral, aesthetic, and economic indifference of prestige involves a danger of the absence of prestige thwarting the influence of men who are of value logically, morally, aesthetically, and economically, and the possibility of confounding what is of value with what is worthless.

The conclusion drawn by the author from this *two-edged* character of prestige is, that the decay of prestige in certain cases involves the setting free of values, in others results in the appearance of conditions less favourable to our values, and that, in face of this danger which menaces from two directions, the attention of people of value should be concentrated on as far as possible preventing prestige becoming an end in itself and on restricting it to an instrument in the service of higher aims.

§ 2. *Socio-psychological self-assertion*.—Many people are of opinion that the desire of men to rule can assert itself in the so-called “classes” only. Yet those very people are themselves compelled to speak of men of distinction, families enjoying universal respect, and of the exceptional treatment of clubs, races, occupations, countries, magicians, chieftains, virtuosos, etc. There is no revolutionary group (as proved in a series of articles by Professor Michels referring to the Socialist party)—in fact, there is no despised family or race, no eyot of the theory of equality, whether a monastery, a factory, or a convict prison, where we cannot find some traces of latent aristocratic tendencies, where the several individuals composing the respective society have nothing to lose psychologically, and where the words and actions of the various individuals, though identical in substance, produce an identical effect psychologically too.



The foundations upon which the institution of *Fratres Minorum* was laid by St. Francis of Assisi were an ideal of perfect equality. In 1210 the noviciate was unknown; St. Francis, too, appointed a warden to rule over him, that no injury might befall this voluntary democracy and that there should be some one whom he too had to obey; at Whitsuntide and on Michaelmas Day the brothers met in the chapel at Portiuncula, near their dilapidated hovels, to exchange experiences and offer one another encouragement. But seven years later an aristocratic fermentation set in, and the democratic character began to fade away: no sooner had the first signs of the permanency and numerical strength of the order begun to appear than provinces were established, at the head of each of which a provincial was placed. The moment Francis left Italy, his deputies, Matthias of Narin and Gregory of Naples, relaxed the severity of the clauses relating to poverty, but increased the rigour of observance; Brother Philip intruded himself on the Clarissa nunneries as their patron; while Brother John endeavoured to establish a new order of Lepers. Hastening back to Italy, Francis organized a Vicariate General, and, as a check to the disorder that had arisen, asked the Pope for a patron in the person of Cardinal Hugolin—*psychological in addition to moral force*. When, in the autumn of 1226, lying on the bare ground, covered with ashes, “he was welcoming Death with singing,” a world of a radically different character was engaged in repeating the warnings of his last will. Four years after Francis’s death, over the holy bones there arose a strife between generals and anti-generals, forming as it were a dramatic elaboration of the triumph of appearances over moral force. But the case of the *Fratres Minorum* offers evidence of a still more deeply instructive character.

It was not merely the fighting generals and vicars—the egoists who placed themselves above the teaching of the Gospel—who needed outward self-assertion; the Saint himself required such: Francis, the spirit and essence of the institution, was unable to maintain it by democracy seriously taken; the neglect of the hedonic valuation of man did not prove successful. The noble charm of Francis's individuality, which even to-day, after a lapse of seven centuries, draws foreigners to Assisi; the simplicity of his life, which stood in such touching contrast to the suzerainty of his intellect; his poetical and rhetorical fire: Francis of Assisi, that quintessence of authority, was unable to settle the discords of those who stood nearest to him without the assistance of a cardinal summoned to his aid as patron!

Even in the simplest of microcosms—reduced to simplicity by the most artistic means—the moment the duties imposed by permanency and universality asserted themselves, the logical centre of that microcosm asked the Pope to send him a cardinal to act as a psychological element, an aristocratic active principle personifying the influence of distance.

This potency is manifestly not identical with the logical, nor is it necessarily opposed to it. It is neither moral nor anti-moral. It is neither aesthetic nor unaesthetic. It is something without which neither truth nor untruth, neither the good nor the bad, neither the beautiful nor the ugly, neither the holy ascetic nor the pushing worldly vicar, can succeed permanently and in the face of large numbers.

§ 3. *Prestige*.—What we call prestige to-day is to be met with in every grade of permanent settlements of large numbers of people—from the Melanesian federations to the British Parliament, in connection with the pearls of a barbarian barter, and on the New York

Exchange. It propounds problems for leading articles and dramas, for budgets and wills. Often a miser is unable to amass it; a punctual man cannot keep it in order; and a spendthrift is unable to spend it. The most accurate book-keepers are incapable of showing the items of prestige in their yearly balance-sheets. Yet people are always alluding to it; it is feared and jealously guarded; sacrifices are made for it; it enables successes to be won, and serves as a cloak for weaknesses. Machiavelli commanded its entrance into princely courts; Retz and Richelieu drove the people away from it; Bagehot introduced it into the London Exchange, and, with a sarcastic smile, Schopenhauer recommended it to civil clerks as a supplement to their salaries. The want of prestige bars the way both of genius and of pushing intruders, of wise men and of parvenus; the book of a genius, if devoid of the help of prestige, is liable to moulder in the cellars of its publisher, even if it does not remain unwritten, for a genius without prestige often doubts his own strength and is himself under the unreasonable spell of those who impress by distance. And, though perhaps unable to harm an invention that is evident (because it has become a universal necessity), the want of prestige throws a thousand obstacles in the way of initiation, of the work of pioneering and experimenting; a professor of moderate capacity, who has no practical success to boast of as yet, has far less difficulty in finding a capitalist to finance his invention than a clever, ingenious mechanic in a blue overall, with his humble way of putting his case: most invalids would much rather trust their lives to a pompous professor practising in the capital than to the cleverest country practitioner: an artist without prestige has a veritable Calvary to go through before he can realize his compositions, his pictures, his carvings, or his skill with the violin; a commonplace

furnished with prestige reaps far more tumultuous applause than an idea which possesses a logical value only but has no prestige: a man possessed of prestige is spared by the biting wit of the critic, the vindictiveness of his opponent, the sarcasm of the crowd, and the suspicion of the magistrate, while the Aphrodite of Whitechapel, having no prestige, is driven to the brothel.

Luckily, however, prestige aids not only what is wrong, bad, and ugly, but what is true, good, and beautiful too. Prestige does not necessarily involve the fall of truth, goodness, beauty; it merely means that they have a dangerously common denominator, and may be confounded with untruth, badness, ugliness. Prestige may be a plant of protection for truth, goodness, and beauty, in the stiff, frozen world of a-logic, an-ethics, and an-aestheticism, allowing the value of nobility, too, an associative protection and a possibility of subsistence in permanency and mass.

§ 4. *The derivation of the word "prestige."*—Originally *prestige*—here, too, etymology proves to be an *enfant terrible*—means delusion. It is derived from the Latin *praestigiæ* (-arum)—though it is found in the forms *praestigia* (-ae) and *praestigium* (-ii) too: the juggler himself (dice-player, rope-walker, "strong man," etc.) was called *praestigiator* (-oris). Latin authors and mediaeval writers of glossaries took the word to mean "deceptive juggling tricks," and, as far as we know, did not use it in its present signification. The *praestigiator* threw dice or put coins on a table, then passed them into a small vessel or box, moved the latter about quickly and adroitly, till finally, when you thought they were in a certain place, the coins turned up somewhere else: "the looker-on is deceived by such innocent tricks, being often inclined to presume the sleight of hand to be nothing more or less than magic art." At other times the conjurer grasped red-hot



iron in his hand, without injuring it, or, pretending to be angry, accompanied his words of wrath with a "spouting" of sulphurous flames, as if shrouding his utterances in divine fire. We have the analogy of this among the ancients, when they speak of an empty "flood of words," the delusive spell of words (*praestigiae verborum*), the "prestige" of the eyes, of the "*philosophari se dicentium*" and the "*simulati numinis*," etc.

For a long time opinions differed as to the composition of the word *praestigiae*. A knowledge of the older orthography (*prestrigiae*, *prestrigiator*) pointed to a probability of its derivation from *prae* + *stringo*: the verbs *stringo* and *praestringo* were used also to mean "affect," "overshadow," "dazzle." Consequently, in mediaeval Latin writers generally used the words *praestigiae* and *praestigium* to signify delusive trickery or incomprehensible devilry, or an inaccessible spell. "The tutor," says Jókai in one of his novels written with a quaint archaism, "seemed to be greatly influenced by Miss Susan; on the other hand, Miss Susan seemed to be under the *praestigium* of the negro grafted on to a Frenchman"—whereby Jókai was evidently endeavouring to express the exotic character of the spell.

The practice of French writers in the oldest times was, so far as we have been able to discover, to use the word *prestige* at first in the signification above assigned to the Latin "*praestigiae*" (*prestige*, *prestigiateur*, *-trice*, *prestigieux*). The use of the word was not restricted to the prestige of prophets, conjurers, demons, but was transferred by analogy to delusions the cause of which is not regarded any longer as supernatural. We hear of the prestige of illusions and fancy (*les prestiges du mirage et de la fantasmagorie*); the word is used of illusions generally, and Diderot actually makes mention of the

prestige of harmony. The word "prestige" became transfigured, ennobled, and writers and orators refined it so as to make it applicable to analogies of the remotest character. Rousseau refers to the prestige of our passions, which dazzles the intellect and deceives wisdom. Prestige is the name continually given to every kind of spell, the effect of which reminds us of "prestige" ("cet homme exerce une influence que rassemble à une prestige"—Littré), and to all magic charms and attractive power which is capable of dulling the intellect while it enhances sensation. We may read of the prestige of fame, of the power which, in default of prestige, is brute force, of the prestige of literature and the theatre; in one place Tarde speaks of the prestige of the *latest* news, of up-to-dateness; prestige opens the way to a career even on posters: in 1869 numberless placards proclaimed through the length and breadth of Paris that Bourbeau, Minister of Public Instruction, though reputed to be a splendid lawyer, "lacked prestige"—"Bourbeau manque de prestige." The English and German languages make use of the word in the latter meaning, as opposed to the imaginary virtue of the conjurer; the same signification is applied, generally speaking, to the Italian and Spanish *prestigio*, only that the Italian *prestigião* and the Spanish *prestigiador*, just like the French *prestigiateur*, have, as opposed to the more recent meaning, kept the older significance; neither of them means anything more or less than conjurer or juggler.

So we see that originally prestige was a deceptive jugglery, called *ars sordida* by those who themselves lived by it day after day in the *forum*. "Prestige" was at this time still a feared or despised action—"hocus pocus" or devilry—the object of caution on the part of the prudent and of terror on that of the foolish. The market clown,

the rope-walker, the sword-swallower, the reciter of long poems, the clever manipulator who defies imitation—all possess prestige: but on the other hand, prestige surrounds demoniacal spells, wizardry, and all effectiveness not comprehensible by logic. The actions branded as immoral or regarded as awe-inspiring do not as yet show forth the genuine mechanical value, which means a morally neutral phenomenon of the psychical intercourse of mankind, the art of emphasizing and generalizing certain things and of hiding and dissociating others without any consideration for the moral worth of such things. When the supernatural power of influencing is more and more differentiated from what is human, the word “prestige” loses its magical, demoniacal *cachet*, and comes to mean only a juggling ability: these juggling *prestigiateurs* practised their psychological experiments in effect in the coarsest manner possible, with cheap and primitive instruments, “by way of show,” selfishly, the craft for the craft’s sake.

It was the spirit of the age which inspired Machiavelli, Retz, and Richelieu, that paved the way for the predominance of the new significance of the word “prestige”: the refined and etiquette-ridden Court of the “Sun King,” the organization of appearances all over Europe, the sophistry of pedants and encyclopedists deprived the word of its former meaning; the thirst for power, which had already existed, though unconsciously only and empirically, grew self-conscious and artistic in the epithet once applied to charlatans. Over the book of Machiavelli, Retz, and Richelieu there hangs the emblem—“prestige”: it is of prestige that they write their profoundest thoughts, as do the men of the Reformation, Luther and Melancthon; as does Montesquieu, who considered luxury contemptible in a republic but



necessary in a monarchy; as Pascal, who is of opinion that the people need not feel the reality of the usurpation of rights; and as do many of the primitive sages of the great barbarian States, who for thousands of years sought to find the secrets of the influence of politics, manners, science, and love. The moment Louis XV declared the State to be an instrument of his own person, the royal example was followed by a personal emphasis and consciousness of even the minutest organs of power; the new use of the word was already in the air. Yet, by a general acceptance of this interpretation of the word "prestige," the public consciousness looks upon it as a plastic truth that the manifold and varying groups of phenomena have a common seed, that even the powerful, the useful, the moral, the beautiful, and the true is enhanced in effect if it appears in accordance with certain psychological stand-points, that there are different rules for force, economy, morals, and truth, and different ones for the psychology of social importance and effect, and that these various rules do not necessarily act disturbingly on one another.

The great majority of men desire to assert themselves, to exercise influence, not merely individually, racially, but socially too; and the limits to individual and racial subsistence are set by society. Consequently prestige is latent—though perhaps tacitly—among the objects of almost every man; and though the word does not usually occur in connection with most individuals and with the greater part of our actions, it is present constantly, in a hidden form and anonymously, in the motives of our social conduct. The importance of prestige is not measured by the frequency of the actual use of the word: what we really have to consider is—how often might it be used?

Prestige, as if in wait at the root of our social conduct, throws its cold electric glitter on strong and weak, useful

and useless, good and bad, true and false, beautiful and ugly alike : as if it were not of our everyday conception, but a scornful smile of the jungle over the secession of the haughty animal world ! This word is a breach, a gap, through which we get a view of the whole sweep of the road ; our real advance is merely a higher, more subtle, more refined continuation—on *similar ground*—of the wilderness, the prairie, and—what is altogether new, what we did not bring with us, but added to the primitive with the settlement into permanent masses—a thing of appearances, a mirage.

The clownish juggler of Rome, the *Praestigiator*, grows pale as he balances himself on the taut wire, amid his rolling dice ; from his buffoon's eyes a tear drops, which trickles slowly through the history of the world.

§ 5. *The use of the word "prestige."*—Apart from any logical development that may have led to the present meaning of our word—even supposing the whole to be a mere change of significance, a mere "word-slide"—there can be no doubt that the pebbles of the ancient meaning have rolled along with the word. We state something of some one when we say that he possesses prestige ; but our statement is not clear, and the predicate cannot be distinguished from the subject. It seems to be a fundamental value, not to be subjected to any other fundamental value—a sentiment like a value inclining towards misty, distant lines, which can scarcely be conceived as a reflected, intellectual phenomenon. We are unable to localize it otherwise than in a person and are bound to refer it to a whole individual : but, as a sentiment, its limits become dimmed, it spreads "like a spot of oil" over the whole associative breadth of the supposed person, is automatically renewed, and seems absolute. Of what is analysable, well-known, commonplace, soulless habit, of what we succeed

in understanding thoroughly, in attaining or imitating, we do not say that it possesses prestige.

§ 6. *Prestige and "pretium affectionis."*—What is difficult of access may possess a "*pretium affectionis*," which may excite our interest, our passion, our hatred; but if our inaccessibility is paralleled by ease of access of others on a level with us, the sentimental super-value of the *pretium affectionis* is not raised to the height of prestige. Prestige arises only if we look upon the inaccessibility as absolute for everybody who cannot be associated with the said prestige: in the eyes of B there is no prestige attached to the A whom B is unable to bribe, if B knows that C has been able to do so; a woman well known to be "light" possesses no prestige in the eyes of the man whom she happens to refuse to listen to: prestige is not an episode, but a psychical generality, a sentimental latency, a permanent automatism amid the changing values.

§ 7. *Prestige is not a religious phenomenon.*—In its present meaning, after losing all idea of the demoniac, prestige cannot be conceived as a religious phenomenon. Pure monotheism lacks the inciting similarity of organic conditions between subject and object of the psychological phenomenon; the sentiment of personal analogy, tension in the direction of a personal centre, is not essential in religion; religion is the cult of the unknown, prestige that of the incomprehensible; in religion we search for that whose place we know not, in prestige for that whose place is known, but which is inaccessible. In religion the personal is but reduction, in prestige deduction: in the former, personification is a means to the conception of the infinite, whereas prestige is itself personification, its destination and its object is personal: in religion we feel an endless continuation of self, the supreme possibility of our perfection, whereas the prestige of some one stops and restrains us—

instead of continuing self, it begins the creation of *another*, it differentiates and creates a quietive. *Objectively* in every form of religion—even in the most primitive—we are approached by the *Different*, whereas in prestige the *Similar* withdraws from us: in the former God unites with us, in the latter man separates from us. Their similarity appears only in the form of sentiment: distance involves softer sounds, an enhancing of feelings of pleasure and an abatement of logical pains—a hedonism of thought.

“Im Grenzlosen sich zu finden  
Wird gern der Einzelne verschwinden,  
Da löst sich aller Überdruß;  
Statt heißen Wünschen, wildem Wollen,  
Statt läst'gem Fordern, strengem Sollen  
Sich aufzugeben ist Genuss.”

But the similarity does not go beyond this fine harmony of the nuances of mood: the role of distance is a different one in either case; even the force of feeling stands in the case of religion in reversed proportion, in that of prestige in direct proportion, to distance.

§ 8. *Prestige and superstition*.—Superstition is the establishment of causality amid phenomena, which have, objectively, nothing to do one with the other, but which have been thrust into causal relation by strong passions—those excitements infecting every imagination of which Lévy-Bruhl speaks when he analyses the thought of savages. Prestige is the avoidance of causality, the involving of the chain of causes—a fundamental cause which does not produce a result, but which, so to say, increases by means of dispersion. A superstition attached to some individual or group, fixes its gaze on events and happenings, not on the radically personal conduct; in fact, it practically neglects the latter, it makes the individual or group objective in creation, in which the admiration is localized: a super-



stitious man is able to say, "I admire this or that person or group for this or that reason; for this or that reason I do not look him (or it) straight in the face, I do not mention his name, etc." These relics are connected with mighty upheavals of the mind, with the terrors of famines, wars, plagues, floods, or earthquakes, when the cause and effect are thrown together by terrible psychical crises, and not by logic, when care and thought intermingle. Prestige does not recognize any localization; it is not a causal labyrinth: with prestige the accent falls on appearances, on the success of the effect, on the psychical answer of those who are under some one's prestige.

## PART II

### PRESTIGE AND CONCEPTION

§ 9. *Prestige and universal respect.*—After having raised prestige—in its universally accepted sense—from the mass of religious and superstitious phenomena, we shall still find the word encircled by a whole collection of similar conceptions, some of which seem to mingle with it. For, if prestige is neither a religious nor a superstitious phenomenon, but the favourable appearance of one man in the eyes of another, how can it be distinguished from the conception of universal respect? Can we trust ourselves to the quick-silver-like susceptibility of the language, which does not delight to create superfluous synonyms, and under apparent synonyms at all times conceals some nuance desirous of asserting itself? Can we believe in the economy of language refusing to carry the conception already referred to, in its new denomination, in triumph through all the civilized tongues of the world? And if we venture to embark on proving the primitive wisdom of language, will not our supposition disappoint us? Can we mark out any clearly defined deviation of prestige from every neighbouring conception—its linguistic object in life, or the special thoughts that arise in us every time we hear or pronounce the word, or recall it to our mind?

If we examine thoroughly the cognate conceptions that

may be combined under the collective term "universal respect," we see the repetition of a common characteristic in every one of them, that in the mind of the recipient the judgment of the person criticized has been formed and conceived *in advance*. Only the application thereof is individual; the individual ambitious of universal respect or esteem *does not form, but merely accommodates himself*. He is but the individual employer or realizer of logical, moral, and aesthetic forms and rules already in existence. The person aiming at acquiring public esteem does not ask questions, but merely endeavours to give satisfactory answers to questions already formulated—the ready-made, fixed questions of logic, morals, aesthetics. The situation of a subject of this kind is one of integration; he depends upon the opinion of men; he strives after an affirmation of these judgments, to be a real value; and he makes due preparation for being weighed and classified, as some candidate at an examination. Prestige has not to do with persons who are thus prepared, or are in a waiting attitude of this kind. It is not a logical answer to some question already formulated. But, for the simple reason that it is illogically accepted by persons who are unprepared or surprised, its real, popular meaning is different to that of public esteem. The latter requires an idea, to which it can attach and refer its judgments: it cannot be applied to anything but what is conceivable in the individual—and in respect of the whole individual only if that something is conceivable absolutely. But as the jealousy of personal reserve is present in practically every man (Simmel), and as this jealousy always produces some morsel of individuality (for even the wretched creature who comes to us for alms enters with a protest—"I do not come to beg"), prestige, although it can coincide with public esteem, generally means something more. Public esteem is an abstract category;



it is deficient in the expansiveness of sentiment, and the limits of its assertion are defined by a modest group of popular conceptions.

§ 10. *Prestige and authority*.—We have defined the distinction between prestige and public esteem: the boundaries of the two conceptions are demarcated by the surplus of personality in prestige, by its distinctiveness and irregularity. Do we find any difference in such cases too, where the individual is just as strongly emphasized—in the cases of persons enjoying not public, but peculiar esteem, who obtain recognition on account, not of their absolute importance with the masses, but of their individual “specific gravity”? The man we have seen enjoying public esteem is the *integer vir scelerisque purus*, to whom a rational respect is due—seeing that in common valuation the exchange of respect among persons capable of giving something in return, among people of the same manners, of a like class and of similar tastes is reasonable so long as none of them breaks through the bounds of the common sense. A man sharing in such expressions of approval does not make, but only obeys rules; he himself is a passive element in the social order; in fact, his prime merit consists in being more effectually passive than the average and commonplace man—not to speak of those who commit breaches of social order. Such an individual or group does not supplant new conceptions or values; on the contrary, every movement of his is a strict compliance with the conceptions and values that have already become common currency—thus taking almost literally the teaching of the Gospel with reference to the Old Testament, “Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil” (Matt. v. 17). In the case of public esteem we have to deal not with a superiority of quality, but simply

with a difference of quantity, a multiplication of the average.

Yet the difference of quality, too, is twofold in social matters. There are differences of quality that may be reduced to one of quantity and are to be rationally valued—the following, esteeming, and requiring of which is an intellectual phenomenon: and there are differences of quality that admit of no such reductions. I have found a few telling remarks in an essay by Professor E. A. Ross, which practically coincide with what I wish to say. Our civilization, he says, contains elements which strive after expansion by means of rational imitation, as, for instance, practical crafts and sciences. In each of them we find authorities who are acknowledged and followed. And it could scarcely be otherwise, considering the enormous advantages of specialization. However, the basis of authorities of this kind is not *prestige*, but *previous success*. Consequently, says Professor Ross, it is quite rational to treat as an authority a general, who has won all his battles; a lawyer, who has never lost a case; a doctor, all of whose patients have recovered: but it is just as rational to withdraw our confidence from an engineer whose bridge collapses or an astronomer whose prognostications do not come true. The division of labour snatches the values of men out of our hands; but the respect due to them—the *authority* of the craftsman, the doctor, the clergyman, the teacher, and the farmer—is not irrational as long as we know *at what angle* the trend of their knowledge, conduct, and power diverges from our own. Our respect is not prestige as long as we are able, in the qualities and conduct of those before whom we bow, to define the point beyond which, as well as that up to which, we are incapable of following them. In this case their isolation is not absolute; they are

the ramifications of a common trunk which, though they grow widely apart and in knotty profusion, are connected by their whole being with the parent trunk and are organically united to every shoot of the same. A man who in my eyes possesses authority, is not the plural of my *ego*, but virtually my own self: I feel that—maybe at the cost of enormous pains, perhaps by dint of labour as hard as Jacob's when he tended those sheep—I feel that it is not a mere absurd dream that I may one day attain to what makes him an authority in my eyes and prevails on me to seek his company, to follow him and bow before him. Authority has a “specific gravity” of its own; it requires special appreciation and individual judgment—though not of a personal or exclusive character, and we are able to take our measure of it ourselves. How different the impressions made by the dominant-psychical object of our admiration! Evidently the *dominant-psychical character* in itself shows decisively the importance of the impressions, recollections, and anticipations of the masses in respect of it: the recipient sees, hears, and reproduces, and expects of the man of prestige this or that impression; but the required standard he is unable to set up in himself or establish of himself. He is compelled to acquire such standard from the man of prestige, whom he is therefore incapable of measuring and discovering to be great or little by virtue of his own scale of judgment. The recipient does not observe the angle at which the man of prestige diverges from him; cannot demarcate the directions in which he would be able to follow him; and is unable to do anything with him intellectually. The impressions gained of the man of prestige themselves act as rules for guidance; and sentiment, not being under the restraint of conception, receives this tyrant of intellect with old-world warmth.

§ 11. *The two dimensions of psychical rule.*—There are

men who represent the integrating energy of society: it is the task of *authority* to weld together and unite individuals, classes, groups by means of emphasizing, elimination, example, and the condensation of energy—authority may be likened to the hoop holding together the staves of a barrel. All of man that is conceivable, capable of being made the aim of our will; all of the *non-ego* that is able to be preserved for the use of reason; all that is not merely simply the plural or a fraction of our *ego*, and yet rational, is relegated to the sphere of authority. This is one of the sources of the authority of law, of some ethical rules, of aesthetical ideals, of certain economic, political, military, etc., leaderships, of the active contents of authority and the condemnation of its negation. Authorities produce the “balustrades”—in the form of representations, ideas, judgments, aims—which the myriad kinds of consciousness may lean on for support, feeling the action of their slumbering forces and raising their desires to the height of will. Examples of authorities are—the scholar among his pupils, the hero in the eyes of his soldiers, the foreman at whose directions workmen modify their activity at the various points of the division of labour, without any fear of trouble ensuing, the artist conducting an orchestra, whose baton compels the first violin, the clarinet-player, the chorus and the soloist alike to watch him with a security reminding us of the feeling of self-confidence. Authority has an effect creative of security, supplanting conception, and productive of an organic calm; men consciously entrust to another the burden of compulsory conception while nothing disturbs their *ego* or prevents them from keeping their distinctive selves.

Of not less importance—though for the most part opposed to the foregoing—is the society-organizing role



of prestige. Those who base distinctions on the popular principle of inaccessibility differentiate society, separate its parts like some "aqua fortis," and divide the community of men into a number of islands of lesser or greater dimensions. The effects of prestige that seem to clash with this process are no longer direct. In the simple facts of life we are daily met with the fundamental tendency of prestige to move *outwards*—the striving after appearances heedless of what is within and caring only for outward results, which in its effects distinguishes it so completely from authority. At an *enquête* dealing with Hungarian ocean-navigation held in March, 1911, the members spoke almost as much about prestige as about tariffs, and far more than about Marconi-stations; the representative of the most important sea navigation company during the discussion specially emphasized the fact that his company maintained their passenger services in the Adriatic merely for the sake of the prestige of Hungarian navigation. Had any one during a discussion of this kind justified the maintenance, not of sea, but of *inland* passenger services, from the point of view of prestige, people would have been justified in smiling him to scorn.

There are in truth two "expansions" of social distinction of influential men or groups—vertical and horizontal, authority and prestige. In many cases a particular individual or group has a share in both, but then both have a different conditionality ( $a + x$ )—the coincidence does not only not involve identity, but is not even necessary. In every British Cabinet, whether composed of Conservatives or Liberals, we can pick out the representatives of authority and those of prestige—the leaders and the "exclusives." Can we wonder that even Spinoza wished to choose the diplomats to be sent to foreign courts from among the

nobility only? Prestige is often in truth the tragedy of authority, the "curse of greatness"; and not seldom one of the most burdensome crosses of genius. Snobs and half-educated enthusiasts are found engrossing even the real values of genius; we have only to think of the Cinquecento open-mouthed devourers of Baedeker, of the imitators of Verlaine and Wilde, etc. And do not those who understand and appreciate represent merely the minority of the calm spectators of a Shakespearean play or of the tearful-eyed audience at a Beethoven concert, while the majority are merely there to *admire*? Yet authority and prestige are but—stepbrothers!

An Authority is a man of comprehension, who sees just a little more clearly than we do on some points—a will just a little less exhausted than ours; authority can teach, raise to its own level: prestige, however, carefully warns its "linen-garmented" priests, "when they go forth into the utter court, even into the utter court to the people, they shall put off their garments wherein they ministered, and lay them in the holy chambers, and they shall put on other garments; and *they shall not sanctify the people with their garments*" (Ezek. xliv. 19).

The permanent masses and the more and more complex division of labour cast an enormous variety of persons before the eyes of every man. Interesting persons, groups, circles, etc., are incomparably more numerous and intricate than the conceptions we dispose of. If the interest keeps awake in spite of this logical bankruptcy, then it will be driven to a more and more associative production of opinions. The ancient engine is working again, only henceforward without engine-driver.

## PART III

### PRESTIGE AND PREJUDICE

§ 12. *Prejudice of race.*—What is the relation between *prestige* and *prejudice*? When what is unintelligible, or mysterious is at one time received with enthusiasm, at another with indignation, *what renders necessary these two extreme sentiments of appreciation* which, though appearing under apparently identical circumstances, are diametrically opposed to one another?

The most general form of social prejudice is that of race. A *foreigner* is received with prejudice, conception, or prestige. If we put “conception” aside, we find prejudice and prestige facing one another. We see this split most clearly demonstrated if we observe the differences of conduct in the reception of strangers by primitive peoples. In Yrjo Hirn’s *Origins of Art* we are told that those travellers who have learned the tongues of savages have often observed that their persons were made the subjects of extemporized poems by the respective savages. Sometimes these verses are of a derisive character; at other times they glorify the white man. When do they deride, when glorify? What characterizes the *Other* received with bread and salt, with a triumphal procession of grovelling savages—or that *Other* greeted with a pack of snarling dogs and a shower of arrows? What is it that



enforces the appreciation symbolized by a castle and a Ghetto?

(a) *Contempt*.—The contempt and abuse of strangers is particularly emphasized by W. J. McGee in his work on the Seri Indians: he affirms its existence in general in the case of every tribe of low grade. Primitive peoples are ethno-centric; they refer everything to the tribe, and glorify everything connected with the same, whereas they use defamatory epithets of strangers. The Seri Indians are a geographically isolated tribe, of a characteristically low grade, whose feelings are typical of that inferior grade of a people hardly yet developed into a tribe, which is still very little subject to the influence of permanency and settlement in masses. According to McGee, the Seri Indian is quite as incapable of suppressing an involuntary growl, on the approach of a stranger, as is a hound when it sees or scents a wolf. Westermarck tells us of the inhabitants of the South Sea Islands that, when they hear of any stupid action, they say “as stupid as a white man,” “as clumsy as an Englishman”; in the language of the *Illinois* Indians, the word *illinois* means “man”—as if to say that all other Indians are animals: professions of this kind contained in a name recur constantly in the case of other primitive peoples too; the ancient Egyptians looked upon themselves only as *romet*, real men; the exclusiveness of the Assyrians, Persians, Chinese, Jews, etc., is well known; every non-Greek was a barbarian, and the Latin word *hostis* at first meant *both* stranger *and* foe. “It is very difficult,” says Herbert Spencer, “for a member of Western civilization to understand that the Orientals regard us with a contempt in comparison with which our contempt for them is feeble.” These examples, which can be added to by any one *ad libitum*, offer merely a cursory insight into the history of the prejudice

accompanying the reception of strangers, which is still "all the rage"; the derisive scorn for "the man from afar," for certain unfamiliar, novel characteristics, habits, and customs, the protracted legal disability of foreigners, all point to the manifold and constantly recurring martyrdom of the *Other*. All this seems quite natural on the part of primitive peoples, who are still guided by animal instincts: the only surprising thing is, that we have just as inexhaustible store of examples for proving the opposite extreme!

(b) *Admiration*.—According to Vierkandt, the Indians of North America greeted the Spaniards, on their first appearance, as legendary heroes; some of the natives of Australia believe that after their death they are changed into white men; before the days of Mackenzie, the Eskimos described the English as winged giants, able to kill by a mere glance and to swallow a whole beaver at once. Dalton tells us that, though acquainted with the English for not much more than fifty years, some primitive peoples assigned them a very respectable place among their ancestors. Of savage peoples of more recent times Lubbock tells us that they have regarded watches and white men as veritable gods—"for the latter supposition," he says, "there was some reason, for they may very easily have taken the crack of rifles for thunder and lightning." In Fiji the printing press recently set up there was at once declared to be a god. When the sea is stormy, the negroes of Tanganyika beg the white passengers to lie on the bottom of the boat, for the sea cannot bear the sight of them. According to Parkyns Mansfield, the inhabitants of the interior of Abyssinia were convinced that in the course of a few days the German missionaries cut a road more than 150 miles long from Adowah to Massowah, along the banks of the Red Sea, for the conveyance of

large supplies of munition. Those rules of hospitality, which we meet with consistently, returning even in the lowest grade of civilization, though partly due to a rational appreciation of the usefulness of strangers, are carried to such excesses as are scarcely conceivable. We need only refer to the material and moral sacrifices made in the interests of hospitality! Speaking of the hospitality of the Indians, Morgan emphasizes the fact that, though they often appeared by hundreds in the Indian villages and consumed twice as much a head as the natives, the Spaniards were at all times accorded a most hospitable welcome. The virtue of hospitality assumes the dignity of a religious function in the sacred books of the Hindoos and in *Zeus Xenios*: speaking of the ancient Germans, Tacitus says that "there is no people which exercises hospitality and entertainment to a greater extent than they do; . . . whether familiar to them or not, every guest enjoys the same rights"; it is as if under all this generosity there were latent the naïve profession of the Ainos: "Treat no stranger with contempt, for thou knowest not who thy guest is." In Morocco, says Westermarck, the Shereef would not for the world permit a stranger to kiss his hand, for he is afraid he would deprive him of his holiness. The spell of what is strange and distant is still felt to-day: Englishmen do not know much German, and their "horizon" rarely extends beyond the British Empire; for this reason, whereas in former days they looked with prejudiced eyes on the German Empire, and smiled at and despised the Prussian type, to-day the German possesses a certain prestige in his eyes, and we are once more faced with the two irrational extremes that made the French the wonder of the world before Sedan and after. On the other hand, in Germany and all over Europe an Anglomania of historical importance

has prevailed, and still prevails—no less remarkable and universal than the Normanomania of the ancient Slavs, the Hellenism of the Romans, the Romanism of the Middle Ages, or the Gallomania of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The authority of the English race, too, may be traced to numerous sources. Their imperialistic successes, their decisiveness, disciplined character, industry, and wealth surely deserve the recognition of even the most circumspect minds. Yet it is not this authority that has produced the fanatical enthusiasm and servile imitation of the intellectual rabble of Europe and America, of the snobbery of great cities that, while it has broken away from the habit of circumspection, has not yet advanced to the forming of conceptions. Professor Ferrero actually generalizes the power of strangeness to secure authority: in his opinion practically every politician possesses an intellectual and moral character of an exceptional kind—*i.e.*, of a kind opposed to that of the people governed by him—and all his successes are due to these differences, for “with qualities which the rest lack, and without the faults which are universal with the others, (these politicians) are able to create mighty works and, as exceptional men, may excite admiration and win followers.” To prove this proposition contained in his *Europa Giovane*, he refers to Cesare Borgia, “the merciless but brainy adventurer of the sixteenth century, the only one to whom it had occurred to create a strong State in Italy,” who was a Spaniard, just as Cardinal Mazarin was an Italian, Buonaparte a Corsican, though “the Corsicans, ethnographically and psychically, are as little like the French as the French are like the Germans.” Parnell was not a Celt, but a pure Anglo-Saxon; Bismarck was a Pomeranian with a sprinkling of Slav blood in his veins. Others point out that it was a non-English conqueror



who united England; that a non-English politician laid the foundations of the House of Commons, the Bank of England, and the library of the British Museum; that non-English statesmen consolidated British rule in Egypt and South Africa. "Outside the sphere of European civilization," remarks Professor Ratzel, "almost all States are ruled by intruding conquerors; that is, by foreigners." Others again will point to the cases of Hunyadi, Kossuth, Petöfi, etc. The problem has been propounded, roughly enough, but in a fascinating manner. But a proclamation of such rules is merely a *coup d'état* in the world of ideas; it is neither justified nor justifiable: the one-sided array of highly-coloured data loses its power of conviction the moment we succeed in arraying an army of data on the other side.

(c) *The problem of the stranger.*—According to De Varigny, the same natives who spoke with such contempt of the English and murdered Captain Cook, sang hymns of fanatical praise of Captain Cook's ships; the ships themselves were celebrated as islands, the masts as primitive trees; the sailors were gods who drank blood (*i.e.*, red wine), etc. In fact, according to Lubbock, after killing him and cutting his body to pieces, the inhabitants of Owhyhee were perfectly convinced that he would one day appear among them, and kept asking him "how he would treat them after his return." On the wings of their imagination, adds Lubbock, savages are only able to soar to a conception of beings a few degrees more perfect than themselves; and Captain Cook was much more powerful, wiser, and, we may add, more virtuous than any of their *gods*. Even the antagonism to strangers often arises from an over-estimation of their strength. The Australian who attributes the death of his relation to the enchantments of some other tribe, will kill any

member of this tribe. Even cannibalism is excused by the aid of prestige; often, we are told, savages eat their enemy because they believe they will thus inherit his courage; later on, it is with the same object that they devour their enemy's eyes or heart. All these capricious changes may be explained with a fair approach to probability as far as savages are concerned.

The prejudices of savages do not appear continuously as equally in place: abrupt changes of mood and feelings are so completely characteristic of them, that they render every phase of their conduct incalculable. We are told by Burton, a writer thoroughly familiar with the natives of East Africa, that at the same moment they are good-humoured and hard-hearted, warlike and cautious; at one moment extremely amiable, and the next minute blood-thirsty, merciless, and brutal, sociable and stiff, superstitious and insolent, brave and desponding, servile and oppressive; now obstinate, the next moment wavering and the play-things of caprice; one moment they worship life, the next they are inclined to commit suicide; now miserly and close-fisted, and then living only for the moment. Savages further possess remarkably few conceptions to aid their reflection; the conceptions they possess are, so to say, warm, highly coloured; that is why their associations of fancies are so wildly extravagant, such as are but rarely met with in our faded existence. If a stranger happens to cross the instinct of a people of low grade at its full force, or if he falls foul of the rigorous connections of their judgments and superstitions, he excites the racial feeling to indignation, or disturbs their religious sentiments and customs. If, however, this primitive society happens to be apathetic, tired, and the stranger trespasses on judgments and superstitions, their racial instinct and moral sentiments are not disturbed, the differentiation inspired

by that instinct is for the moment not in play. The spell of distance, of something that is *Other*, is able to assert itself unimpeded.

The question becomes more difficult when the features of permanency and settlement in masses are found existing side by side with barbarian societies. In expansive, deeply rooted societies of this kind, racial differentiation is attended by a catastrophe if the stranger, who was formerly kept strictly at a distance physically, treated as a mortal foe and condemned to death, is allowed to live; the moment a stranger is taken prisoner in war, a permanent society formed of large masses is compelled, despite dislike, not merely to allow the slave to survive, but to suffer his presence in its midst as a slave. This is the first great compromise of prejudice—an enemy received into the society in place of an enemy devoured or tortured to death. Herewith the guiding power of instinct loses considerably in effectiveness, for the society of oppressors becomes more and more accustomed to the sight, colour, features, movements, smell, and accent of the stranger; on the other hand the permanency and grouping produces a type of inner, homogeneous slavery; the sight of the *native stranger* vies in sadness with that of the *imported stranger*; the tremendous process of the blending of races is started; it creates forms and a *jus gentium* of its own; and the severe racial negation of the Seri Indians is thrown into the background. Less account is taken of the primitive views of racial intuition; there is already a distinction between *hostis* and *peregrinus*; the rights of guests and strangers steal into the maxims of the sacred books; contempt is no longer universal or frank enough to keep the slave at a distance.

We have now three variations of the fate of strangers: (a) they are despised and rejected, because they are ob-



served to be strangers; (b) no one remarks that they are strangers, and (c) they are admired and acknowledged as leaders, because they are strangers. Even a statesman individually so important and acknowledged rationally as an Englishman like Disraeli, was compelled to wage a war of associations both as a novelist and in society that is nearly akin to caricature, to prevent his foreign extraction affording a bitter seasoning for any recognition he obtained; Buonaparte was forced to Frenchify his name to "Bonaparte," though his Corsican birth was made the subject of biting criticism even when his fortunes were at their zenith. Yet both rose to a great height; in a moment they overleaped the narrow circle of prejudice. Where strong prejudice values are present, as in the case of negroes, every conception of equality and nationalism incorporated in the statute-book is perverted. All that *appears* permanently divergent is made the subject of damnatory prejudice; and the more apparent and seeming, the more primitive the impression that restrains, the more general the prejudice; smell affects more keenly than form, and form more than mode of thought. Prejudice, having come into conflict with conception, has been worn down and paralysed by the struggle for existence, which has made it petty like everything that grows old; to-day prejudice means fewer sword-thrusts, but more pin-pricks than of yore. If a member of a nation is not typical, but exercises an exclusive, personal impression on us, he possesses prestige; if he is typical, he is indifferent to us, or we look down upon him and consider him comical. The weighty words of Emerson may perhaps be able to make us comprehend the prestige of English *individuality*: "each inhabitant of this island is an island in himself." No small part of the successes of the English nation is due to its geographical isolation,

and to that reserve (probably partly due to the above) which individualizes every Englishman—taciturnity is an identity of character which is not productive of a type; the English language is easy and clear, but its *pronunciation* is difficult for all who are not Englishmen—and this involves distance. Englishmen are reserved in their dealings with strangers, they do not speak much, they show but little sentiment, outwardly they are stiff and inaccessible, keeping intruders just as far off as critics. In contrast to this English individual with his reserve born of intellectual judgment, we have the typical *globe-trotter*, mechanical alike in clothes, movements, and mode of life, who is generally not recruited from the best elements of English society; himself an Anglomaniac, he is the snob of his own nation, the parvenu of the English world, who does not show much of the personal “overweight” behind the typical—an Englishman as an eccentric, not as an individual; in dealing with this divergent commonplace, English and foreign taste assumes an attitude of rejection, smiles at him and makes fun of him. To sum up: the stranger whom we feel to be divergent as compared with ourselves, is indifferent or the object of prejudice: the stranger whom we feel ourselves unable to measure by our own standard, whose measure—not his qualities—we feel to be different, we receive with prestige. We look with prejudice on the stranger whom we dissociate, and receive with prestige the stranger who is dissociated. We become more often and more keenly conscious of the want of type in the case of strangers who are less known, less comprehensible, to whom we are less accustomed; for this reason their prospects of prestige are a shade better, just as their prospects of prejudice are too.

Antipathy becomes prejudice only when it grows strong enough “to interrupt the due sequences of thought.” Like-

wise sympathy also becomes bias only when it grows strong enough to have the supremacy over judging all contradictory causalities rigidly excluded. "A sound judgment," says Professor Sully, "implies a considerable development of the power of resisting the forces of bias."

We *will* not understand some one, though we possibly could understand him. We only take *interest* in somebody to the extent permitted by our prepossession. Subjectively this suzerainty of the restraint appears *in the mind's feeling of security*. This intentional choice of the Ego among the different categories of judging and the accompanying sentiment of security distinguish prejudice or bias from prestige. In the case of prestige we *will* understand some one but we *cannot*; and this produces *the feeling of insecurity of the mind*. We no more select, we are being selected by psychological laws. We gaze at men with anxious wonder, as a child would gaze at the city where it has gone astray.

*Between the feelings of security and insecurity of mind there is a large zone of neutral sentiment, in which case the feeling of security is out of the question, though it is latently present in the background of mind. Psychological values do not appear in this indifferent state of the mind with exclusive aggressiveness in front of intuition and logic.*

## PART IV

### OUTLINES

§ 13. *The justification of the word.*—Is it possible at all to snatch a word at random out of popular usage and set it in the setting of a system of thought? When faced by this question, it is comforting to think that all systems of ideas have started from the assimilation of conceptions already existing in public consciousness. "Heat and light," says Wundt, "are conceptions taken from the sphere of outer experience, which were called into existence direct from the feelings of sense. But the object could not have been attained, unless the conceptions of public consciousness had for the moment been accepted, and an examination of the same had served as a starting-point." The word "prestige" too—it is true—is used by many people, and is latent in the consciousness of still more, enlivening the otherwise individual hues of thought with the variations of the most divergent languages, races, and histories of Europe. It is probable that in saying the word "prestige," the diplomat and the provincial journalist do not think of precisely the same thing, and that there is a difference in conception between the use of the word in the French Academy and in the Servian Parliament. Prestige is mentioned and heard of by men of the most varying inclinations, dispositions, and education; and the use of the word is uniform at most as concerns the essence of the con-



ception. However, we believe with Durkheim, that the object before us is not the examination of the manifold modes according to which people conceive the word—in this case the word “prestige.” Our task is not to explain words, but we shall denote a series of phenomena more intelligibly discussible in connection, for the sake of rendering matters easier, by a word which in public consciousness practically echoes that series of phenomena. And as, in the course of our reflections, we have at all times striven to accommodate ourselves to the everyday thoughts connected with the word “prestige,” we may perhaps with some justice assert that we have not lost sight of the constantly recurring, essential element of the everyday meaning.

We are thus able, in a way, to form a more accurate idea of the message implied by the word as exempted from trivial disturbing elements. As evidence of enormous series of phenomena forgotten, unobserved, or which no one will admit—like a petrified organization—we have the word, so long avoided, so unsuspectingly used, but no longer deniable. The memorials of the mental conditions called prestige may be traced back to time immemorial; only the word is new; the phenomena understood thereby are thousands of years old, as old as society itself—as a permanent settlement in large masses, in which men are no longer familiar to one another. However, without word and conception, it was difficult to grasp these mental conditions—though all the easier to confuse, deny, or pervert them. Until the word came, until the tension of nerves and the excitement of brain cells were compressed into that word—consonance in variety, permanency in ephemerality—the conception and logical arrangement of these phenomena was out of the question. When people began to use the word “prestige” in its present meaning, the



consciousness of the mental condition made its appearance ; the ice was broken : human reflection made a confession, the retraction or unmaking of which is out of the question.

We shall endeavour to “take” this splendid confession “at its word.” We look upon it as if the word were right—as if its definitive element of conception were not confoundable with anything else. The word calls our attention to a special group of phenomena, and defends its right to a separate existence against all attacks from without : perhaps words after all are not so “fleeting” as the proverb would have it. We must presume that unless it were profoundly peculiar and possessed of vital energy, it would not be used so consistently and decisively by all the languages of Europe.

The word is here and is compelled to confess. Why did it arise ? What does it mean ? Why—and in what—does it differ from all its fellow-words ? Like dactyloscopy, it is bound to make a confession.

§ 14. We shall endeavour to prove the recipient of prestige, then its possessor, and finally we shall strive, in the psychological situation of both, to find that peculiar, constantly recurring essential point which—setting aside all coincidences—characterizes prestige.

## PART V

### RACIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERS OF RECIPIENTS OF PRESTIGE

§ 15. *The possessor of prestige and its recipient.*—If we investigate somebody's prestige in point of a given quantity of consciousness, we shall find that this consciousness, which can be latent somewhere in the background, always points to *at least one other person*. For prestige to arise, one person is not enough; at least two individuals are requisite. There is, indeed, such a thing as self-prestige, too, especially in the case of lunatics: but both in these irregularities and in the case of self-admiration arising from a conscious possession of prestige, we can recognize a fractional reaction of the conduct of others. The "living wage" of prestige is two persons. But this minimum is rarely found. The atmosphere of prestige is permanency, large numbers, exaggerated distances between men, and the receptivity of the masses. In the presence of a single man any other single man can appear absolutely inaccessible and generalizably intact only in a case of an exceptionally favourable psychical situation. Even in the case of Robinson Crusoe, who had brought with him so many dissociative elements for Friday to reflect on, we find "my man" under the influence of an authority that gained in importance step by step, advancing with each fresh proof of Crusoe's skill, rather than of an irrational spell. Prestige possesses a kind of democratic

conditionality; it shines forth in large numbers, in general and *in extenso*; consequently its foundations are secure by their very extent; its permanency and universality is practically a foregone conclusion; thus it is more probable that it remains uncriticized and unanalysable; and there is a kind of insurance in the suggestive number of recipients. A solitary individual is usually lacking even in the self-neglecting requisite to confess the prestige of somebody in word or deed, as needs be, he does not trust his own eyes: a solitary individual is generally composed of nothing but judgments and prejudices; if he does not analyse, he is circumspect. That anybody should come under the prestige of somebody else *as a result of his own special feelings*, is improbable, for two reasons. Either because the minimum of numbers is involuntarily more pronounced and compels narrower observation, or because the immense mass of unknown opinions acts confusingly and disquietingly. In the track of a limited prestige of this kind there is always lurking the possibility of the spell being broken—for “familiarity breeds contempt.” With respect to the possession of prestige, just the contrary is the case; the more individual and exclusive the appearance of a person, the better his chance of securing prestige: prestige possessed in numbers becomes commonplace—a mere habit or conception—an indifferent or abstract commonplaceness, not possessed of any sentimental warmth. If, however, we find that people in general have more confidence in the prestige of their race, their society, their class, or their party, than in their own, this circumstance is merely the assertion of the law of least resistance in addition to the habitual value of numbers: to acquire something is easier than to create it, to slink in is easier than to conquer. But, under equal conditions, individual prestige is at all times more intensive and stronger than

that due to numbers; and, even though facts gainsay this statement in one or two points, this is only attributable to the larger quantity of means, generally of historical value, at the disposal of the prestige due to numbers. In general we may say that the intensity of prestige grows in proportion to the number of recipients, and decreases in proportion to that of its possessors. Here we must take care not to confound this relation of numbers with the function of the value of rarity. The *person* possessed of prestige is not the object of volition, and cannot be measured. The fact that the persons possessed of prestige are either single exceptions or but few in number, affects, not with the tensional force of rarity, but by the spell of psychical inaccessibility, and a more pronounced emphasis of personality. Both the Kohinoor diamond and the Siamese twins possess a value due to rarity; but neither of them has any prestige, and the prestige of a large number of inaccessible persons is always more important than that of a small number of accessible persons. Here the number is of importance only from the point of view of a greater psychical impediment. However large the number of those concerned in the play of prestige, the main principle is at all times the intellectual inaccessibility of the possessor.

The situation of the two parties concerned is disparate. They are not mutual or destined to exist side by side: their relation is characterized by an incomparable divergency. Here there is no question of the barter of psychical life, rather merely of patriarchal presentation and acceptance. Objectively the possessor of prestige is not necessarily of a higher order (either by habit, prejudice, or conception); taking his qualities and his average conduct as  $B_1$  and those of the recipient as  $B_2$ , and the logical, ethical, and æsthetic values as  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$ , it is not absolutely



certain that  $B_1(a+b+c) > B_2(a+b+c)$ , but it may be that  $B_1(a+b+c) < B_2(a+b+c)$ —without, however, the prestige in question becoming impossible, or indeed sustaining any injury. In fact, probably in most cases  $B_1(a+b+c)$  practically  $= B_2(a+b+c)$ —average men. The inequality expressed by prestige does not declare itself in such a divergency, but is one of *situation*; although even the inequality of situation may be understood, by way of complement, in such a manner that not only does  $B_1$  possess a “prestige” situation superior to  $B_2$ , but vice-versa too—in this case, however, we have to deal with *two* different kinds of prestige, not with one. More decisive and characteristic than the individuality of the possessor and recipient of prestige is the psychical situation in which they are placed as against one another; the vitality of prestige may be strengthened, expanded, or provided with a surplus colouring by the particular individuality of the possessor and recipient, but the *conditionality* of the phenomenon depends after all on the psychical situation of the two, and turns on the disproportionate character of the same; the same person, possessed of the same suggestive force, may be ridiculous in the eyes of one public and excite a feeling of homage in another; the African chief, whose dignified swagger is so well described by Stanley, doubtless enjoyed the most perfect prestige in his own village; the “great men” of the provincial towns often show up ridiculously in the capital, and a similar fate awaits the “prestige” possessor of the capital when in the country, etc. The possessor of prestige owes the same to his psychical situation.

§ 16. *The recipient of prestige.*—Prestige leaves its mark on the mind and conduct of its recipient; the drama of prestige plays in his world; the virtual existence of prestige is latent in his mind, its up-to-dateness modifies his



conduct—while the possessor of prestige often plays his part therein without mental participation or modification of behaviour.

1. *The race.* (a) *Signs of the reception of prestige in the animal world.*—If we may compare the psychical phenomena of the animal world with those of humanity, we might almost assert that in a primitive forest we come across no “*prestige*”-like spells. Let us attempt first of all to investigate those phenomena which may be regarded as prestige to be found in the animal world itself before man, the tamer and domesticator, had disturbed the stillness of the primitive wilderness. The abundance of data to hand on this point (in the cases of the eagles in the Russian steppe, of rabbits, monkeys, etc.), allows us to consider it probable that younger animals, in dealings with their elders, very often feel the existence of a kind of authority, which, however, is of very limited compass. Yet in this consciousness of authority we have evidently a psychical shadow of fundamental tendencies of organization that assume a more pronounced shape as old age approaches; an animal still in process of growth in every sinew and instinct feels potentially what in the older ones is already stereotyped; its affections and interest are certainly not rational, but merely instinctive. However, even in the animal world we come across individuals consistently treated with deference, of which, in his work on the psychical world of animals, Perty has plenty to tell us: “Even in the animal world,” he says, “there are certain eminent individuals, which in comparison with the other members of their species show a superiority of capability, brain power, and force of will, and obtain a *predominance* over the other animals.” Cuvier observed the same in the case of a buck which had only one horn; Grant tells us of a certain ourang-outang which got the upper hand of the rest of the

monkeys and often threatened them with the stick; from Naumann we hear of a clever crane which ruled over all the domestic animals and quickly settled any quarrels that arose among them. Parrots possess an authority with crows, probably on account of their superior intelligence and caution. In India, says Kropotkin, the crows fly a distance of miles to be able to spend the night in the company of parrots; snipe, again—probably owing to their well-known caution—often act as the leaders of more peaceable birds; the Kentish plover, when surrounded by birds of a more energetic species, is almost timid, but in the company of smaller birds undertakes to watch over the safety of its fellows. All these data, as well as numerous others of the same tenor, must be employed in general with caution, for the observer is often influenced by human intelligence and a sympathy for the animals in question; besides, it is scarcely possible to verify the observations by experiment; and they often come from one single or from not always reliable observers. However, there is no lack of absolutely reliable data either, which bear witness to a special treatment accorded in the animal world to particular individuals or species; of these special importance is due to an observation particularly emphasized by Darwin. Buxton, who, according to Darwin, had a splendid opportunity to investigate the matter, declares that his Macao parrots, which lived in the open air, in Norfolk, evinced an “extravagant” interest in a pair of birds living in a nest—so much so that, whenever the female bird left the nest, they flocked around her, and made a terrible noise “in her honour.” In the long series of instances we are unable to verify this single instance of a demonstration of an irrational and an instinctive character; we could not decide how much there is in it of chance, how much of it is in accordance

with rule: but the essence and reality of prestige is evidently wanting in all these instances. Colour and sound may have a certain suggestive effect, which is felt by animals; some part of the phenomenon may be due to sexual instinct or jealousy; it may also be attributable to the fact of being habituated to the company of a certain fellow-animal. But nowhere do we find any trace of the spell of distance or exclusiveness. Far more important than these somewhat obscure observations is the peculiar social mechanism of the animal world to be found in the mechanical following of the leaders of flocks and herds. But this obedience is so conspicuously instinctive, so genuine, and so little varying in substance and intensity, that it can hardly be identified with prestige. And—what is most important of all—leadership among animals is merely the initiation of imitation; and this imitation is successful in the case of the others too: there is no coming to a standstill, no stagnation; there can be no question of anything like prestige. This imitation, as a manner of defensive reaction, “is specialized by the part played by peculiar leading animals, which the flock follows blindly; this involves the advantage of the division of labour, for it is enough if one single animal is kept in observation” (Professor Groos). Bees are strong royalists; but the extent to which their selection of a queen is instinctive and strictly exclusive is proved by the fact that the smell of a strange queen forced on them makes them hate her; they kill her or torture her—though the same working bees prefer to die of hunger rather than allow their own queen to starve. There can be no question of the revival of the subjects’ instinct, unless the bees are by some artificial means made accustomed to the smell of the strange queen (Forel). Of bees Professor Breysig has well observed

that, though they constitute a State, we are not aware that they have any holidays. Among animals of a higher order we find intimate relations of rule and subservience such as might far rather be called authority than prestige. "Of many species of monkeys," says Topinard, "we know that they elect a chief exactly as human beings do, and that the said chief controls their activity and is obeyed by all." The chief, says Brehm, compels and receives absolute subservience. "At first he is obliged to use force, to fight to secure their complete subjection; but in a short time the respect he thus acquires lends him a deeply rooted authority, to which the others instinctively yield, using their best endeavours to win his good graces. On his part he is seriously anxious to preserve the welfare of his tribe; he is always on the watch, keeping his eyes open in all directions, as if he trusted nobody, and consequently he is almost always able to recognize any menace of danger in good time." If it is correct to denote leadership of this kind—which is to be found among other highly developed animals too—by a human word, Brehm (even from the point of view of our terminology) is right in calling it authority—though perhaps it is still more correct to call it "authority grafted on instinct."

In the works of Professor Duncan, Morgan, Perty and others we read of many cases of cunning hiding and the instilling of fear. The building of a nest in a hidden spot, the return home and escape by round-about ways, as well as the putting out and change of colour of the "phosphorescent way-lamps" of certain deep-sea fish on the approach of a powerful foe, are probably the highest degrees of development of the "psychology" of the struggle for existence, which is organical and often touchingly wonderful. To the same category belongs the pretence of death so



admirably carried out by numerous species of mammals, birds, and insects. An opossum attacked by a number of dogs simulates death, and not even the most savage bites can prevail upon it to relinquish its pretence. Numerous insects, too, assume an appearance of death on the approach of an assailant; but their simulation is rather a kind of involuntary paralysis due to fear, whereas the instinct of the opossum is far finer, for, when attacked by only one dog, it faces him without simulating.

We must include under the same heading "mimicry"—the imitation by animals of colours and forms.

But it is impossible not to observe two main features common to all these variations. One is the temporary character of these pretences—their assumption at the approach of the enemy or on his assuming the offensive—the *absolute lack* of anticipatory simulation, of a virtual pretence prepared to meet persons at a distance. The other is the *dominant instinctiveness* of the pretences in the case of animals. Accordingly, the conduct of animals become mechanic in simulation differs from that of men in two decisive points, in every stage of development.

Things are radically changed when animals are brought face to face with man. Some animals sympathize with men, and like to take part in their hunting and fighting, as the dog and the horse; others subject themselves as a result of force. Consequently men have succeeded in *domesticating* a number of species of animals. It is here that we find the first traces, in the animal world, of phenomena, reactions of conduct in the course of development, which, to a certain extent, remind us of the reception of prestige. The behaviour of a dog, says Darwin, which returns to its master after being



absent—or the conduct of a monkey, when it returns to its beloved keeper—is *far different from what these animals display towards beings of the same order as themselves*. In the latter case the expressions of joy seem to be somewhat less demonstrative, and all their actions evince a feeling of equality. Even Professor Braubach declares that *a dog looks upon its master as a divine person*. Brehm gives us a description of the tender respect shown towards his children by a chimpanzee that had been brought to his home and domesticated. “When we first introduced my little six-weeks-old daughter to him,” he says, “at first he regarded the child with evident astonishment, as if desirous to convince himself of its human character, then touched its face with one finger with remarkable gentleness, and amiably offered to shake hands. This trifling characteristic, which I observed in the case of all chimpanzees reared in my house, is worthy of particular emphasis, because it seems to prove that *our man-monkey describes and pays homage to that higher being, man, even in the tiniest child*. On the other hand, *he by no means shows any such friendly feelings towards creatures like himself—not even towards little ones*.” This attraction towards man is far more rational than any of our “prestiges.” But the dependence of this prestige-like relation, on the presence and peculiar role of man, is proved by the fact that the extent of domestication accommodates itself to the capability and ability to impress of the men concerned. “Australians, negroes, and Lapps have only half tamed the dog, because the latter everywhere assumes the character of its master; becoming wild again, it forgets how to bark, and is only able to howl” (Perty). According to Brehm, “only men are able to train animals, as is proved by every poodle in existence, or by the dogs

and cats of women living alone or of single women: these are generally spoiled and insolent. An animal requires earnestness and firmness of the person who trains it—not excessive tenderness or inconsistency.” Accordingly, tamed animals, including man’s most faithful companion, the dog, acquire their “prestige” reaction from the person of the human beings they come in contact with; by the tricks of training and habituation man has gradually rounded and made hereditary by selection those qualities of the animal which are best calculated to produce quietives in certain kinds of instinctive life and motives in the world of feeling. It is not impossible that the first step in the taming of animals was that hypnotic spell which even to-day, in dealing with certain animals, offers the only possible—if somewhat meagre—substitute for domestication. Catlin tells us that Indians tame young bisons and wild horses by blindfolding them and blowing a few times in their nostrils, a process that reduces the animals to a state of subjection and makes them voluntarily follow their tamers for several miles. Lions—particularly young ones—are fed from the hand at the beginning, first from outside, and then in their cages, the tamer at all times facing the animals. The latter stipulation, which is mentioned in so many variations in connection with lions, as well as the complaint of experienced tamers that lions “in captivity gradually become accustomed to the gaze of man, which consequently loses its power over them,” bears witness of some paralysing of instinctive life due to surprise, which is acute, but passes away and lacks the power of reproduction. In olden times the eyelid of a hawk was sewn down immediately after its capture, that the temporary loss of its sight might make the work of the tamer easier. The snake-charmers of Ceylon excite the naja by blows and rapid, threatening movements of

the hand, only to reduce it to motionlessness by monotone sounds, gentle taps, and slow gestures (Perty). These are all instances of mechanical and enchanting (hypnotic, mesmeric) intervention, which belongs only indirectly to the sphere of normal psychology.

If we exclude enchantments from the range of our investigations—regarding them as the psychical cohesion of two individuals—the limits of those phenomena which in the animal world remind us of prestige are narrowed down to domestication. In the primitive forest prestige is non-existent. For prestige to arise, there is need of the self-government, of the generalizing and energizing force of appearance; and this all, it seems, begins with man. In the immense possibilities of the jungle, the pampas, the desert, the air, and the ocean, distance is of no value; the absent are never in the right, and among the myriads of competitors and parasites only those who struggle and hold their own have any chance of being left in peace.

(b) *Savages*.—This requirement of struggle and holding one's own characterizes the expressions of respect of all savage peoples, too, without exception. It is with a proud self-consciousness that the Bushman counts the bodies of the men, women, and children, members of a hostile tribe, whom he has killed. The Indian of North America, says Sutherland, who within his own tribe is peaceful and obedient, regards as his noblest ornament the collection of enemies' scalps with which he decorates himself or his house. A young Sioux Indian cannot possibly get a squaw until he has scalped some one. The Nagas of the hills of Assam, the Alfuras of Ceram, and the natives of Formosa are required to bring in at least one bloody head of a foe before they can think of marrying. Similarly, in Australia the most glorious

moment in a man's life was the one when he hacked to pieces the body of a hostile tribesman. In such circumstances we can understand the pride of a member of one of the most ancient tribes of India in informing the British authorities of his splendid "record" of nine hundred and thirty-one murders (Sutherland). But, without touching on the strong contrast this barbarity towards the outside world offers to their gentleness within their own tribe, we would merely point out that in this stage—the very beginning—of human development we have authority, not prestige.

In every stage of the development of savage peoples we come across classical examples of mock kings—of the "primus inter pares," "duces ex virtute," *not* "ex nobilitate reges"—of rational and valued leaders. The savages of Chili elect as their chief the man who is able to carry the trunk of a tree farthest. In other places, military prowess, command of words, crafts, a knowledge of spells are the causal sources of the usually extremely trifling homage due to the chieftain. "Savage hordes in the lowest stage of civilization are organized, like troops of monkeys, on the basis of authority. The strongest old male by virtue of his strength acquires a certain ascendancy, which lasts as long as his physical strength is superior to that of every other male." Conscientious explorers of Tasmania and Australia of more recent times warn us against older descriptions suggestive of the existence of prestige. In Australia obedience, even on the field of battle, is left to every one's discretion, and, even if the really eminent member of a tribe possesses a power that is practically dictatorial, this power is always of causal origin, and ceases with its cause. Travellers of former days, says Sutherland, spoke of the "chiefs" of the Hottentots; now we know that the authority of these tribesmen was



extremely limited. Wallace tells us of the chieftainship of the forest tribes of Brazil being hereditary on the male side ; now we know it is only a question of a " spokesman " or " manager," who is supposed to assist all members. In the case of savages of a more advanced order, we find a certain development of the character of chieftainship, " but the leader has no personal claim on the obedience of any tribesman, still less on his servile homage." With the Indians of North America, according to Schoolcraft, warlike assemblies are presided over by the " elder " whose courage and heroism entitles him to enjoy a certain distinction—yet only if he is sage and eloquent enough to maintain his position : yet he is merely " the representative of public opinion, and the moment he falls foul of the latter, his power is at an end." A. W. Howitt tells us that in South-Eastern Australia numerous laws are in existence for the regulation of the intercourse of the sexes, their secret ceremonies, and meals, but that they obey the manifold laws and customs without being subject to the threats of any tribal authority, whether individual or collective, for any breach of the same. Howitt explains that the source of this obedience is the fact that, from his earliest childhood, the native is taught to believe that the breach of these laws or customs is immediately followed by some supernatural punishment. Let us take, for instance, the universal law, by virtue of which a husband and his mother-in-law are bound to a mutual avoidance of one another. I know of no law, says Howitt, which is more strictly observed. The belief is, namely, that any breach of this law involves a consequence of a magical character—*e.g.*, that the hair of the person guilty of breaking the law will grow grey before its time. The impersonal authority which compels respect for the laws of primitive peoples is public opinion or the supernatural. A tribal rule



is ordained and sanctioned either by democratic consensus or by a fear of premature grey hair, of a rash, of a disease, and, in particular, of death by enchantment. The retaliatory power of the "elders," who in other respects may be regarded as the depositaries of these primitive democracies, is confined to certain actions. With the Australians, too, the chieftainship can be acquired only by the valiant, the clever, the ready-tongued, the heroic; the "elder," as well as the chief's son, is compelled to give proof of his personal value before his authority is recognized. However close the connection here between age and authority, the authority of age grows and decreases in proportion to the eminence of its possessor. We find similar data in the carefully compiled works of Spencer and Gillen, those unwearied explorers of Central Australia. If a majority of the council of the Wyandots—T. W. Powell tells us—is agreed as to action, the sachem (tribal chief) does not speak, but may simply announce the decision. If we investigate carefully the psychological importance of the Shamans, wizards, and Coradchis, we shall find that formally it is just as causal as that of the primitive chieftain. Only the power of these enchanterers is connected with causalities of a superstitious (if not hypnotic) origin, but in any case *causalities*. The causalities deduced are often certainly ridiculous, but logically they are specious enough; and however comical the horn-worship of the negroes, the pot-worship of the Dyaks and Alfurs, etc., may seem, it is not possible to demonstrate any lack of *causality* in the respect for the Shamans due to such origins.

Only on those points where distances have been created, not by man, but by nature, do we find the first streaks of prestige illumined by the first flickering beams of conceptions—the difference in age, biological distance of man and woman, the mystical distances of the

animal world embodied in totemism and nahualism, the disparity of life and shadow, sleep and death, strung to the chords of society by primitive worship, etc. But of all these things we shall treat in another place. Their coming into existence points to the appearance of a more definite capacity on the part of man to recollect and wait eventualities.

(c) *Barbarians*.—However, beyond that given by nature, primitive society recognizes no other prestige, for the society of savages lacks the subjective conditions of prestige—settlement in large numbers and permanency. The lack of distance compels the savage to believe in verified values only, and to respect only persons who hold their own in his presence; this conspicuous clearness of the estimation of primitive peoples is the cause that has prevailed on us to dwell so long on this point. That the cause of this want of prestige among savages is the lack of concentration in masses, not any esoteric peculiarity, is proved by the profound psychological appreciation of the distances created by nature, and still more by the expansion of tribal life into a barbarian one. The tenfold increase of the number of a tribe renders difficult a logical, ethical, or aesthetic selection of a leader, as well as an intuitive control of spells and superstitions. At Athens, in 309 B.C., to 20,000 citizens and 10,000 strangers, there were about 400,000 slaves; in Rome, Caesar himself was surrounded by a body of slaves probably more numerous than the vast majority of savage tribes; San Domingo was once the home of 30,000 slave-masters, 15,000 overseers, and 400,000 slaves. According to the trustworthy calculations of Sproat, in every old tribe consisting of 200 members, some 50 possessed various grades of acquired or hereditary rank, while the number of slaves must have been the same, and the remainder were independent tribesmen, whereas among

the most highly civilized nations to-day about 80 per cent. belong to the so-called "lower classes." Babylon and Assyria, Egypt and Rome, collected many hundreds of thousands, Hindustan and China hundreds of millions of beings into one organization of power. The expansion of the limits of religions caused enormous Shaman distances to come into existence; the prophet who had to deal with 200 men was replaced by the prophet who found himself in psychical relation with 500,000,000 Buddhists, etc.

The dramatic *mise en scène* of human prestige coincides with the first appearance of this concentration in masses, and triumphs with its triumph. The usual process is as follows: (1) in nomadic life the slave was a burden, in settled life wealth, consequently he was allowed to live; but, as by letting him live and tolerating him in their midst his masters reduced the effectiveness of the anthropological characteristics of slavery, they endeavoured to extend prejudice by dissociative exclusiveness. True; the slave too came from *afar*, but the war of which he was a product was preceded by prejudice or of the formulation of an aim of strong effect; the conqueror *knows* or *feels* with whom he has to deal, when he takes his foe captive. For this reason he is able to shut himself off from these distant persons, who are distant *without spell*. According to Tacitus, with the ancient Germans slaves were rarely tortured or put in chains; more frequently it happened that they were beaten to death without warning, "as enemies are beaten to death." (2) In the mind of the slave we find the presence of a parallel change. A person under racial prejudice is himself prejudiced; his complete exclusion renders this psychical accommodation necessary. The Avenues of San Francisco show no more profound contempt for the Chinese quarters than the latter shows for the Avenues; the nobles and peasants felt no greater scorn for

the Ghetto of the Middle Ages than the Ghetto did for them; the contempt of the gipsy caravan and the town is mutual. It is only with emancipation that the process becomes onesided. Emancipation means that, owing to psychological or economic causes, the racial prejudice is no longer able to assert itself; on the one hand it has lost colour, on the other it has proved too narrow. Thereby, however, the primitive distinctive marks of master and servant are condemned to death; and the instinct of self-preservation compels the servant to attack, the master to defend himself. By psychological means or conditions the master stops the progress of the assailant at all points where such means or conditions are capable of asserting themselves. (3) The society thus formed, divided into slaves and masters, engaged in further wars against the outside world. The country being replete with slaves, the object of the fresh wars is conquest. The conqueror sets himself to rule the conquered territory, bringing with him the fame of his terror, and his strength, and the spell of his distance; for the conqueror generally speaking loathes or knows the conquered as object of his conquest, but the conquered does not necessarily loathe or know the conqueror, whose distance for this very reason will probably be conspicuous the moment he invades the country. Consequently the settled conqueror appears in the consciousness of the conquered people as the possessor of a significant sentimental value. But how is this sentimental value maintained even when, after the completion of the conquests, it becomes causally meaningless, and when the memory even of the causes fades away after the lapse of one or two generations? The dynamic force of the sentiment of authority is limited; what power, then, keeps it alive far beyond these limits? It would be stretching logic too far to imagine, for the sake of our proposition, that the



conquerors are so many cunning thaumaturges, capable by conscious *raffinement* of seizing hold of the capacity of the conquered to remember and forget. On the contrary! Prestige, the art of generalizing and preserving values, has its own pioneers, and claims its own martyrs, just as aviation and the South Pole. If we pass in review the bitter psychological struggles of modern imperialism to enthrall a small African or Australian tribe, and the frequent psychological errors of Spanish, German, and French colonization, we shall perhaps have some idea of the enormous psychological difficulties attendant on the captivating of *hundreds of millions*. We admit the difference is significant when we regard the objects. Modern imperialism makes severe demands on savages—concentration, work; whereas ancient imperialism demanded of its subjects only negative things—distraction, and the being satisfied with little. The monotony of customs of the large conquered societies of yore, the sleepy stereotyped character of occupations and views, practically afforded a “ready-made” negativeness. Yet the conqueror required a considerable psychological value to enable him to bind this ready machine to his *person*, and to provide that the conquered should be accustomed, not only to their ancestors, but to their conquerors too. Military defence rendered necessary the isolation of fortified positions, occupied by the conquerors only, who, while keeping a keen eye on the horizon, were themselves invisible. The psychological significance of these castles and fortified positions—these “eyries” rising majestically on the summit of precipitous rocks, which the tourist even to-day is unable to approach without a *guide*—vies with their military importance. Even a cursory investigation shows us how much *unintentional* preservative power follows as a result of the invasion of a conqueror.

(4) Similar displacements are found in the religious life of



the conquered and the conquerors. The necessarily cautious exclusiveness of the whole world of conquerors has thus quite unintentionally created a prestige with those with whom caution is in vain and, owing to the non-disturbance of their customs, continues to be meaningless. *This prestige is the result of the strange, peculiar struggle for existence of the conquerors*, and extends the process of conquest; it is as if the rusty arms so long laid by were continuing to fight invisibly; the battle won loses its episodic character and becomes enhanced in importance, transfigured to a virtual force, a possibility recurring automatically. The preservation has been rendered possible, and the exertions of the fighters easier, by the monotony of customs and the predominantly negative unity of the vast masses of the conquered. All the conquerors have desired of them is that *they shall not remark something*—and this the conquered knew quite well of their own accord.

(d) *The type.*

“Alla virtù latina  
O nulla manca o sol la disciplina.”

TASSO.

The type, as minimum, is appreciated even by the most sceptical inquirers into the racial question. Bismarck said, “It is just as important to be acquainted with people’s characters as with their interests.” But the type or character, or the essential point found in the case of savages, barbarians, or civilized men, is in each case of different material. A *type* is the sum of all those permanent and universal features which we are able to observe in the case of a certain number of men, and which distinguish them from other groups. In a race such permanent and universal features are those displayed by the life of the

constitution ; in barbarians, soulless movements ; in civilized men, a uniformity of thinking. Most current definitions of the type seem to be forced. What is typical may be illustrated in all three grades, but, so far as we are aware, no one has yet succeeded in grouping the features of character thus appearing according to their value. Perhaps we shall be better able to approach the question with success if we proceed negatively and say : What the type is, we do not know, but we do know what is *not* the type ; for (both in men and features) the type and the non-type are separated by an extensive neutral zone. That is no type which is necessarily conspicuous compared with the type, though otherwise a completely objective value ; the man who excites to a combat, or the idea of whom is contributed to in strict association by a mood for combat, quite independent of all other conceivable effects, is not typical. In a savage instinctive racial exclusiveness, in a barbarian a breach of custom, in a civilized man a peculiarity of thinking, as opposed to our conception of some man or group, means that we have to deal with a non-typical person. We have already seen the two first groups ; let us now take a cursory glance at the third. Community of surroundings, heredity, and history may produce a kind of uniform rhythm in the mechanism of thought without the uniformity extending necessarily over the whole of any particular nation, though the thought-forms of language make the *national* a peculiarly suitable framework for a uniform rhythm of thought of this kind. When we speak of German, English, French, Italian, or Hungarian thought, we desire to denote a more rapid or slower conscious alternation of the rule of the intellectual or the sentimental ; but our sensitiveness to such distinctions at most enables us to presume with approximate certainty to deny the German, French, English, etc., typicalness of somebody. Let us imagine to

ourselves that the type of thought is absolutely objective—*e.g.*, when we read the novel or essay of a writer of an unknown nationality in an English translation. As the copying and aping of other nations has for centuries been universal, our intuition must now confine itself to negatives ; this or that speech could not have been delivered by an Englishman, this or that book cannot have been written by a Frenchman, etc. A person going any further according to the rules in general currency, would probably overshoot the mark, and would be inclined to dub many a wit of Munich and Berlin “a real French *esprit*.” No doubt there is a kind of thought, of expression, which we could not possibly conceive of in connection with Dickens ; but we cannot define the form of thought by which he differs from all other types of thinkers. When Prime Minister of England, Disraeli was always felt to be a foreigner ; why was Luzzatti not treated as such in Italy ? Unless we are mistaken, the principle of this differentiation is not decided by the greater or less measure of external difference. Besides the huge scale of external differences within the type, the hundredfold possibilities of external equalization (clothes, head-dress, acquirement of manners, etc.) are at the disposal of persons outside the type. But Disraeli’s rhythm of thought betrayed the non-type, whereas Luzzatti’s did not. Keeping these reservations in view, let us attempt to probe the conduct of *typical* thought in dealing with prestige. From what has been said, it is evident that what we intend to say refers, not to the solution, but merely to the illustration of the question.

Few distinctive features of the non-typical person are so pronounced as the remarkable degree of credulousness and reverence that regulates his thought over against his fellow-men. Jewish thought, for instance, in these points shows a certain rapid changeability of the sentimental and logical,

of which we may certainly say that it is not English, not German, not Hungarian—with somewhat less certainty than that it is not French, and still somewhat less certainty than that it is not Italian, not Armenian. It is undoubtedly history that has developed the Jewish type into something different from the English, German, and Hungarian; this type becomes expanded and spreads out, but, even if no longer uniform racially, it is always in the main not English, not German, not Hungarian. Even in such cases where the exterior does not present any such sharp contrast as it does between Anglo-German and Jewish types—*e.g.*, Spaniards and Jews, Jews and Hungarians—we shall find large numbers of Jews whose thought (however superior the ethical or intellectual substance of the same may be) will at once betray the non-type, the non-Spaniard or non-Hungarian.

Non-types are thrown into sharp relief by nothing so strikingly as by the rapidity and consistency of the judgments of men. History has amassed in the type the potency of enthusiasm and derision; and the type is able to recognize the non-type from nothing so nicely as from the divergent proportion of enthusiasm and derision when the divergence is permanent and universal. The intensive or extensive husbandry of enthusiasm and derision seems to denote the highest degree of discipline within and exclusiveness as against the outside world: where enthusiasm and derision change suddenly and frequently, discipline is slack, and the exclusiveness is uncertain; but where enthusiasm has become stereotyped in the form of reverence, and derision has assumed the seriousness of contempt, discipline is firm and the exclusiveness clearly defined. Most probably it is by this that the type recognizes the non-type, in the civilized stage: where people indulge frequently in derision and



become suddenly roused to enthusiasm, as in the case of Jews, Italians, and Frenchmen, where we meet a readiness to deify and suspect—we are struck by the earnestness of Englishmen, the faithfulness of Germans, the heavy calmness of Hungarians, and vice-versa: the overreaching of the prestige of the moment is just as conspicuous in the eyes of those who confine themselves to virtual prestige as is the contrary. There is a historical cause for this and that type, just as no type—in its own place—is without utility in the history of the world. Yet we have no data to prove that in a different historical situation, in a different *milieu*, this or that type would not be able to completely change its husbandry of prestige; all that is necessary is fresh proportions of distance, new possibilities of human self-assertion. Frenchmen, Anglo-Saxons, and Dutchmen settled in America become *non-types* of their kin in Europe: for in America men must be regarded as *other* than in Europe; the force and rapidity of human values are different, as are their relative positions and the light in which they are viewed.

2. *The individual element in the recipient of prestige.*—

(a) The interdependence of the *climate* and human thought is of influence in man's nervous system; and this influence, though perhaps not of primitive profoundness, is so universal that, when men stand face to face, it appears in both parties in the same manner; however, we must keep in mind the disparity of the two parties; the one faces the other as object—consequently the nervous system of the *recipient* will display the *cosmic* conditions of prestige.

The heat of the desert acts depressingly on analysis, on the critical faculty, and on the will; all the more does it excite the imagination, the desires. With his dramatic conciseness Kipling tells us that in India nothing need be



taken too seriously—the *midday sun always excepted*. While the stifling heat thus weakens intellectual initiation, the Ossianic dimness subjectively increases the difficulty of analysis and the appreciation of distance. Let us think merely of the colouring of the evening, the dusky mysticism of the twilight. The torrid zone and the summer are more favourable to the coming into being of prestige—the North and the winter to its maintenance. In the North the intellect is, generally speaking, cooler, competition is more fierce, aims are more clearly defined, the will is stronger; prestige finds an approach to the nervous system of a Greenlander more difficult than to that of a Zulu; on the other hand, a prestige already in existence, under equal conditions, is probably easier to maintain in the broken sentences of men who speak little, in the dimness bordering on snow-fields; the lack of colour and variety provides the prestige of the North with the potency of permanency. Measured more narrowly, the effect of summer and winter shows an identical dissolution. But the cosmic influences create only a disposition, not necessity. Winter overcrowding forces the Eskimos to idleness and affords an opportunity for religious and legendary exaltations, whereas “in summer life becomes as it were worldly; only the commonest medical forms of magic are left, and their ceremonies are simple.” The same is told us by Professor Breysig of the Columbians. For these fishing people, too, winter is a time of rest and festivals; and at these periods their exclusive alliances come so prominently into the foreground that winter is called by them the feast of secrets. We see what manifold factors are at work even beneath the cosmic appearance; we see what reckless generalizations are connected with the influence of the seasons, and the quarters of the globe. As with all

other phases of our conduct, our investigation of man too becomes more and more independent of the cosmic; the endless series of finer, more human factors forces it back and counteracts it.

(b) *Normality*.—In a sound mind the reception of prestige causes no disturbance of balance; and the incontinent catching at different prestiges is just as much a sign of mental aberration as is the desperate clinging to the same unique prestige. The inclination for prestige naturally depends on the temperament of the recipient. Hot-blooded men receive it more rapidly, but preserve it less persistently, than persons of a cool or melancholy disposition. But, generally speaking, there is room in a sound mind for a large contingent of prestiges without causing any morbid disturbance of the mental processes; for the moment the latter threatens to appear, the sound mind closes its door or orders the superfluous prestige out. The happy harmony of physical and mental activity which once prevailed in Athens, or in *old merry England*, without by any means excluding prestige, evidently tolerated only healthy proportions of it. The resistance of a tired and underfed workman, who sleeps little, must be extremely feeble; where this psycho-physical *minus* is joined to a lively nervous life, it results in a rash reception of prestige, in credulity; and where the nervous life mourns in company with the constitution, the result is a *blasé* acquiescence in prestige, a servile bowing before and mechanical copying of older human values. The pathology of prestige will be treated separately; for the present we would merely point to those poisons which blunt the attention and excite the imagination. Of objective factors probably none create and preserve so much superfluous prestige as spirituous liquors and opium. However, this group of causes is at the same time a group of effects too. Why

is this? How is it possible? Our unfortunate brethren look to alcohol and opium only as the causes of their sentiments.

(c) *The sexes and the reception of prestige.*—Under similar circumstances a woman is more ready in imagination, enthusiasm, admiration, personal worship, psychical devotion to others—in general, more passive—than a man. Under the pressure of her history and economic situation, she tires more rapidly, is more distracted, and more easily led. The average woman lives the best part of her life in and for love, and—usually unconsciously—regards the majority of life's events under the anonymous depression of love. In the position of the average woman to the male sex there are developed primitive opportunities of passivity, of sentimental generalization, of personification. The fundamental mood of the average woman's mind—which is passively sexual, but extended far beyond the sensual, and refined in the process of continual self-defence—is latent in all sentiments existing outside that of love, as a guiding motive of unconscious profundity.

Every love in a woman's heart increases the universal possibility of the entrance of prestige. Sentiments do not usually stop at the limits observed by the conceptions we have formed of them. In particular, a life-giving fundamental sentiment that so faithfully accompanies the instinct and incites the blood, as does a woman's love, pervades every experience of the soul like psychical perfume. The sentiment felt by a woman in love towards the man of her choice is itself the greatest, the most perfect, and most successful kind of prestige in the world—a prestige which is not due to chance, nor to the bungling activity of man, but a masterpiece of nature, the result of a repeated activity of her will, and ensouled of her soul. Although the force of love in the heart of a man is more in-

toxicating, this force is less equable, and prestige acquires less of it. For a woman, however, the man she loves (above and beyond his sexual value) is above all not a logical, ethical, or aesthetic, but a psychological value. She is *affected* by the man, who claims all her sentiments, incites them to action, and binds them to his person; the desire for a lasting psychical union endeavours to blot out all unfavourable images and to emphasize all favourable ones, but at the same time looks for the *Other* in the man, and strives to eliminate the *Ego*, the womanly; among men only poets—the Dantes, Petrarchs, and Brownings—are able to love so profoundly, with so much psychical art, as the average woman; if from anywhere, it is from the hearts of women and poets in love that the constant irradiation of prestige which passes beyond love, or, indeed, beyond the beloved person, proceeds. In a woman's soul love need not be momentarily present to create prestige; the psychological fundamental motive of prestige is virtually afforded by the disposition of her constitution and the development of her individuality, by reminiscence and expectation.

If love is the primitive "accumulator" of the actuality and intensity of prestige, motherhood, with the accompanying constitutional aptness and psychical suitableness, is a splendid instrument for the preservation and extension of prestige. Calvin reminded the captive women of Paris of those women who had stood beneath the cross of Christ. "The Saviour was deserted then even by his apostles! but the women, with remarkable steadfastness, remained on the spot." Every woman in love is a bit of a Jacobin; every mother is a bit of a Legitimist. Of courtesans, Balzac said that they were born Legitimists. No: the courtesan fights for legitimation, for the stopping of the fleeting moments—that is why she supports the



*ancien régime.* The born Legitimist is the mother, who cannot be anything else but a permanent, a divine automaton: the wars of the Red and White Roses—inflam-mableness and conservatism, love and motherhood—sweep in this manner over the appreciation of man of the average woman.

But even this genetic inclination does not raise itself to the character of a law; it creates prestige, but does not preserve it in every case; only in similar circumstances does it render susceptible and more suitable. The inevitable process of conceiving and compelling a man to competition considerably shortens the “beautifying distance” of the stronger sex; it is the man who is most absolutely conceived and completely compelled to competition who is the goal of feminism; and an approach to this goal will probably weaken the constitutional and psychical preliminary conditions of prestige in both directions (love and motherhood); man’s spell for woman has already lost force, as has the conservatism of mothers; at present it is impossible to tell whether these changes will finally result in a confusion or in a clearing up of development.

(*d*) *Age and the reception of prestige.* — Impulsiveness is, generally speaking, characteristic of childhood, intellectual passivity of old age. A child’s credulity is fresh, spontaneous, original, and keeps strictly to the dynamic direction of its development; in a child’s mind there is not an atom more than is constitutionally inevitable of concentration or automatism. Its credulity, as it were, enters the service of its development, but never degenerates into a selfish aim; it is a sail-swelling wind, not a mast-breaking storm; a child, so to say, rather creates the sentimental variation of authority, and this reminds us more of religion than of prestige; it does not receive human values until it has copied them

*with its whole soul.* For this reason the average child, though it feels in advance in the direction of its growth—though a child of six prefers the company of children of eight to nine years to that of comrades of the same age, whereas its affection does not increase with the growth of the difference in age, and a child of six generally prefers the company of children of eight to nine years to that of older ones of fifteen to sixteen years. The average child, I say, experiences a feeling that the conduct and words of children of eight to nine years betray something of the nature of a programme; the latter understand his language, and their movements still remind us of his movements—only that their dolls and balls have gone one drawer lower down. He is still conscious of the few years' difference in age; his suggestions, the tension of his growth as it were, enable him potentially to advance himself and to seek the company of those who change this advance "for cash." The tension of growth and training accounts for the authority of parents. That of the father is the more intensive; and Baldwin is right when he says that the child's first god is his father. But this sentiment of value has its own rational explanation. Every one looks up to the head of the family; the dinner is kept waiting for him; he provides for schooling; it is he who consults the doctor in private when a child is ill. His authority possesses a prestige too—but only in comparison with that of the mother: during the day the father is not very much at home—he is the man of absence and earnestness; on the other hand, beyond the father, the prestige does not increase in proportion to the distance; this prestige, too, still possesses a kind of constitutional character. Scarcely a single minister or banneret is capable of giving the king so unconcerned an answer as a little shepherd-boy whom the monarch addresses in the country.

The child is a keen-eyed critic of his tutor, his teacher; the "prestige" legends of conceited pedagogues are made to look very silly when we think of the caricatures, long faces, and derisive mimicry with which the young fry are used to "speed" the tutor or master leaving the classroom with a majestic pose. Even among themselves children do not very often confine themselves to psychological values; they are full-blown democrats even without compulsion. An English boy who does nothing, writes Escott, is not popular, nor has he any authority in his school. He lives without any recognized position in the little world, which is a miniature edition of the great world he is about to enter. The only essential condition to his obtaining some rank or authority among his schoolfellows and contemporaries is, that he must do some work. This fate follows him to the close. At the universities, idlers are ignored; the only people who are anybody at all are those who really learn and—athletes. In a child we find powerful sentimental values; but they are confined to the narrow limits of a restricted observation. The period between the ages of fourteen and seventeen usually brings the first great crisis of life. Of this critical age James, Starbuck, and others have observed that boys often lose their balance and become enthusiasts. But a child who is at loggerheads with himself and profoundly dispirited, and morbidly exaggerates his worthlessness and imperfection, is still for the most part proof against the perversions of the observation of human perspectives; he does not even then insure the fate of his values by human appearances, but by new human values, or by an intensive conversion to the superhuman.

The "prestige" behaviour of old age is the exact counterpart of that of childhood. While in the case of a child the progress of prestige is obstructed by the powerful

directness of the sentiment of value, in that of old men the monotony of the reminiscences of value, mechanical, exclusive, and tending deathwards, deprives automatism of its material of sentiment—the machine runs on, as it were empty. New prestige is not admitted by old age; and the older ones gradually lose colour. The older prestiges have stolen in among the wrinkles of the old soul, and have become *ego*, a prejudice. In reproducing the reminiscences of this snow-covered prestige, the old man is practically only reproducing himself:—

“Was ich besitze, seh’ ich wie im Weiten—

Und was verschwand, wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten.”

In this reproduction old age revives; these experiences were once of considerable help to the tension of life and the instincts of self-maintenance—for this reason memory readily dips deeply into them. Now they are able to decorate old age with the colour of life, the haunting mood of *what is not yet pure mechanism*. This mechanism is not the automatism of prestige; it is not the *Other* that is revived in it, but the old man himself, who in these highly coloured reproductions is, as it were, the mimicry of his own youth. That leader-writer in the seventies!—only he could write! The world is sadder, more trivial, less full of substance—for those old statesmen are dead, and the old shops have been closed! And the ancient books of the dust-ridden libraries, which were so much wiser and more moral than those of to-day—their type so much more legible, their binding more artistic! Where are the women of yore, the stalwart men and the balls of old, the servants and the masters of days gone by? Evidently things are not as they should be. Forty years ago!—only the golden ears of those days are visible now; there is



no sign of the chaff and the tares ! The old man feels only the life-giving mood of whilom *possibilities*—only their joy, not their objective two-sidedness. But this blessed indulgence of appearances of old age is autonomous : the constitution does what it does for its own sake. Neither the freshness of childhood nor the self-reproduction of old age is favourable to the reception of prestige. Under peculiarly favourable circumstances, however, premature childhood, too, may become mechanical ; and we do find old ages, like that of Gladstone, with all the freshness of spring.

§ 17. *Survey of the importance of the recipient.*—We have endeavoured to test the “prestige”-importance of the recipient by the (a) *racial* and (b) *individual* touchstones of human life. *Nowhere have we found necessary conditions of prestige*—merely an enhanced inclination to assert the outward conditions and means of prestige. We have seen that in all instances of this inclination everything points *outward*—denoting the *situation*, and emphasizing the *appearance*. Our second station is, leaving the recipient, to investigate the outward centre, the person possessed of prestige, from the following point of view : by the aid of what conditions, or means, does he force his prestige on recipients possessed or not of this inclination ? We know already that the recipient is not compelled *necessarily* to receive prestige by any motive pre-social or extra-social, nor is he *necessarily* exempt from such compulsion. Objectively speaking, every man is capable of prestige ; but in the ideal *destination* of man the reception of prestige is lacking. The recipient admits the prestige of certain men, and refuses that of others ; another recipient perhaps does the reverse. There is no absolute appearance of prestige ; we cannot admit a prestige which is the same

everywhere. To find the source of prestige we must give our whole attention to this relativeness—to find some proportion between possessor and recipient: and now, leaving out of the question the recipient, we must try to discover what is the peculiar “prestige” value, and what are those proportions which produce prestige.

## BOOK II





## PART I

### THE POSSESSORS OF PRESTIGE

§ 18. *Intentionality and consciousness in the possession of prestige.*—Aristocrats, scholars, dandies do not necessarily display prestige-creating conduct with any tendency to another consciousness. The mediaeval knight secreted in his castle desired physical security, not that psychological security won by him as a result of his exclusiveness. A "respectable woman," exercising self-restraint either on moral grounds or from fear, does not maintain her virginity for the sake of prestige; yet her self-restraint is just as productive of prestige as that of women who act in a like manner merely as prestige-hunters. This unintentionality is finely described by a French novel, which shows evidence of a fine knowledge of human nature. A poet lost in reading was sitting on a promenade on the Riviera. He was so immersed in his book that he neither saw nor heard; and the many-coloured wave of humanity passing to and fro before him remained unobserved. But *just because* he did not look up at the people walking in front of him, at first he awoke the interest of imitative tension, which, finding no outlet, resolved itself into the obscurity of homage. People began to regard with embarrassment the man lost in thought who did not even remark them. Here we have an instance

of prestige being unintentionally acquired by a person wrapped in his book, who took his seat on the sunlit strand with the pure and single intention of reflecting, and who at the moment was occupied with nothing less than *lo gran disio dell' eccellenza*. And the person possessed of prestige does not always stand face to face with the person whom his prestige affects. His conduct towards somebody may create prestige in the eyes of a third person. And just as prestige is not necessarily intentional, so it is not necessarily conscious—as it is not a vital condition of love that the person beloved should become aware of it. Consequently this or that intellectual or volitional value of the possessor is not a *conditio sine qua non* of the possession of prestige; it is not imperative that he should be either the artist or the virtuoso of the psychological result in which he participates, which is due solely to his psychological *situation*. If he is an artist, virtuoso, or good artisan in the field of practical psychology, the involuntary or intentional accommodation of his situation to the psychological scale of values will probably be carried out more easily, more nicely, and more accurately. But this is merely a gift—not the everywhere recurring essence of prestige. Such a suzerainty of a possessor is also unable to create anything but *situation*. A situation of equal value may be granted even where the possessor lacks creative power; other times, other men, other constellations, people long dead, circumstances tending by chance in the same direction, may create prestige; and even the most minute psychological nicety is sometimes incapable of doing so, despite its strenuous efforts. No: the man enjoying prestige is not necessarily a hypnotizer endowed with psychological super-force—not necessarily a poet reading in the souls of men; prestige possesses one

quality by which it lives, without which it cannot exist, the depreciation of which involves the death of prestige, viz., its *psychological situation*. This proposition of ours we shall endeavour to compare with other possible explanations.

§ 19. *Prestige and vanity*.—The endeavour of our supposed, desired, or real values to secure recognition—i.e., vanity—may at most take its place among those motives which impel a man to the acquirement and preservation of prestige; but vanity is not an essential element of prestige, and in very many cases prestige is acquired and maintained without vanity. Often, indeed, it is vanity that damages prestige; an endeavour to please, artificiality, and “push” more than once spring from vanity in such a manner as to deal prestige a mortal wound; on the other hand, the points of view of prestige frequently force those of vanity into the background: speakers inspired by prestige use different language to those led by vanity; and, even in the case of a woman’s toilet, from the question of colour to that of the extent of *décolletage*, the advice offered by prestige is quite other than that dictated by vanity.

§ 20. *Prestige and ambition*.—Continuing our investigation of the instincts and feelings combinable with prestige, we would in conclusion devote a short time to the consideration of ambition, the desire for fame. Prestige and ambition overlap one another causally just as little as do prestige and vanity. To understand the separation of prestige and ambition we could probably not do better than follow Dante, in whose words are reflected with equal force the bitterness he felt at the ephemerality of the former—its relativity and the burdens it lays on genuine values, and the thirsting desire of the glory, which glows through so many of his lines: *ut palmam tanti bravii*

*primus in meam gloriam adipiscar.* "With the whole power of his soul," says Professor Burckhardt, "he strove after poetic laurels; as publicist and *littérateur* too he emphasized the essential novelty of his creations, declaring that he was not only the first to essay the paths he trod, but that he desired that the world should recognize the fact. But even in his prose writings he touches on the inconveniences of surpassing glory; he knows how dissatisfied and disappointed some persons become when they make the personal acquaintance of men of renown, and explains that it is due partly to the childish fantasy of men, partly to jealousy, but partly also to the unstraightforwardness of the person in question." And it is he—the man who is openly ambitious—who sings as follows in the *Purgatorio*:

"Non è il mondan rumore altro ch' un fiato  
 Di vento, ch' or vien quinci ed or vien quindi,  
 E muta nome, perchè muta lato . . .  
 La vostra nominanza è color d' erba,  
 Che viene e va. . . ."

Does satisfied ambition always, and of necessity, result in prestige? We know that ambition can tend towards prestige-less objects too! Do the wrestler in the circus, who throws his opponent, the "queen of the ballroom," the triumphant demagogue, and the most eminent singer, whose ambition has been satisfied, necessarily possess any prestige? No; there is not even any justification for the statement that, under equal circumstances, a greater measure of ambition involves a greater probability of prestige—that it necessarily means a surplus of energy tending towards the acquirement of prestige. How often we find ambition actually *injurious* to prestige—how often panting ambition overleaps the bounds of prestige—enticing prestige to issue from the



obscurity of its reserve; how often it throws into the conflict a man who is *hors concours*! Ambition is just as little a primitive source or explanation of prestige as vanity is; both the one and the other—even if they possess degrees ethically alarming—are in their fundament sovereign: they serve the desire of the *Ego* for self-assertion and preservation, and are often merely the universal settings of the struggle for existence, and of the primitive desire for self-preservation.

On the other hand, prestige is a psychological *situation*, in which we are placed, which may be given according to the suitability of our psychological values, in proportion to favourable chances, without any desire or intention on our part, even without our knowledge; it is not an essential element of any psychical quality of the possessor of prestige. From Petrarch to Bismarck prestige has often been spoken of as a burden, of which the speakers fought shy and yet participated in it; it is true that the possessor of prestige as it were determines the recipient's standard and guides his judgment, and is himself under the governance of psychological laws, and owes everything to his *psychological situation*—*e muta nome perchè muta lato*. Prestige is not the special experience of *one* man, not an individual fate, not a special life-destiny; it is the common lot of several men, in which only the parts are distributed in manifold ways; it is no longer an individual but a *social* fact.

§ 21. *Conflict, competition, imitation*.—Men's behaviour to one another consists of visible and invisible movements: active conduct, and invisible thought, appreciation.

Prejudice means that our feelings and instincts greet somebody's image with spontaneous contradiction. The *conflict* may begin; the new arrival may win his way through, or may fall in the attempt. His fate is the fall or triumph of the primeval forest; only that this conflict



has become (with the exception of *the sexual struggle between man and woman*) an abnormity, a crime, or game; what is conspicuously odd, the coarseness that does not accommodate itself to the feelings, becomes more and more difficult of observation; to-day there is scarcely a war which the masses engage in with hatred of one another; indeed, the Reformations, Revolutions, and even the great innovations, as Nietzsche says, tread noiselessly, like doves.

All the more universal are in society: *competition* and *imitation*. Within certain groups the needs of the animal constitution are to a great measure similar. The needs of men too. The number of means required is limited: hence arises *competition*. Only that man does not compete with all those with whom, objectively, he might or should be compelled to compete. Monopolists still continue to compete; only instead of economic means they resort to political ones—*e.g.*, the trusts, with their paid parliaments and judges. A man exhibiting *hors concours* does compete with the other exhibitors; only the recognition he desires is not that determined by the jury. But if *A* does not feel—though objectively he should—that the needs of *B* are similar to his own, or if *A* feels that his own power or situation is disproportionately greater or less, there is no competition. *Competition exists between persons only who are alike*. It sounds like a commonplace; yet it is an often-forgotten fundamental phenomenon of society, which opens the way to a psychological adulteration of natural competition. The greatest conquests, the oldest established dynasties, have taken their origin, not from competition, but from other individuals renunciation of competition. It is not only the stronger that may win, but also a man against whom we *consider* competition hopeless, or whom we *do not observe* to be a *competitor*; the power of the *je ne sais quoi* is the greatest

power. A child competes with everybody; but as his age advances the number of *competitors* gradually decreases, without their standing aside out of his way. Our instinct of self-preservation, the tension of reproduction, slackens and loses its psychological vitality in our dealings with thousands of men and groups.

But we may ask whether the failing vitality of competition is not succeeded by *imitation*. In our dealings with a man with whom we should like, but are unable, to compete, we strive to reproduce the supposed personal conditions of the competition. The cause of the imitation is the contemplation of a *homogeneous overbalance*. This overbalance observed in another person may be the rough multiplication of a numerator standing above our denominator; this variation appears in most so-called *crowd-phenomena*, in social phenomena based on rhythm and practice, in the spell of the majority, etc. The common denominator may further, in the case in question, correspond to something virtual; and then the actuality of the latter becomes more probable. There are, finally, men and qualities objectively inimitable. If these are, however, connected with us by powerful associations, we copy them slavishly.

But we must not forget, even in this connection, that of *imitations* objectively possible, only those can really come into being which seem to be possible subjectively too. The path of our inclinations, desires, and interest is crossed by thousands of men, who deprive us of our bread and of glory, of sunshine and the intensity of life, who meet with people who listen to them, follow them, and serve them—thousands of men weaker, more worthless, worse than ourselves—thousands of *rivals*, whom we do not recognize as *competitors*—thousands of men similar or hardly different, whom we can overtake, have overtaken, or left behind, but whom we still regard as inexplicable,

different, men of another denominator, to be copied only mechanically, but not to be replaced. And in our dealings with those who interest and excite us, whom we long for, whose fate impels us, whom we burn to possess, but whom we are nevertheless incapable of considering as competitors or as imitable, our contemplation, our conduct, is unable to maintain a sovereign character; it becomes confused, embarrassed, and without any one to guide it, breaks down before the *Other* surpassing our knowledge and capabilities. This derangement of our thought and conduct means that we have come under the influence of the *prestige* of the person or group with which we are dealing.

§ 22. *The psychical preliminaries of competition and imitation.*—These are the psychical experiences of competition and imitation, the external motional part of which is merely the corollary of the psychical preliminaries referred to. And when we observe an irrational failure to compete, and the degradation of imitation to mere mechanical copying, we must try to investigate the changes that have happened to the *psychical preliminaries*. As we have said, competition exists only between persons who are *alike*; and imitation springs from the contemplation of a *homogeneous* overbalance. When we observe a failure to compete and a half finished imitation, we have evidently to deal with a case where *this similarity is lacking*—whether in reality or only in the *subjective feeling*. The question is: What is our view of the men or groups in dealing with which we do not think of competition and are incapable of imitation? From the simple facts and the every-day practice of the social life of man, we must endeavour to gather those *values* which save us from competition and dissuade us from imitation.

## PART II

### VALUES IN PRESTIGE

§ 23. *The fate of our values in prestige.*—Our legal, ethical, political knowledge—in other words, the known branches of social sciences—hold their own in the investigation of the social life of man as long as men are able to love or hate one another (bias, prejudice), or to understand one another (conception); but our ancient sciences prove inadequate the moment predominance of prejudice and of conception are rendered impossible by *permanency of settlement in masses and division of labour*. The world where appearances predominate, which was formerly not in existence, the world of triumphs without conflict and of homage without appreciation—this is the *mere society*, nothing else, but mere *society*. What we intend to say about the fate of our values as they are swept into the mill-race of prestige refers to their fate in *society* as above defined: we will investigate the fate overtaking the sentiments of value of men still capable of loving or hating or understanding one another, and the changes of rank undergone by them in those enormous and permanent masses in which neither love nor hate nor intellect is capable of unriddling more than a small fraction of men and qualities, in which the psychological determinants of the sentiments of value predominate.

(a) The intensity of pain caused, let us say, by a slight operation that can be made without resort to anaesthetics,



such as the lancing of a tumour or the extraction of a tooth, will hardly be influenced by the fact of the operator being a professor endowed with prestige or a country practitioner, provided of course that the process in either case is precisely identical. Before the excitement of the senses caused by the operation commences, from the moment of selecting the doctor down to our seating ourselves in the operating chair, our discomfort may be less, our expectation more tense, if we have chosen a surgeon who possesses prestige in our eyes; but in the excitement of our senses produced by the surgical intervention, in the moment our self-consciousness ceases to act, the intensity of the pain scarcely differs at all. Similarly, the satisfaction of a torturing hunger, at the moment when that hunger is first satisfied, is not very likely to cause enhanced pleasure owing to the fact that the food taken was prepared, not by our familiar cook, but by the *fashionable salad-maker* whose prestige was immortalized by Brillat-Savarin. The effect of prestige appears in conjunction with some minimum of self-consciousness, of a capability of selection. Where self-consciousness or the capability of selection is absolutely paralysed prestige is incapable of coming to the fore until an internal dissolution takes place.

For this very reason the phenomena of the hypnotic spell are out of place here. Suggestion does not produce limitation but paralysis; and prestige is characterized by the autonomy of the execution of limitation—the *formal immunity of the capability of selection*. Professor De Mosso's fine work (*La Paura*) must convince everybody that the *numbing* effect of terrorization must be distinguished from the *preserving* force of prestige. The paralysing, cataleptic effect of fear was understood best by the artistic commanders of men, the Eastern generals and the Romans. Alexander the Great offered sacrifice to



Fear before he engaged in battle: Tullus Hostilius dedicated priests and temples to its service. Fear, Mosso tells us, produces a stagnation of action, and numbs motion; a man who does not experience fear may escape, but he who fears is irretrievably lost. Fear is not prestige. We fear objects of contempt, we dread what is vulgar; the *apache*, the highwayman, the hot-tempered superior is feared, but he does not necessarily possess prestige.

(b) For the acquirement of *moral* prestige, it is not enough that some one should be autonomous, true, good, honourable, that he should, without compulsion, observe the rules of a person, group, or circle, either on account of a harmony of inner motives or of a fear of the disapproval of the said persons, group, or circle. Nor does the reverse necessarily involve a loss of moral prestige. A man who desires moral *prestige* must conform to rules not only in point of conscience or conduct, but in respect of appearances too; however moral he may be himself, it will be detrimental to his prestige if among those easily *associable* with him—his ancestors, kinsmen—there be found many persons of ill fame—if immorality be proved against his friends, though he himself be unsullied—if he live in a street of ill fame, though probably compelled to do so by poverty; a candidate for prestige should not appear often before a court of justice even as a *witness*; he must take care to avoid the unfavourable criticism even of the yellow Press; he must be careful not to engage in any occupation regarded as vulgar or accessible, or—even for no fault of his own—to take part in any noisy scandal. He must never be a defendant, even though *innocent*; nor must he admit the possibility of his being connected in any way with any gossip—respectable women are not talked about! A man who desires to maintain his moral prestige according to the paragraphs of the law or the rules of school-ethics, without

external ornament, or in default of all further caution or favourable coincidence, will find himself in a bad way. Society does not consist of trained judges or pedagogues; our morals are investigated by a public fond of generalizing and the prey of moods: the personal image of morality is the moral man, who is, as it were, the imaginary representative of the conception of morality, with psychological requirements (*noblesse oblige: calumniare audacter semper aliquid haeret*: ferns do not rustle unless the wind blows them).

(c) In *logical* prestige, again, it is not necessarily genuine logical values that assert themselves, but the strict and effective externals of logical forms which obtain so complete a hold on the bulk of the public; a commonplace dressed in a heavy style is more likely to possess logical prestige than weighty sayings expressed in facile sentences; the greater part of the public, when in quest of logicalness, expect cold forms suggestive of logicity, though the identification of accuracy with dryness is certainly not quite a genuine definition of value. These parasites of categories, these buttoned-up nobodies, with their unreadable Sphinx-faces, often rise gradually by the aid of their judgments (hurting no one but without substance), which are delivered before persons devoid of understanding in a provocative manner, before those who understand, cautiously; in time, to the utter astonishment of those who know them but are unfamiliar with the psychology of self-assertion, they appear in the lists of the intellectual *élite*, as members of the Academy, prelates, directors of operas, ministers, or women-killers. If they break the silence they usually observe, the main principle of their sentences is elegance and chiselled perfection; their neatly-rounded moral *sententiae* are decorous and full of reverence; and, where feasible, they open even a

groceries exhibition with a quotation from Milton; even though they lack the fine vibration of nerve and the fever of analysis, their words are smooth, choice, and unexceptionable. They remind us somewhat of the superstition of the natives of Malay, according to which the ourang-outang (= man of the woods) is also human, only that he keeps silent in order to avoid paying taxes. In the simple facts of life a similar role is played by logical prestige; by it the interest that cannot be saddled otherwise than by psychological means may be diverted towards really useful and desirable examples—though at the same time it may be the cause of a quotation being regarded as an argument, of insolent glibness being taken for intellectual readiness, and of the pragmatism of a lucky simpleton being mistaken for wisdom.

(d) *Aesthetic* prestige is evidently a parasite of the sublime and speculates on the charms of beautifying distance. Kant calls the sublime *magnitudo reverenda*, “which entices us to approach, but at the same time frightens us away, since we are afraid that in the comparison with it we shall in our own estimation disappear.” But a man who is sublime necessarily from inner compulsion, who cannot be anything else but sublime, does not necessarily possess aesthetic prestige too; inner compulsion has no enforcing power; and public opinion often judges a man whose individuality is dominated by the aestheticism of the majestic, as stiff, spiritless, ridiculous. Evidently all these sublime persons do not sufficiently emphasize the popular associations of the sublime, which in the given surroundings are attended with success, and either overcome or moderate the opposing motives. The most flexible *associations* of what is sublime in point of extent and degree are not necessarily brought into play by those moments which are necessarily aesthetical; we see a long line and motley

variety of all kinds of *poseurs* and insignificant beings, "sculptures in marble," dancing round this sort of prestige; they are clever administrators of abstractness and distance, which is belied by an inner emptiness. Are there not other conditions of prestige besides the aesthetic ones, when we feel this or that man or group to be comical, or when we fail to observe the comic element latent in them? And do we not pass by with indifference or with a derisive smile many tragic elements devoid of prestige? Do we not admire many things which we should deride if aesthetic motives were to affect us in virgin purity? And do we not laugh to scorn many things which would move us to tears if they possessed prestige? A man who has a word for everybody, who is kind and communicative, who is a good fellow at table, and throws himself with enthusiasm into a game of football, who is majestic without gestures, finds it more difficult to assert himself in the struggle of prestige; many a Hungarian "aesthetic" contemporary shrank from the "boorish" Petöfi! Yet this desire for abstraction may be beneficial too, purifying and holy, a fact that probably appears nowhere with such plasticity as in sexual life: not merely the love of a Petrarch, but sexual tension generally, cannot continue undisturbed, as merely love and nothing else, where the cares of vegetative life or housekeeping are permanently brought into connection with it, unless taste intervenes to conceal and dull the former, and good humour the latter.

Aesthetics are generally distinguished from aesthetic prestige: the former is the harmonious emotion of the recipient's mind, whereas aesthetic *prestige* is unequal—it dominates the principle of the intensity of the psychological enjoyment, not that of the greatest possible organic order. The essence of the enjoyment of art, for instance, according to the nice definition of Lange, is



*conscious* self-deception; prestige is not even necessarily deception, for it may coincide with the truth; but it is never *conscious* self-deception; as contrasted with the enjoyment of art, it lacks the real self-government of deception.

(e) With the appearance of permanency and settlement in large numbers, the primitive appreciation of *strength* becomes more and more supplemented by the *prestige of strength*. In the beginning the epithet of "strong" was given to the man who was a head taller than his fellows, to the victorious wrestler, the man who bore toil, heat, and cold without a murmur—of States to the one containing the largest numbers. To-day this controllable appreciation of strength is seen only in gymnasiums and on the football field; in the outside world the conception of strength, of the power of States has become complicated and looks for associations; ever since the objective standard of strength became supplanted by the decisive character of the average opinion of the most diverse masses, the *appearance* of strength has assumed an importance often greater than that of strength itself, though naturally even here the two may coincide. The prestige of strength is strongest where the assertion of the special laws of strength is supplemented or replaced by a psychological effectiveness most generally observable and least confused. The masses do not measure strength by the principle of causality; a single—objectively insignificant—blunder at important manœuvres on which the eyes of all Europe are fixed, damages the prestige of an army in quite different proportions to the harm it does its real strength; for this reason the military authorities often attach graver importance to representative weaknesses than to inner corruption. Both in individuals and masses the prestige of strength aids the assertion of (and in the interests of this



prestige both individuals and masses are compelled to develop) those forces which create an *impression* of absolute security, which, however, are not always the most important energetically too; and under similar conditions those weaknesses are primarily dangerous, the sentimental generalization of which is strongest and their remarkable character most conspicuous. The standpoints of the inner value of discipline are widely displaced by those of its outer value; and determination exempt from conflict affects quite other persons and groups than it would if it had to struggle. Energy is measured according to the rough, primitive laws of strength by the masses, who appreciate its gross weight and are incapable of imagining that courage may be concealed by vacillation or cowardice by consistency. It is often more opportune to seem energetic than to act energetically; and the prestige of strength of will often impels men to an obstinacy which is just as far removed from their individuality as it is from the importance of the object.

(f) Human values, as we see, often appear in the company of prestige; often they do not; they do not exclude, but they do not either necessarily involve prestige. A moral man may content himself with a quiet conscience; prestige fears being "aired"—is afraid of being brought into connection with this or that, or of being left out of this or that. A man who is economically valuable may content himself with the maximum of utilitarian self-assertion; prestige takes into account psychological importance too, etc. Any moral, logical, etc., value which is not at the same time a psychological value possesses no prestige; on the other hand, even the smallest objective value may possess eminent prestige, if it is only endowed with sufficient psychological value.

(g) In every person we have interest for, we wish to

find *the assertion of our values and appreciations*. If intuition or logic give us no control over this assertion and we are feeling the insecurity, then we are restricted to illusions of judgment. East-European peasant-electors, *e.g.*, scarcely look with any different logical or moral sentiment of values at a vehement parliamentary campaign concerning Free Trade than at a village boxing match. Prestige isolates certain groups of judgments, discovers uniformity in causal multiplicity and multiplicity in causal uniformity; the intensity of our instinct, desire and inclination concerning the persons in question, and consequently our conduct, are now determined by psychological laws. The example of certain rulers and the role of prestige in institutions show how prestige can be more powerful than custom or law. Of Emperor Vespasian it is said that the endeavour of men to resemble him and attain his level proved of greater influence than penal law.

(h) Concerning interesting persons, we are especially interested in the way *they appreciate the values of our own personality*. If their conduct does not give proof enough of this appreciation, then we are restricted to associations and we feel uncertain. The greatest part of men do not appreciate their own values through self-conviction, *i.e.*, through intuitive self-justification or logical conclusion. The less sure some one of his own worth the more capable he is to accept supposed judgments of other men as measure of self-valuation. *In this manner other men's psychological values limit aspirations, social point of view and outlook of millions of humble souls, who never dream of their own worth, nor of the possible worthlessness of their masters.*

### PART III

#### THE PREDOMINANCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUES AND THE FEELING OF IN- SECURITY

§ 24. *Prejudice ; conception ; habit ; prestige.*—(a) There are men, circles, and groups our inner and outer conduct towards which is radically subjective—our behaviour towards which is, in anticipation of any intervention of intellect, already determined constitutionally or by judgments that have become part of our being : there are men, circles, and groups which our love or hatred enables us to judge with spontaneous security, through the behests, impatient of contradiction, of our constitution or of treasured habits that have become part of our being. We love our children ; we despise what is glaringly in contrast to us ; we regard our mother tongue as beautiful and treasure it—our ability to express our thoughts clings to it in all its minutest nuances. Certain proportions, connections, and successions have been enforced on us and grafted on our power of judgment by the instincts we have inherited and the habits which have *become part of our being* : where these are lacking or confused we are provoked to disgust, or in default of unpleasant excitement, to laughter. Prejudice guides our dealings with men whenever ready-made sentiments of value await in sovereign decision the advent of excitements or emotions, as a prince

awaits the subjects who come into his presence. Prejudice is connected with a feeling of absolute security in the state of mind. The characteristic feature of prejudice is a decisiveness that brooks no contradiction involved in the behest of the sovereign *Ego*; this alone will explain a mother's heart or national sensitiveness, or the rigidity of conservatism that refuses innovations *a limine* and of the unusual that exasperates our sense of harmony. Prejudices are based on an illusion that something is already familiar to us; they are the *subjective variation of the appreciation of men*, whose zone is a narrow one; the insufficiency of prejudice is plastically displayed by the permanency of masses and the consequent division of labour.

(b) The second variation of the appreciation of men, circles, and groups is the *notional* one introduced by the careful selection of self-consciousness. This other extreme of appreciation of men, contrasted with prejudice, is the *objective variation*. Men, groups, and circles may mean for us certain substantial values which we are capable of elaborating notionally. When I call a man nervous, a group poor, a country one of climatic extremes, I hereby pronounce a rational judgment on them; in my eyes the policeman on duty at the street-corner, the beggar who knocks at my door, and the prostitute who sells her love, are all notions; the relation of my thoughts towards them is an objective one—I think of objects just as I do of them; it is not of life but of matter that I think thus—not of subjects, but of means. This notional appreciation finds its counterpart in the fate of the values of all those whom, owing to some reason, some phenomenon, I am able to conceive of as means (the notional objects of my will)—as non-subjects, as material, non-life. In the course of forming our appreciation we feel all these to



be divisible in thought, subjectible to other conceptions and main values—like things, capable of notional elaboration. The appreciation is not the work of a primitive determinant, as in the case of prejudice; our *Ego* withdraws, the appreciation is cold; and the sovereign rule of thought (or at any rate the illusion of that rule) comes to the fore again with the feeling of security of the mind.

The perfect conceivability of a person destroys the specific character of appreciation, which is confined exclusively for the human individual; in such cases the struggle for existence is practically material and objective, and the consideration that here man means the beginning of a new order of values is thrust into the background. An interesting man who is conceivably opposed to an interesting man who is not conceivably *caeteris paribus*, has already half lost the battle. *Caeteris paribus*, it is more than probable that he will not be *hors concours*; being analysable into elements, it is much easier to get at him, to imitate him, to find causes of quarrel, and to probe every inch of him. An analogy to conceivability is found in the feeling that some man, group, or circle is not a subject but an instrument—our instrument, or that of others like ourselves, the conceivable object of our will striving towards it. In the reality of life it is analysable, exchangeable, accessible. As conception breaks the isolation of a man's image, analyses and distributes it among other notions; as it mixes up the fragments of the image and pushes them into their place among things and inanimate objects—so we find an ethical repetition of this dissolution, when we see in the role of instrument, the conceivable object of our will, that formerly autonomous suzerainty, with which people traffic at will, throwing it hither and thither, and not even asking its opinion when they decide its fate.

(c) Permanent settlement in large masses and division of labour involve a third variation of appreciation of man, which is *as it were the bastard child of subjective and objective sentiments of value*. The horizon of intuition is left behind; there appears a substance of consciousness relating to men, the problem of the spontaneous application or refusal of which can never occur, seeing that the given or mechanicalized reactions of the constitution do not correspond to the impressions that crop up. This is the first condition of the new sentiments of values—they must be in advance of the guiding ability of prejudice, of the bounds limited by the intuitive Ego. The second condition is, that the men in question must not be perfectly conceivable or able to be regarded as instruments, for otherwise they are subject to the influence of the same technique of valuations, as is employed in estimating things and inanimate objects. Where the predominance of both intuition and intellect fail, where the prerogatives of the constitution are just as little able to assert themselves as those of the mind, the third variation of sentiments of value relating to men begins, viz., *the dominant role of psychological value connected with the feeling of insecurity of the mind*. This does not mean necessarily a simultaneous destruction of the other values, but the securing of the ascendancy by psychological value, the interests of which are now above all others, its influence the greatest and anticipatory of everything, it itself being now the chief support of the sentiments of value. Naturally, the farther any one is from the bounds limited by the intuition and the less he is capable of being included among our conceptions, or of being forged to the form of an instrument of ours, the more perfectly and clearly are his *merely psychological values* able to assert themselves. Even in the sovereign realm of prejudice psychical values

assert themselves, but they are subjected to the constitution or to some habit that has become part of our being; and psychical enjoyment and suffering take their place among the enjoyments and sufferings of the whole man, without being able to acquire a separate existence. Notional appreciation and the instinct concentrated into will, with the setting forth of the purpose, provide the psychical value with independent life; but this psychic appreciation is no longer hedonic, no longer professes the principle of pleasure and pain, but that of the greatest economy, the essential and what is explicable by something else; primitive *hedonism* is thrust into the background by that *rational* variation of psychical appreciation which is called logic. Of the third variation of sentiments of appreciation we have said that it excludes the predominance of intuitive logical or volitional exploitation, or, to express both in a more concise summary, it excludes the feeling of suzerainty of the *Ego* as opposed to value.

(d) But this double determination of the new sentiment of value is only negative and refers also to everything and every person beyond our intuitions and intellects—to everything and everybody outside our horizon—to everything and everybody we pass by indifferently. But, as we have said, beyond the negative conditionality, the new sentiment must possess a “kernel”—a *positive* psychical value which may assert itself in a superior and commanding manner—that psychical hedonism which is beyond being disturbed by anything. While prejudice and conception are qualitatively opposed to prestige: *habit* (grown soulless, mechanical through frequent repetition) is the *quantitative contrast to it*. *Prestige* tends towards maximum, *habit* towards minimum of psychological value.

## PART IV

### PSYCHOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF PRESTIGE

§ 25. *The origin of prestige.*—As we have seen, prestige is acquired by a sentiment grafted on our *Ego* in association with man—a sentiment which brings with it the spirit of what is not analysable or dissoluble—*most associative, but least accessible.*

For the creation of a sentiment of “prestige”-value, it is necessary that the sentimental force of the image, person, group, or circle in question should be powerful, while we feel it is unsuitable for perfect intuitive or intellectual expropriation—*that in fact it should mingle with our Ego without, however, losing its independence.*

(a) To receive the image of the person of prestige in our mind, we must provide for the development or fixing of that sentiment or those sentiments of most value at the moment (because most capable of that generalization that fills out consciousness). Those sentiments are psychologically most valuable and most capable of generalization and expansion which in our consciousness are simultaneous with, or similar to, or in contrast with most feelings, but not heterogeneous. “Even such disparate impressions as are created by colour and sound may by their sentimental coefficients produce a certain resemblance or contrast, and may mutually recall and drive away one another.” Ribot calls this association



the expansive or generalizing movement of sentiment, which is carried independently of the previous images—"it spreads," he says, "like a spot of grease." The most important role of associations in prestige is in connection with those sentiments which we call *human*. Children feel things to be cold. "The imitation of their noise or movements," remarks Ruysen, "is a difficult matter; besides, a child generally begins to recognize things through the agency of persons. On the other hand, persons constitute for him a fairly sharply defined category of excitements in which possible and peculiarly interesting imitations are wrapped." The *human* is the sentiment which offers us a prospect of most complete success; what is in general *human*, certainly shows—at least up to the limits of psychological values—advantages over what is not human; the bringing into connection of the substance of consciousness relating thereto, the generalizing and expansive movement of sentiment, is far easier, where we ourselves constitutionally feel the simultaneity and coexistence. In general every impression of ours relative to man is a psychical value *favourable to the endeavour of consciousness towards unity*; such psychical values are the "whole man," a consistent man, etc. To speak of the sentiments suitable for "prestige" associations in a narrower sense, among the very first we find *tradition*, the cult of those sentiments most profoundly and universally ingrained. The psychological opposite of tradition is *surprise* (not the breach of traditions!), when the mind is not at all prepared for intellectual or volitional work and necessarily immerses the image in the most universal sentiments—as the primitive Hungarian rebels did when they retreated stupefied before King Imre, who appeared in their midst with a cane and nothing more: further, *actuality*, to the intellectually still unelaborated generalization of which the whole sub-

stance of our consciousness accommodates itself—this is the effect produced on people in the highest tension of expectation by the sudden appearance of Buonaparte or the star of society of whom everybody has just been talking. But the image of the candidate for prestige may be drawn into sentimental generalization, not only by values of sentiment of such a quality, but by its mere *intensity* too. The disproportionate mass of impressions, the overcrowding of the consciousness with impressions and reproductions relating to a person, the excessive connection of concrete elementary associations of a powerful sentimental effect with the person, force the consciousness into a lassitude, as with Dante :

“E tanto da uno in altro vanneghiai,  
Che gli occhi per vagezza ricopersi  
E il pensiero in sogno trasmutai . . .”

From times immemorial those who have striven after psychological eminence have tried to realize this experience. In many Indian tribes of North America, says Professor Lehmann, the wizard's dance is a veritable performance at the bedside of the sick man in the presence of a crowd of awed spectators. Beating his little drum, or gesticulating with a drumstick, the wizard moves in a circle and relates how he holds mysterious intercourse with the spirits, pulls the disease out of the sick man's stomach, drives away the evil spirit from the various parts of the body, etc. In this way he gradually works, not only himself, but the onlookers and the sick man too into an ecstasy, for they regard him amid a thousand fears and terrors, and if he shakes his magic drumstick or beats his tiny tambourine they believe heaven and earth are listening to him and that the whole world bows before him. Vierkandt tells us of the Indian prophets of North America—others tell us

the same in connection with other instances of the acquirement of prestige—that a prominent place is assigned to the invention of some captivating dance which carries the spectators away with it. The peoples of India, writes Ratzel, are fond of being dazzled by pomp; even the English are compelled to surround themselves with splendour which is otherwise foreign to their being. The Indian Rajahs and Maharajahs form bodyguards of Oriental splendour, which have hardly any value from a military point of view: their shining armour and gem-studded uniforms captivate the Hindu masses—but they generally run away before the smallest detachment of European troops. The outward pomp of the Roman magistrates was never so dazzling as when their real power had fallen into decay and they merely served—as *honorarii*—the “prestige” aims of themselves and of the emperors. Such a *captatio nolentia* is still in vogue—*nolentia* being understood to mean all kinds of non-volition, even that of thought. According to Taine, before the Revolution there were 274 offices in the household of the Duke of Orleans, 210 in that of the King’s sisters, 68 in that of Princess Elizabeth, 239 in that of Count d’Artois, 256 in that of the Countess of Provence, 496 in that of the Queen; to the Court of Louis XVI were attached 4,000 civil officials and a bodyguard of 9,000 to 10,000; and if we include the 2,000 persons otherwise attached to the “suite,” the whole involved an annual expenditure of 40 to 45 millions of livres—a sum representing twice as much value to-day, but even then consuming one-tenth of the public revenue. As contrasted with a prestige-expenditure of such dimensions, the revenue accruing from prestige is quite insignificant, though even in 1789 the positions of cloak-bearer and gentleman-in-waiting were purchased for sums of between 30,000 and 100,000 livres. All these positions and the

ceremonies attached to them show scarcely any traces of arrangements for defence; whereas they must have been rather a burden to the lovers of sybaritic comfort, however effeminate and lascivious they may have been. Probably nowhere do writers on public law more jealously emphasize the notional differentiation of crown and king than in Great Britain; yet the appearance of few monarchs in public is surrounded by so much pomp and splendour of colour as is that of the King of Great Britain.

(b) Spinoza defines wonder as the image of a thing in which the mind remains immersed, for this peculiar image has nothing in connection with other images. *Mutatis mutandis*, what is implied in this passage is just what we above defined as the condition of the undisturbed and sovereign self-assertion of psychical value. Distance is the best for the purposes of prestige, out of which the image of some person, group, circle, etc., becomes most profoundly grafted on our most universal sentiments, but which prevents the said image from coming under the suzerainty of either our intuition, our intellect, or our will. For instance, the prestige spell of *long past* times that have become *up to date*, of exiles who are *expected home* but *live at a distance*, or of the Papacy, which is *surrounded* by religious sentiment but *shut off* from the world in the Vatican, are classical instances. To this is due the preference for foreign writers, the carefully preserved exclusiveness of certain *salons* and clubs, families and shops, names and places, the spell of parties unsuitable to govern, and of interesting but cold women, etc. Of the four statesmen who had the greatest influence on the more recent history of Hungary, three (Kossuth, Széchenyi, Andrassy) spent a very considerable—the concluding—part of their lives away from their native country, in Turin, Döbling, and Vienna respectively, while the fourth (Deák)



lived in modest retirement as a bachelor, and practically took no part in official and economic life. Though all four of them were placed in the very centre of events and public interest, no reporters, servants, friends, customers, or jealous rivals invidious of their success connected the reputation of these statesmen with what is trivial; scandal and suspicion hardly ever approached them, they were far separated from the image of the "anybody"; and, while they scarcely gave rise to any of the impressions which are vulgar, they to the greatest extent created the impressions which are universal. Let us reflect on the bent shadow of the *temporis acti laudator*. The half-cultured inhabitant of imperial Rome made Græcomania mechanical, with every sign of a lapse of intelligence; the shadows of Greek writers, teachers, linguists, actors accompany the greatness and decadence of the Roman Empire to the end, and a knowledge of the Hellenic tongue was sufficient to secure many an idler and half-cultured person wealth, an introduction to Court, an audience, and patience. The mediaeval feudal lords who seized the peasant estates did not content themselves with naked force, but summoned the folios of Roman law to the aid of their force as witnesses to their prestige. The French *agronomes* of the eighteenth century smiled a smile of superior derision at the new experiences then rapidly on the increase, or indiscriminately unearthed the out-of-date instructions of Vergil and Columella. Our intellectual development in more recent times, right up to a few years ago, has been the slave of the Roman system of law, of Roman rhetoric, and the Latin tongue. The audacity of an English philosopher who dared to confess that the reading of Homer wearied him caused a sensation all over Europe. Certainly not everything that is old has so favourable a destiny. Man's memory is only able to preserve an exception here and there from among the

phenomena of any period. But *the work of selection* is generally affected by contemporaries or by the intuition or intellect of an age of discovery, whereas the irrational maintenance of such a phenomenon among posterity is due to the dissociation of prestige. The working days, burdensome cares, and villainy of past ages are little known to us; and even where we are familiar with them, they do not any longer hurt our instinct of self-preservation; the language used by their poets is not that of our peasants, our porters, or our curses; even sincere aesthetic abstraction is easier in those rhythms and pictures which do not include fragments of a "rignus" or of news of the day; but taking all in all, the source of this lasting spell is irrational, and only its dissociation accounts for its not having dried up. A scholar who quoted a remarkably clever *datum* of direct observation from a "popularizing" work, however eminent that work might be, would make himself ridiculous; and in giving us a fine psychological analysis of newspapers, correspondence, and conversation, Tarde certainly affects only a modest circle of men with the solemnity he could have attained by writing similar or less potent reflections on *totems* or *taboos*.

(c) For prestige, therefore, a psychical value is required, the self-assertion of which is restricted by the behests neither of intuition nor of logic. All we would add is, that *this dissociatedness may in itself* be a *positive* psychological value too, if only it is accompanied by sufficiently clear emphasis and by a separation which, without being a crying one, is nevertheless able to rouse interest—for a conspicuous measure of dissociatedness of this kind is in itself sufficient to challenge attention and to favour the endeavour of consciousness to acquire unity. We have merely to think of the prestige of an unknown solitary or a taciturn man. But, even if this kind of prestige

requires no special psychical value, in the psychological self-assertion of men, groups, and circles of this kind, as we see, there is nothing *mystical*, and it is quite gratuitous to call the same, as Professor Simmel does, "the notional sphere surrounding every man," "personal radius," etc.

We have thus revealed the two fundamental features of prestige, the positive and the negative. What we have to do now is to investigate how these fundamental features appear, their result, and the manner of their effacement, and to see what effects accompany prestige in the mind of the recipient, or we might perhaps say: What is the view formed of prestige by him who examines it objectively, and what does the man who receives prestige feel it to be?

§ 26. *The life and death of prestige.*—The life of prestige runs its course in the sentiments of the recipient. It means that the sentiment of value relative to the person endowed with prestige is lacking in spontaneity and intuition, and that on the other hand it is guided by psychological—not logical—requirements, becoming universal or maintaining itself in accordance with the same. It means that the psychological values of some person, group, or circle dominate the logical, moral, etc., values in so far as they are able to accommodate themselves to the psychological ones. It means that the substance of our consciousness regarding some person, group, or circle depends for its prominence on the ease of association. Let us take the case of a politician championing the cause of universal suffrage. In the course of time events, or second thoughts, convince him of the incorrectness of his views. Now, if he changes his point of view, as a "turncoat" he loses prestige, for prestige requires a *consistency* psychologically more valuable, because more uniform and more associative. As it is

just in politics that a change of opinion on any particular subject is, practically speaking, more frequent than a consistency of opinion, we must not look for an explanation of the prestige of consistency in the calculations of probability resulting in favour of consistency. Here the scales are turned by the greater psychical value of the prestige of consistency. To take another illustration: how much greater is the prestige acquired by the man who *reaches* the North Pole than that of the man who by his pioneer work brought the Pole within reach of man and himself *almost* reached it! Is not the scientific value of the latter a greater one? Without a doubt. But prestige favours *the former*, because the form of his success has more colouring for the masses, is more dramatic and effective. And, generally speaking, how much more prestige is attached to the image of the explorer of the Poles than to that of other discoverers! The man who discovers a plateau of the Himalayas, a Central African lake, or an island in some ocean, is probably a greater benefactor of humanity, probably does more tiring, more scientific, more self-sacrificing work than the explorers of the Poles; but the latter are psychically of more weight—the image of “the pole of the earth” is plastic and arouses interest, and the problem is popularly fixed, uniform, undisturbed. Think of the solitary accidents of remote villages, isolated farms, and of building enterprises in large cities! If we aggregate the whole sum of them from the statistical data published at the close of the year, we shall find they mount up to a number—a roll-call of mortality tenfold in excess of that of Mont Pelée or the *Titanic* catastrophe. But statistics to-day are merely cold figures, and “solitary” accidents are not effective; men’s imaginations are excited by masses of human beings perishing *at once*, and the victims of *big* catastrophes always



receive individually disproportionately more charitable aid than those of *single* accidents.

The rule of psychical values that intrudes everywhere shows that we have to deal with prestige. In general, what does *psychical value* consist in? In the end all our values are psychical phenomena. If yet we contrast a *self-aiming psychological value*, it means a *value independent of the intentionality of the Ego, coming to the surface according to its own laws*. Everything that increases intensity and duration of interest (*i.e.*, of the "hedonic aspect of attention") possesses psychological value; that means: on the one hand impressions of strong and exclusive effect—on the other hand which makes psychological work subjectively less wearisome; where much *interest* is possible and little *attention* is needed: we have to deal with a pleasure of our Psyche. In every interesting person we are looking out for our values and for the sentiment of our values, but from persons possessing prestige we get only associative answers of appearances. "Formerly," T. W. Powell tells us about the primitive poor North American tribe of the Wyandots, "the sachemship inhered in the Bear gens, but at present he is chosen from the Deer gens, from the fact, as the Wyandots say, that death has carried away all the wise men of the Bear gens." On the other hand, J. Bryce tells us about the high cultured North American democracy of eighty million people: "What a party wants is not a good President, but a good candidate. . . . Many things have to be considered. The ability of a statesman, the length of time he has been before the people, his oratorical gifts, his 'magnetism,' his family connections, his face and figure, the purity of his private life, his 'record' (the chronicle of his conduct) as regards integrity—all these are matters needing to be weighed."

*Predominance* of psychological values means that the actual or latent supremacy of intuitive and logical security is paralysed. But this lack of security is not to be confounded either with the autonomous moral sentiment of self-distrust, nor with the logical appreciation of our uncertain position towards other persons. *The feeling of insecurity characteristic of prestige is a self-consistent, genuine feeling of mind, co-ordinate with the feeling of security caused by intuition or logic.* It is not a kind of judgment we have to deal with but a *kind of judging*, a different technology of mind.

The principle of psychical valuation comes to the front in the technics of judging when the psychical value is stronger than intuition and logic, or

(a) Because the average psychical values of him who causes the impression is either objectively (affecting the average man) or merely subjectively (affecting the recipient in question) stronger than the feeling of security of mind caused by intuitions or reasoning, or

(b) Because the impressibility of the recipient is either objectively (in relation to the average man) or merely subjectively (in relation to the person causing the impression in question) stronger than his intuitive or intellectual feeling of security.

The psychical value must therefore assume the ascendancy over the stock of exclusive reactions of intuitive life and over the logical categories of intellect; and as it must notwithstanding remain a *value* for the recipient, two apparently opposing tendencies are often found to confuse the investigator of the phenomena in question. Parallel with the relative *retirement* from intuitive life and intellect there must be an endeavour to secure by every possible means a psychical *approach* towards the recipient. Simultaneously with his removal from the *intuitive or causal*

*connection* of the impressions, the recipient becomes gradually more conscious of every *associative* connection. With all his strong dissociative "prestige" values Napoleon Buonaparte thought it advisable to *appear* from time to time *among the rank and file* and to share their fatigues. In fact, we must go a step farther still: psychical value too has its own natural boundaries in the universal instinct of self-preservation, which appears in the form of tiredness, of a flagging of interest. This accounts for the fact that even of those impressions of men in the elaboration of which we are unable to ensure our intuitive life or our intellect a decisive role, *only a small part acquire psychical value*; the rest remain, in proportion to the laws of psychological determination, either soulless habit, unobserved and indifferent. That is why the great majority of our impressions of men affect us but little.

If there is an opportunity for the ascendancy of the psychical values, in this case we call the prestige *actual*. And if we find to hand the conditions that seem to expect a possible actuality, in that case we call the prestige *virtual*. Only that the store is no longer the property of the owner of the sentiment of value, as his property consists in intuitive or intellectual appreciation. The store belongs now to the man who affects, who possesses prestige. Where both the positive and negative conditions of prestige are present, the psychical main-value, like a foreign tyrant, assumes the reins of government. Intuition and intellect cease to guide. The laws of psychology *arrange* the order of precedence of the emotions; the rules of the limitation of consciousness, of attention, surprise, distraction, remembrance, and forgetfulness, associations and dissociations, habituation arising from frequent repetition, of inattentiveness and weariness, *the hedonic aspects of the recipient's mind*,

thrust every other interest into the background. And where these psychological moments *guide* us in our judgment of a person, group, or circle, we say of the said person, group, or circle that he (or it) possesses *prestige*.

Notwithstanding our sentiments are quite normal, the government of *our attention* falls to another; provision is made that—and in what manner—this attention shall spread from point to point without the primitive opinion of intuition, the selection of logic, and the concentration of will, according to the physics of associations and dissociations, and without the chemistry of thought. *Memories* too are drawn in by associative generalization. We consider every indifferent past conduct of a hated antagonist, if he possess prestige, to be suspicious; we regard even the childhood of a great man possessed of prestige as eminent at any price. The *expectation* of experience is similarly restricted to one possibility of judgment; we laugh heartily at every bit of silly facetiousness “committed” by a famous humorist, which no provincial journal of any standing would dare to publish anonymously; the orator of prestige is greeted with applause when he steps on to the platform, as if to denote that the judgment is already formed; it is scarcely conceivable that an audience which has received some one with applause should belie itself, however trite the common-places its favourite may utter. In connection with prestige everything has a value that accommodates itself to the interest displayed at the outset, *without any selection of worth*. We do not care to pronounce even the name of the envied possessor of prestige; we fear every movement of the terrible possessor of prestige: most men are considerably more interested in a trifling episode of the King’s life than in twelve Slovak workmen killed by the collapse of a scaffolding. In October, 1906, 620 crowns was



paid at an auction for a testimonial written by Beethoven for a servant of his—"a far larger sum," adds the person communicating the event, "than the fee ever received by the same Beethoven for Op. 6." If we compare the conduct of an individual towards the same person before the acquisition of prestige with his conduct while the prestige lasts, we shall find that with the reception of prestige words and actions lose immeasurably in directness and rationality, logic becomes obscured, the order of judgments often suffers a complete upheaval, and the motives of conduct are incalculable and incomprehensible. A peasant gives a much more concise account of things in the parish hall than before the president of the tribunal, where with minute verbosity he attributes a like importance to everything, or, his memory failing him, he breaks down. Persons appearing for the first time at a *levée* are generally unable to cope with the prestige of the monarch; they grow red, then pale, and are rarely able to say what they want; it is the curse of princes that the greater part of their lives is spent among stammering and awkward persons. When prestige is violently and aggressively actual, the biology of independent reflection comes to a standstill, and the constitution behaves with a kind of psycho-physical loyalty that permeates every drop of blood; the activity of the heart is extreme, the breathing and the pulse display similar fluctuations, the sinews tremble or stiffen, the voice fails or loses its self-control, the blood rushes to the brain, then suddenly rushes out of it again, the eyes are lowered and then beam with excitement; a rich scale of extremes appears where prestige is actual, and it is only equable energy, cool gravity, and the fresh directness of self-respect and consciousness that we see withdrawing to the smallest area. If he meets the possessor of prestige

face to face, the recipient must be encouraged to approach ; he much prefers to retire, his statements are defective, as if all his data were second-hand and all his best home ideas had remained "staircase ideas." He determines again and again to tell his opinion on this or that, to suggest this or that business to him ; but when he meets him face to face, when the prestige becomes actual, he again and again puts off saying what he wants to say. Taine gives us a description, based on contemporary authorities, of an audience given by Buonaparte to his generals : " The generals were ushered in, but Buonaparte made them wait. At last he appeared, strapped on his sword, put on his helmet, explained away the measures he had taken, gave his orders, and dismissed them. Augereau was speechless ; it was only outside that he recovered and found words to express his accustomed execrations ; he agreed with Massena that the little general had awed them ; he could not understand the effect which for the moment had captivated them." In Adam Smith's work we read the following account of the Sun-King : Louis XIV, during the greater part of his reign, was regarded, not only in France, but over all Europe, as the most perfect model of a great prince. But what were the talents and virtues by which he acquired this great reputation ? Was it by the scrupulous and flexible justice of all his undertakings, by the immense dangers and difficulties with which they were attended, or by the unwearied and unrelenting application with which he pursued them ? Was it by his extensive knowledge, by his exquisite judgment, or by his heroic valour ? It was by none of these qualities. But he was, first of all, the most powerful prince of Europe, and consequently held the highest rank among kings ; and then, says his historian, he surpassed all his courtiers in the gracefulness of his shape and the majestic beauty of his features. The

sound of his voice, noble and affecting, gained those hearts which his presence intimidated. He had a step and a deportment which could suit only him and his rank, and which would have been ridiculous in any other person. . . . An old officer, not being able to conclude his discourse, said to him : " Sire, your Majesty, I hope, will believe that I do not tremble thus before your enemies " (Ad. Smith). During the Russo-Japanese War was not the commander of the third Russian fleet a hero and a trained sailor? Yet the psychological value of the Japanese, who had not been accessible before either intellectually or volitionally, inspired the heroic and scholarly commander to irrational actions and ridiculous movements, of the most remarkable of which it will be sufficient to mention the case of the fishers of Hull. In summing up Louis XIV's prestige Smith seems to sensualize as it were on the film of a cinematograph what we have said about the ascendancy of the psychical value : " Knowledge, industry, valour, and beneficence trembled, were abashed, and lost all dignity before him."

The actuality of prestige appears in like manner when it is dealing not directly with a person, but with a record or expectation referring to the person possessed of prestige. In the abstract reflection of the Middle Ages the prestige of Aristotle (*iste sol erat*) dominated men's minds ; hence, according to Bayle, arose the method of proving every proposition first by authority (prestige) and then only by arguments ; proof by authority was carried out on the basis of quotations from Aristotle, while the arguments endeavoured to show that these quotations, correctly interpreted, stated the same things as the proposition. The ascendancy of the psychical value is summed up by Lewes when he says that philosophy is no more the feudatory of the Church but of the antique world.

Prestige means a decadence of self-government—a decrease of the temperature of intellect in favour of sentiment. The knights and senators of the age of Marcus Aurelius, even if they did not know Greek, left the theatre to applaud in an intoxication of enthusiasm the Greek speeches of the rhetor Hadrian. It would be superfluous to search for modern analogies; every one can supplement the list of instances of similar irrationality of enthusiasm from his own experience. Even to-day the record left us by Seneca of a certain Calvisius Sabinus, who, to appear cultured, made his slaves learn by heart the Greek poets from whom he desired to quote, is not by any means out of date. But the sentiments that predominate to the detriment of the intellect are in this case not the welling forth of the ripe, divine behests of the constitution, which regulate in sovereign manner the intensity and expansion of the sentiments. The recipient is incapable of being driven back from intellect to the suzerainty of intuition; he is no longer the master of sentiment, no longer its starting point or its divine ultimate aim; he is drawn into the confused whirlpool of psychical values; lacking conscious self-guidance, he becomes the plaything of chance connections; he no longer *acts*, but things *happen to him*; he has no longer the *autonomous power of appreciation*—he is merely the means of attaching value to the impressions.

All this is merely possibility latent in the depths of *virtual* prestige. But the mechanism of the new sentiment of value is already in waiting even here; and only the electric spark of psychical value is necessary to set its cogwheels in motion.

An actual prestige just about to assert itself is compelled to watch every little deviation of appearances; but even this tense caution of intentionality is not enough: the misuse of a single foreign word, an invitation obtained by



insistence, a little surplus of communicativeness, a false step on the platform, a dance causing public ridicule, a single *fraseo* in the presence of pupils—any such failure of the negative conditions at once puts an end to prestige in the given surroundings. But this prestige may fade away with the destruction of the psychical value too: the impressions endowed with psychical value fade away, and become vulgar and indifferent, and the association extends so far that its very intensity proves detrimental, or stronger psychical values push it aside, and the prestige becomes relaxed, like discipline. The existence of the prestige was not rational, nor is its death so: it drags everything with it, harmful and innocent alike, according to the degree of their associative connection and not to their causal interdependence (*e.g.*, the fall of Louis XVI). We know how completely all interest was focused in politics, even a few years ago, in France. To-day we find extremes of disillusion just as irrational as the infatuation that formerly wrapped everybody up in the charms of active politics. "Not to interest oneself in politics," says Professor Vial of the French middle class of to-day, "is in their eyes a sign of refinement and intelligence. Politics they look upon as a noisy 'career,' which is not particularly respectable and is best left to intriguers, 'journalists' and *déclassés*. In their eyes politics is not a living drama in which, willy-nilly, every citizen must play a part; they do not regard it as more than a comedy or even a farce." It is easy to verify the truth of this political indifference of the middle-class from the Press. The French Press is no longer political. The public are more interested in law courts, theatres, races, than in the affairs of the country. A cursory glance at the daily papers will illustrate this displacement. Even the important journals styled "political" devote scarcely one page out of four to politics. In

England and Germany, where politics have never been so remarkably "personal," where there have not been, even in the past, chiefly prestige standpoints to manipulate the scenery of Parliament, no such disgust of politics exists. But phenomena similar to the sudden change of front in France are to be seen in Italy, Russia, and Hungary, in South America and elsewhere.

The irrational infectional atmosphere of its death is characteristic of prestige in its dawn. Presuming that the prestige is intentional, this intention is not connected with a chain of causes; and for this reason the average prestige is merely a torturing uncertainty. The majority of those whose prestige is conscious are anxious for the fate of their prestige—this more favourable form of the struggle for existence—and this anxiety contains a certain element of that of the savages who pass a toilsome existence amid the deadly chances of the desert and the jungle, without the possibilities of calculation. A man whose whole value turns on his prestige, who risks his all on this one card, who, if his prestige is lost, is hurled down from the highest grades of society to its lowest category, guards his prestige even against breath-like obscurity, more carefully than love, mind, or honour. For these are all isolated values of an exclusive class; but a man possessed of prestige lives in the more expansive world of associations; a man endowed with prestige may still become anything and everything—a Don Juan, a minister, a judge in a court of honour; prestige is distributed like air, and recognizes no precise division of labour. A man of prestige, when he feels his psychological eminence is approaching destruction, watches with the excitement of a hazardist, collects together every possible advantage of association, and emphasizes every conceivable advantage of dissociation; but his endeavour *does not after all come up with*

*the instinctive*; he is disquieted and catches at straws; he is bent on remaining *en vogue* at any price; he must not fail to appear anywhere where any bit of prestige is to be obtained; and he carefully avoids everything that might blunt the spell. We need only think of the anxiety of the Jew or the negro for their prestige—or of the charlatan carefulness with which powers on the brink of effacement, artists out of fashion and fallen women, save the wreck of their prestige. The fear of *being destroyed* in prestige appears mechanically and irrationally; and the *destruction* caused by the death of prestige is just as mechanical and irrational. This is what Thucydides must have been thinking when he made Ghyllippos say that a man of prestige who comes to grief means less in our eyes than if he had never had any prestige at all.

§ 27. *What part of prestige is felt by a man who stands under the influence of somebody's prestige?*—After sketching what an objective investigator is able to discern of the life and death of prestige—what a disinterested eye can see from without—we have still to investigate (as far as the few self-confessions, personal reminiscences, and the deductive conclusions to be derived from phenomena will permit) the following questions: In what kind of effects does prestige enter the consciousness of the recipient? What effects accompany the sentiment of value of prestige in the mind of a man under the influence of some one's prestige?

(a) *Prejudice* creates a fresh *feeling of security* arising from spontaneity, and the maximum of *self-consciousness*, in the mind of its subject; the constitutionally ready or mechanically exclusive reaction is accompanied by a *sentiment of resolution*, which does not waver for a moment; the mind is calm, because its prepossession or prejudice is the only reaction which in the given case it was at all able to carry out: “*hier steh ich und*

*ich kann nicht anders.*" We never trust so profoundly in ourselves as when we are prepossessed or prejudiced towards some one. For this reason the first opinion of the *Ego* in course of development is subjective towards everything; its husbandry is as far as possible sentimental, and even in respect of the appreciation of men it restricts itself to the extreme minimum of objectivity. Our *Ego*—as a result of its instinct of self-preservation—only treats as objective, only conceives and concentrates what is inevitable: reflection is warm with life, and only loses its warmth in proportion to the cooling of the inevitable. But even the *notional* and *volitional* world only loses the direct life-warmth of spontaneity: their evolution in the consciousness is still accompanied by a *higher and clearer degree of a feeling of security*. For this reason, when our *Ego* is in search of notions, when it concentrates the obscure primitive tendencies of its instincts, and desires by the setting forth of an aim arising from one experience, into will, it is a wanderer in search of shelter.

Prejudice, and notions and aims, are thrust into the background behind the psychical value, which assumes the reins of government. And with the dethronement of the old valuations, the affection accompanying these valuations is also displaced in a negative direction: that *self-confidence* which accompanied the former varieties of the sentiment of value decays and is thrust into the background. This *supplanting or dispossession of self-confidence* is the first effective result accompanying prestige. We feel that the reins of our sentiments, which were at first guided by intuition and then by intellect, fall from our hands; we are no longer able to guide ourselves; our divine compass is broken; we have become the impressionists of chance, tossed hither and thither, the tools of sentiment, no longer their subjects. Our actions, our



conduct, both within and without, betray a lack of self-confidence; we feel the earth give way beneath us. It is this decrease of self-confidence that some people, in treating of prestige, regard as fear; yet it is nothing more than a certain dizziness due to uncertainty—similar to what is experienced by a country yokel when he first visits a big city, or by a sailor when he steps on dry land.

(b) As we have said, our *Ego* prefers sentimental to intellectual economy, because in the former it is exempt from the hindrances of notional refrigeration and selection. Owing to the fact that prestige too is exempt from these hindrances, and that prestige too is a sentimental economy, a *psychical hedonism* giving the preference to sentiment is the second effect accompanying prestige in the consciousness. Our *Ego* is gratified by it, and warms at the knowledge that it can once again live a *purely sentimental* life, and is not compelled to worry about obscure notions. This psychical preference renders possible the popularity and rapid reception of prestige.

(c) Prestige is therefore accompanied in the consciousness by an unpleasant and a pleasant effect (independently of those specific sentiments which react on a corresponding substance of psychical value)—a *pain* and a *pleasure*: one is the *feeling of a want of self-confidence*, the *pleasure of psychical hedonism* is the other. The *pain* increases in proportion to the strength of our self-confidence, and is consequently in the present case a loss; the *pleasure* increases in proportion as we are wearied by intellectual life and to the force with which we are liberated from it by the *psychical value* afforded by the prestige. In proportion to the person possessing no prestige, the advantage of the individual endowed with prestige consists in a blurring of the feeling of self-confidence, a fading of the pleasure of security in self-guidance when opposed

to him, and in the fact that at the same time the psychical hedonism produces an inclination. His advantage is that of the belligerent whose territory and tactics are unknown, his fighting lines not reconnoitred, who is opposed by an enemy who has no idea of his presence. The primitive stores of instinct, the piled-up munitions of intellect, fail when brought face to face with such good luck, and stick fast like heavy batteries entangled in deep sand. He is faced by antagonists who have no store of munitions, no working machines, no capital to enable them to judge of him—they are the outlaws of intuition, the proletariat of logic.

§ 28. *What is the reason why only men and human creations possess prestige?*—Theoretically, we must presume that those psychological conditions which we have established for prestige are *not* to be found *only* in our impressions of men or human creations. And, indeed, primitive mythology affords some traces (the worship of springs, hills, heavenly bodies, etc.) of the possibility of the assertion of prestige among objects other than man. But, in treating of the *totem* phenomena, we shall have to point out the thirsty desire of man for analogies—he finds the abstract analogy of his own self in certain animals. And it is actually permanent cohabitation in large masses—society—that creates the form in which it becomes so easy, if not to get to the bottom of the origin of the *non-human* world, at least to practically deduce its notional pedigree, to establish sequences of causes and values, to preserve a record of the essence of all these and to communicate them to distant masses. Even the Middle Ages resounded to the *prestige* of the *terrae inhabitabiles*, lands of gold, and continents swallowed up by the sea, wonderful animals and monsters, and stars guiding our destinies: the spread of knowledge, the deepening of notional conquest, however, completely

crumbled away the psychological foundations of *non-human* prestige. To-day the prestige of things is practically restricted to what owes its psychological value to the *men* connected with it (though even to-day we have *the prestige of America* in the eyes of the emigrant from Eastern Europe, who appreciates that geographically distant quarter of the globe, and its incomprehensible dimensions, mostly from a psychological point of view). How can we account for prestige having been effaced almost everywhere, and for merely man and the human still possessing a remarkably wealthy stock of prestige? How is it that to-day we regard prestige as a *merely human* phenomenon, and that, as such, it is still able to spread its toils over the whole of society? The answer is not difficult, if we think of the conflictingly parallel process we established as the condition of prestige—(a) removal from intuition and causality, and at the same time (b) closer affinity to our psychical values. As soon as the division of labour develops, this conflictingly parallel process becomes a hindrance to all that is not human and facilitates the assertion of all that is human. Our comprehension of things has widened—that of subjectivity has grown narrower. The number of those unforeseen *events* has decreased—the number has increased of those unforeseen *acts* which we are unable to make objective, to conceive and to set up as the object of our will. We began to know things better, the remains of subjectivity in men less; among the former the subjection of causality has increased, among the latter it has decreased; the arms of savages are less sure than ours, but they are able to trust their leaders more than we can ours. Our *feeling of security* concerning things increases, concerning intentions it diminishes. *We know more and more of causes and less and less of motives.* This is why prestige has been able to become, and has

become, the fundamental phenomenon of society: for, the more men know and understand things, the less they know and understand one another's intentions.

(b) But behind incomprehensibility of men there are hidden possibilities of organic *affinity*. As soon as men become interesting: we can no more get rid of that fundamental disposition which leads us to feel certain anthropomorphic affinities in our own self in order to value fellow-men. Therefore wherever we judge men, not things, possibility of *comprehension* remarkably diminishes, while possibility of *interest* remarkably increases.



## PART V

### THE MEANS OF PRESTIGE

§ 29. *Introduction.*—Adequate psychological means are required to bring into being the conflictingly parallel processes of prestige and the accompanying effects. These means, as we have said, appear in proportion as the qualities of the recipient and the psychical value of the possessor of prestige are unfavourable to the predominance of intuitive or intellectual judgment, and favourable to prestige. The self-esteem and self-consciousness of a drunken man swells inordinately up to a certain degree of intoxication, and in such a state he is not fit for the reception of prestige—he is inclined rather to commit lese-majesty, a breach of the peace, forcible sexual intercourse, etc. On the other hand, a normal man too may be incapable of coming under the influence of the prestige of a greedy monarch who is continually gossiping and getting into love scrapes, or of an authority accessible to bribes, etc. The means must accommodate themselves to the relative positions of the two parties defined above, in order to enable prestige to come into being and maintain itself.

§ 30. *Acquisition and inheritance of prestige.*—The most manifest means for the creation of prestige is the connection with an older prestige or older prestiges—the acquisition of the psychological means of identifiability.

Prestige is characterized by the sovereign nature of psychological laws; consequently its expansion beyond its own boundaries is not carried out by the recognition of intuitive identification or causal connections, but according to the rigid interdependence of associations and dissociations. An older prestige is inherited not by him who is intuitively or casually regarded as identical with it, but by him who is seen to be associatively identical. The only restriction to the inheritance is that it shall take place within the limits of psychical value—that on the one hand the possibilities of intuitive or causal judgment shall not come into prominence as against the inheritor of prestige, and that on the other the prestige shall not by inheritance lose its psychical value to such an extent as to thrust the latter into the background.

Inherited prestige appears, for instance, in the case of the younger Garibaldis and Kossuths, who are individually quite insignificant. We find it too where snobs collect even the nightcaps of heroes; or again, where Mme. Bovary gazes in emotion at the graybeard who had sixty years before been the Queen's lover. Prestige more or less clings to everything and everybody who (and which) is identifiable or connectible with the psychical value to which prestige owes its origin. The only requirement is that these inheritors shall not furnish any impressions by means of which either intuition, intellect, or indifference obtains the ascendancy. In the case of inherited prestige, *the older prestige itself*, its dynamic tension and associative expansiveness is the positive psychical value: the more concrete, elementary, simple, the possibility of identifying a man who has not yet any prestige with a man already endowed with prestige, the more powerful the psychical value of the former. But this identifiability only becomes possible and lasting if, in a negative direction, intuition and intellect

do not come *to the front* and obtain a *decisive* influence on the production of the sentiment of value. The only role intuition and intellect should play in the creation of the sentiment of value is to prevent the psychical value being dethroned, and to ensure that in any possible conflict that value shall always keep the upper hand.

Prestige is hereditary, not in the proportion of causality, but in that of the clinging of associations. Sometimes names are borne by men, not merely to prevent them being mistaken for others, but actually to enable them to be confounded with others (we have merely to think of Napoleon III). That is why people are so careful of names—as if a name could be responsible for anything! Certain blemishes or “shadows” must not occur in connection with the name itself; and it is clear that in this reserve it is the associative importance of the name that is appreciated by those who exercise or demand the reserve: from the barter of names by savages to the Magyarizing of names of to-day, names are the bearers of associative sensibility. It is the *son* of the statesman of prestige who is “Herbert,” and not his secretary, who is probably much more intimately acquainted with his secrets—but the chances of prestige of the secretary too are evidently better than those of officials of the same rank, who are connected with the statesman of prestige by ties that are perhaps logically and ethically more intimate, but psychologically more worthless. On the other hand, however intimate the relation of the footman to his master, his prestige is very trifling, because in dealing with him the sentiment of psychical value is unable to *dominate*: however, the footman, who performs duties in the house, enjoys far more rays of prestige than the servants outside the house—and the coachman who drives the master enjoys far more than the farmer who drives

his own carts on the master's property. Naturally the same rules are in force in respect of the *inner* expansiveness of prestige too; the conduct, surroundings, belongings of the person endowing with prestige participate in the sentiment of psychical value in the measure merited by their force of association with him and their distance from intuition and notional judgment. It is only thus that we can understand, for instance, the enormous waste of money and time involved by the collection of autographs, which is by no means commensurate with the purchases of pictures, statues, music, books, etc., made by the collectors of autographs: among those asking Spencer or Bergson for an autograph there will certainly be many who are familiar with the activity of these scholars only by hearsay, and who would not be inclined to read through an essay of theirs.

This "clinging," its often crying irrationality, is superbly caricatured by Plato in the dialogue between Socrates and the rhapsodist Ion:—

*Socrates* : So you think the rhapsodist, and not the shepherd, is likely to know the kind of speech which a shepherd ought to use when addressing his bewildered charge?

*Ion* : Not at all.

*Socrates* : Well, but he certainly knows best what a labouring woman would say about the manufacture of wool?

*Ion* : Not at all.

*Socrates* : Do you think the rhapsodist and the science of strategy are one or two things?

*Ion* : In my opinion, one.

*Socrates* : In other words, a man who is a good rhapsodist may be a good general too?

*Ion* : Certainly, Socrates.

*Socrates* : Consequently a good general is a good rhapsodist too?

*Ion* : I don't think so.

*Socrates* : So you believe only that a good rhapsodist must be a good general too.

*Ion* : That's what I think.



*Socrates* : And you are the most eminent rhapsodist of the Hellenes ?

*Ion* : No doubt of that, *Socrates*.

*Socrates* : Then you are the most eminent general too. . . .

The spread of prestige is noiseless, like the still undulation of a river. For this reason intention creates prestige somewhere, as does unconscious involuntariness too, as far as possible : it unfurls the sails of an older prestige. It does not rush in—it glides in.

§ 31. *Instances of the employment of older prestige.*—The brevity of human existence, the complication of conditions, and the greater ease of “getting home,” point to the gliding behind older prestiges already in existence as a disproportionately richer source of prestige, both for intentionality and chance, than the creation of a new prestige. For the acquisition of fresh prestige, exceptionally favourable psychical conditions or exceptional psychological readiness, are necessary. A newcomer desirous of acquiring prestige clutches at the elementary, concrete, and simple associations of a deeply rooted older prestige, and endeavours to make his own similar dissociations. Being unable to excite sentiment or acquire a distance of his own, he simulates identity with those who possess a sentimental effect and distance of the kind. That was the method pursued by the old Roman Imperialists when they left the barbarians in possession of their gods—by the Chinese, who formally leave the government of Tibet in the hands of the Dalai Llama and the Pansen Llama, whereas the real government has passed to the two Chinese staff officers residing at Lhassa—by the English rulers of India, in taking refuge behind the prestige of the native Maharajahs and Brahmins ; and it is for the same reason that, in German colonies, the administration of justice among the natives remains for a time in the hands of

the chieftains who have tendered their submission. New occupations generally live the centuries of their childhood under the sheltering wings of older prestiges. We are familiar with the religious character of occupations among primitive peoples. The smith, who without prestige was generally treated with contempt among primitive peoples, appears in certain places "as an aristocrat and a wizard, as a depositary of all the secrets of Nature, as a musician, often as a doctor too"; in Madagascar the butcher is a veritable priest; all over Africa the depositary of industrial secrets is the magician, elsewhere the king and the priest. The commercial guilds of China are concentrated in holy cults; the gods protect the merchants of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The Greek Asclepiads connected their descent with the first god of healing. In the temple of Pythian Apollo, ambiguous and obscure prophecies, uttered in the mist of gases rising from fissures of the earth, formed the nucleus of the first bank-like treasury of the ancient Greek States. In the ornamental *peribolos* of the temple of Apollo most of the Greek States, and some foreign ones, had a kind of safe-deposit; and when people began to borrow money thence, and a kind of exchange life began to throb within the sacred walls, the imagination of posterity seems to see a theocratic national bank rising into being. In the Middle Ages, in the North the *guilds* lent prestige to industry and commerce. Every Germanic guild had legal, political, and religious aims; but the *religious guilds*—generally called *brotherhoods*—were particularly numerous in mediaeval times. Each guild of this kind had its own patron saint, after whom it was called, and by whom its members swore; it had an altar of its own, and feasts of a religious, pagan Christian character. More recently the *sordidae artes*—commerce and finance—have endeavoured to acquire the

distance of older prestiges by means of associations and dissociations. As both of these occupations demand a business nobility divergent from the conduct of the older occupation, merchants and bankers endeavour to mount the wagon of ancestral prestige by the aid of their personal habits and manners, by emphasizing or concealing certain connections of theirs, and by striving after external distinction, etc. In Scott's *Guy Mannering*, Glossin, the agent, in executing the transfer of a property called Ellangowan, makes every effort to look like a country squire, and gives a beggar half-a-crown because the cunning idler addresses him as Ellangowan by virtue of the old Scotch custom, according to which it is the exclusive right of the landed gentleman to bear the name of his property. The title-page of a Hamburg prayer-book of the eighteenth century gives us a picture of the Hamburg Exchange crowded with speculators; and where it is no longer possible to employ the prestige of the Church and the priesthood, commerce and banking withdraw behind the prestige of monarchs, aristocrats, old names, and political eminence—like a modern battery firing from behind ancient ramparts. This connection is often startling and awkward, for the gliding in, as Smith says, generally searches *with a very superfluous attention* for associations and dissociations; but the search for prestige is so vital a question that ill-success, derision, and humiliation merely instigate to fresh attempts. The first thing a modern merchant or banker does is to purchase real estate and to acquire a nobility and distinctions which cause the general public to think of old employments and ancestral syntheses. He forces a distinguished calm on his excitable temperament, endeavours to contract a marriage with the daughter of an ancient house, and to secure the friendship of old families—if he is an American millionaire, or a European parvenu, of

English, French, and Hungarian aristocrats. When he founds a company he strengthens the board of directors with names that mean, not expert knowledge or business connections, but *distance*. Escott (whose observations are perhaps more accurate than the high-sounding periods of Ruskin concerning merchants), in speaking of the favourable distinction made by the public opinion of England between the merchant and the stockbroker, accounts for this distinction in the following terms: From times immemorial, he says, the merchants have been the friends and supporters of the Crown; they had their place in the popular chamber of the legislature, and have risen to a position of eminence among the titled nobility of the realm. We have had, not only merchant princes, but merchant aristocrats and merchant statesmen too. . . . A British merchant has no difficulty in becoming a Member of Parliament, but we could count the instances of stockbrokers having entered Parliament in our times on the fingers of one hand. . . . Stockbrokers have acquaintances in the highest circles; and for this reason they flatter themselves that they are in society. But their wives do not share in this welcome experience. Escott also gives the historical reasons for this differentiation; but is himself forced to admit that the results have themselves become causes. The man of circulating capital forces himself to take part in sports and amusements for which he has no inclination, and in which, apart from the acquisition of prestige, he takes no delight. But the careful cut of his hunting coat, the pompous ceremony of his *soirées*, his mania for "gentry" talk and mannerisms, often remind us of the fine irony of Mikszáth, Scott, and Thackeray. Politics, which are compelled suddenly to create prestige for some particular formation, have just as little chance of selecting the means. An eminent German publicist says of the appointment



of Caprivi: "They could not have imagined a Chancellor who did not wear a uniform." Even of a man so eminent as Disraeli, MacCarthy gives us the following characterization: In respect of birth, education, exterior, and the instinctive comprehension of things, he was absolutely and entirely foreign in English society. Of all the classes of English society, that with which his intellect, temperament, and education would justify us in presuming him least in sympathy, was that of the landed proprietors. Yet he seems to have taken a special pride in being regarded as an English landed proprietor—or, to be more correct, in being mistaken for an English landed proprietor. Speaking of the limits of English democracy, Sidney Low discloses the *prestige weights* which every Cabinet, of whatever party, is compelled to give a share in the Government. The bulk of the Cabinet is recruited from so-called "society." The class of members from which the great majority of the Cabinet is chosen includes a considerable percentage of aristocrats, side by side with a certain number of members of ancient county families who are wealthy enough to be able to live in style and keep up a big house in London. . . . The ruling *cliques*, says Low, are able to govern because they see one another daily, are always visiting one another, breakfast or dine together, meet in society, and were at the same school or college; they have shot at the rifle range, hunted and yachted together; they frequent the same country seats when they leave the few streets and squares in which they all live in London; practically one-half of them are intimately connected with one another either by blood-relationship or marriage. Yet how is it that one or two *outsiders* do nevertheless drop into office in the Cabinet? Even the most eminent and high-principled *outsider* is generally unable to achieve success unless he has either married into this circle or

acquired sufficient wealth and social prestige to amalgamate with it. Of the English Prime Ministers of the nineteenth century the majority were either aristocrats or nearly related to aristocratic families—such were Grenville, Portland, Liverpool, Grey, Melbourne, John Russell, Aberdeen, Palmerston, Derby, and Salisbury; two of them were scions of wealthy patrician families; and of the three of *bourgeois* origin, Addington was the son of a man who had been medical adviser to the Earl of Chatham, whose powerful support enabled him to get into Parliament. There is no constitutional rule or ordinance prescribing that Ministers shall be appointed from this group; but the force of circumstances generally provides that only members of this group shall be appointed.

A leading politician, says Sidney Low, even if he be a man of eminence of *bourgeois* origin, and even if in his heart he despise all prejudices, to be able to achieve success, must avoid intercourse with men who are poor, unknown, and socially insignificant. And this “prestige” standpoint is above all parties and tendencies. To prove his point, Low compares the lists of the Tory Cabinet of Lord Salisbury (1895) and the Liberal Cabinet of Lord Rosebery (1894–5). Of the 18 Ministers composing the former, 12 were aristocrats; of the 16 members of the latter, 12 were aristocrats and scions of county families. Of the 413 deputies composing the Hungarian Parliament of to-day, 58 are aristocrats, and the rest are mostly members of ancient noble houses. Those who are acquainted with the guiding principles of party organization on the Continent (*e.g.*, in Germany and Hungary), know that it is imperative to take into account prestige questions in nominating candidates, and that a failure to do so would prove fatal to every party. In particular are newly formed unpopular *and* “prestigeless” parties compelled to make psychological concessions. In

a lower stage of culture, the use made of such considerations is of a ruder kind: the Emperor Theodoros was so sensibly conscious of the lack of the aid afforded by the prestige of the Church, that, according to Rolfs, he pointed a pistol at the breast of the Patriarch with these words: "I beg your paternal blessing, holy Father!" We shall on several occasions be compelled to return to the "prestige" relations of the secular powers and the Church. Where the Church already possesses prestige in the eyes of any tribe or class of society, the secular power appearing later on the scene has recourse to the aid of the older prestige of the Church. On the other hand, whenever the Church desires to insinuate itself into an organization of power already formed, it clutches at the older prestige of the secular power, and sends its missionaries first to the king. A prestige borrowed seems surer than one wrested from somebody; the less noise made on its behalf the better. Even Justinian, in his sixth novel, urges the need of harmony between kingship and priesthood. The Middle Ages were the classical age of these efforts. Its events are well known. The Czar is anointed not only monarch but chief priest. The form of oath prescribed for all members of the Holy Synod was as follows: "I swear to recognize the Czar of all the Russians as the supreme judge over the Holy Synod." On the reverse side we find a similar acquisition of prestige in the case of all religious reformations. The spread of the Riamba religion of Africa is due to the exceptional prestige of the King Kalamba. Of the appearance of Buddha we read as follows: "He succeeded in winning for his friend and supporter one of the most powerful princes, who appointed a bamboo grove near his capital for the use of Buddha and his associates in the rainy season. From this moment the fame and glory of the reformer was firmly established." His oldest disciple,

Sanita, describes his joining Buddha in the following terms : "I was of low birth, poor and needy. Mean was the work I did: it was my task to clear away faded flowers. People despised me, took no account of me, and abused me. . . . Then I saw Buddha with his following of monks, as the great hero was entering the most splendid town of the Magadha. I at once threw off my load, stepped up to him, and with reverence bowed before him." Is not the lineage of Jesus who struggled with revolution and martyrdom against the perversions of prestige traced back in the first chapter of the gospel to King David? "So all the generations from Abraham to David are fourteen generations; and from David until the carrying away into Babylon are fourteen generations; and from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are fourteen generations" (Matt. i. 17). Powers in process of organization finally mutually aid one another with prestige. When Pepin the Younger, "not content with the essence of kingly power, longed for its name too," he required a higher sanction: it was given him by the Pope. In return for this, he protected the Pope, "the Holy Church and republic of God," against the Lombards. This guiding principle of mutual prestige-alliance pervades the whole history of the Middle Ages, lending a peculiar psychological flavour to the mediaeval diplomacy of the Roman-German Emperors. But the clearest contribution to this wealthy gallery was made by Buonaparte, when he invited the Pope (Pius VII) to crown him hereditary Emperor of the French on December 2, 1804. That his own prestige, not religious homage to the head of the Church, was his main object is proved by his behaviour during the coronation, the most striking points of which were: he made Pius VII wait, first for two and a half months in Paris, then, on the day of the coronation, an hour and a half in Notre Dame; the Pope strapped the consecrated sword on Napoleon's side, and put



the staff of government in his hand, but it was Napoleon himself who put the crown on his head and then crowned his consort; and after yawningly listening to holy Mass, he had himself crowned once more on the Field of Mars. No wonder that, when he offered the Pope Paris as his residence, the Holy Father answered: "In Paris all that would be left of the Pope would be a poor, everyday monk." And indeed we scarcely find any more coolly calculating, Shylock-like "bleeder" of the prestige of others than Buonaparte was! But this prestige-alliance of the secular and spiritual power has been throwing out fresh—both native and exotic—shoots ever since this ungrateful Emperor had his prestige creditor taken prisoner. According to Ratzel, missionaries generally cannot work with lasting success except when they are able to rely on the support of powerful native rulers. The Austrian Mission in Gondokoro, which began with so much promise, was ruined because the ruling class (being slave-merchants) looked askance at its endeavours. The Roman Emperors utilized the prestige of Greek rhetoric; mediaeval theology withdrew behind the prestige of Aristotle; and Buonaparte did not feel secure on his throne until, in 1810, he wedded a Habsburg archduchess, *the descendant of twenty emperors*.

If we examine all the instances of second-hand prestige pursued in the thousand variations of life with calculating strategy or unconscious chance, we find a uniform feature—it is consistently a question of psychological, not logical, ethical, or aesthetic accession. The new-comer endeavours to take over the most associative points of the older prestiges—to assume what is most effective, most apparent, most actual, most personal. Similarly he will strive above all to attain a dissociation of the most striking divergencies. His one standpoint is to be identified with the older prestige. When the Jesuits appeared among the Nairs of Malabar, they

called themselves Western Brahmins, ate and dressed as Brahmins, simulated a disgust of all that is disgusting to Brahmins, adopted Brahmin customs and practices, pretended to be divided into Jesuits of higher and lower rank; and when a Jesuit carried in a cane chair met a Jesuit on foot they pretended not to know one another. Their teachings were endowed with a Brahmin colouring; they added a fifth book to the Vedas, which—as if by accident—contained the whole Christian revelation. This method of procedure is questionable from the psychological standpoints of Catholicism; the Dominicans actually condemned it; but it is quite clear that the Jesuits' approximation to the people of Malabar was not a logical or ethical, but an *exclusively psychological*, concession. The contrary opinions of the Dominicans may have been due to two suppositions. The first is the supposition that a missionary in such cases—which are constantly recurring elsewhere too—should strive after logical, ethical, and religious conquest, without having recourse to prestige. At first sight, and according to the evidence of previous efforts, every attempt of the kind in dealing with primitive peoples seems so hopeless (not to speak of the numberless instances in history where Dominicans have shown signs of a proper appreciation of prestige), that we may safely leave this first presumption out of account. We have then the second: to create a brand-new prestige untainted with anything pagan, and carry it to triumph over the older barbarian prestige. And indeed we can only regard as an ideal prestige one that has come into existence by means of such a *generatio aequivoca*. But the man in search of prestige was here met by unsurmountable primitive hindrances. The barbarian's mind was under the ineradicable influence of the spell of his fathers, old sages, and ancestral castes. This barbarian prestige had long ceased to employ means; it had

*conditions* already, and worked of itself. The Jesuits evidently took into account the logical and ethical dangers latent in the fountain of errors of foreign associations. But they took into account the disproportionateness of their psychological force too, and reflected on the poverty of their means and the wealthy *given* conditions of the old-world prestige. That is why they chose the insinuation of inherited prestige in preference to the hopelessness of prestige creation.

§ 32. *The honour and prestige of orders.*—The institutional, historical self-assertion of this expansiveness of prestige is to be found in the wealth of prestige-means of the segregations of orders. These segregations—from the formation of *cliques* to the life of orders regulated by law—each developed a standard of inner and outer conduct for their members ; and the two were not only divergent in point of substance, but their psychical quality is also absolutely different. Those belonging to any order display a unity in conformity with their instincts and an estrangement towards those who differ from them—*i.e.*, strangers—equally in conformity with their instincts, and judge of each other's conduct in accordance with the dictates of their intellectual life, their conceptions, and their recognized interests. This *inner point d'honneur*—an accommodation to which, and a non-deviation from which, is dictated by the inner comprehension of the order and its historically developed standpoints of honour—is continually crossing and becoming entangled with the *outer point d'honneur*, but in respect of quality of value diverges from it: this *point d'honneur* looks outwards. This psychology has already a tinge of military discipline ; the possibility of associations *forces a veritable psychological solidarity on the members of the order* ; and in the course of time the psychological means of the dismemberment of orders are selected in so Darwinian

a manner that psychological aberration or sedition becomes practically a curiosity. It is not enough to accommodate himself accurately to the *inner point d'honneur* of the order; every member must remain valuable psychologically too: and the man who does not want to be dropped by the other members of his order must not do any harm to the *psychological* interests of that order. On the other hand, *over and above* the psychical value, the public opinion of the order is indifferent to what its members do outside its pale; the man who pays his "debts of honour" with a trembling hand shows the door to the tradesman presenting his bill; and not even the most fastidious *chevalier* may fight a duel with his barber.

§ 33. *The limited scope of direct sensual influence.*—The desire for the permanency of authority once obtained, the wish that it shall not obey the laws in force for everything that lives and is compelled to fade away appears in some form or other in a somewhat primitive stage. A man of authority—guided by the instinct of self-preservation—is not inclined to content himself with a suitable appreciation of what he has created, done, or arranged, on the part of those whose instincts or interests have been served by that creation, work or arrangement. As the appreciation accorded him by the other members of the horde or tribe flattered the self-respect of the man of authority and favoured his instincts of self-preservation and reproduction of kind, as long as it lasted and as far as it expanded, he instinctively endeavoured to extend his authority in point of area and to maintain it in point of time. However, in itself the direct sensual influence is only able to restrain; its sphere of time and area, its group of means, is narrow, though its intensity is vehement; it is not—by itself—fitted for automatism or permanency. Only the value of the virtual form creates a generality



ready for every eventuality by the aid of its own *accumulator-like means*; for this reason, even of direct sensual influences only those possess general and permanent social importance which after the actual blaze burn on ember-like, in virtuality; and it is better that the virtual means should be strong than that the actual means should be so. The social importance of prestige consists in its virtuality, in its *not being a conflict*: the motives of conduct of the recipients collect in prestige as life does in the cells of a germ, as thought in the meninges. Latent prestige is merely a *possible* actuality; it is quite possible that its turn will never come—just as an armed peace does not necessarily mean the approach of war.

Of endeavours tending towards generalization and automatism, those coming earliest into action are—the causing of astonishment, fear, and subordination, etc., by means of a direct sensual influence, which means call into being a narrow and short-lived lengthening or expansion of authority. However, sensual influences require a disproportionate waste of strength (cf. the Japanese cavalryman in the Grassi Museum at Leipzig, who even as late as 1867 was loaded to the point of exhaustion with ornaments for the purpose of instilling fear), and are able to extend only to a particularly small number of individuals. Further, they destroy the mental elasticity of the recipient, and produce narcotism, not a quietive.

Speaking of artificial perversions, Topinard says: “The flatness of the forehead—where sometimes the forehead runs remarkably far back, a characteristic of the Aztecs—is by some peoples called *the transformation of courage*.” The forehead is generally very narrow, much lower and longer than in the case of an ordinary skull; one result of this is that in consequence of the pressure on the forehead the sockets of the eyes flatten downwards, the latter fact

resulting in the balls of the eyes being more prominent (hence the epithet "of courage"). Lubbock tells us of the Columbians of Nootka, that among them there prevailed a universal custom of artificially flattening the head. A plate of wood was firmly tied to the forehead of the baby lying in a trough or cradle, and the child's skull was tortured in this manner until it was able to walk. Its eyes stood athwart, the balls of its eyes swelled and became fixed in an upward direction. With many peoples, says Lubbock, only male children were treated to this distortion. In ancient Peru a veritable dismemberment of classes came into being by means of these transformations of the skull. Of the inhabitants of Vadai in the Soudan, Nachtigall tells us that the swelling of the skin between the ear and the neck by rubbing in suitable materials (which, according to the people of Vadai, was a sign of warlikeness and courage), was regarded as the chief ornament of manhood. With the North-West Indians the wooden wedge worn exclusively by women, which so completely deforms their lips, is a sign of social rank and distinction; while the inhabitants of New Guinea try to enhance their power of instilling fear by artificially lengthening their ears. The artificial transformation of the shape of the head, which is a universal and respected custom among the Columbians, is forbidden their slaves, the normal shape of whose heads is the mark of slavery. But the significance of all these artificial means of preserving the power to frighten is far surpassed by that of the preservative appearances constitutionally given. Numberless conflicts are avoided even in a primitive horde by the restraining effect of stature and a sonorous voice. To this is added later on the effect of rude numbers, to resist which is extremely difficult. However, all these conditions led at most to the establishment of superficial causality, and to rash calculations of probability. And as there can be no

question of active following, a preservation of sensual fear of this kind can at all times be only *restraining*; other sentiments intrude into the consciousness and drive prestige out. The king who rose a head taller than the crowd, the leader whose terrible voice silenced all contradiction, is not unknown even on a disproportionately higher level of the life of man. Even to-day the point singled out for praise in the political orator and the vicar-elect, by the peasant, is that "he is a fine strapping fellow," "a splendid man"; in the county hall, at the mass meeting, in the school and on the field of battle, resolution expressed in power of voice is more than once of decisive importance; but the preservative power of such sensual values is rather limited: it cannot prevent a conflict hand-to-hand, nor is it capable of creating automatism. Stupefaction, horror, paralyses, but it does not quietize; and its effect rarely extends beyond the actual, only exceptionally beyond the stupefied and horrified individual.

The preservative endeavour of power makes a gigantic stride in advance when the accent of the sensual effect is on generalization and automatism, when it strives not to kill self-consciousness, but to use it for its own purposes. Here the sensual effect has the power, not to restrain, but to *keep back*; it is already somewhat more widened in its scope, and may lead to the formation of a class, as Herodotus tells us of the Thracians, that with them a tattooed man was noble, the man who was not tattooed was ignoble. Speaking of the American savages, Starcke contrasts integrating with differentiating tattooing. The crumbling fragments of the clans are kept together by the tattooing, painting, and ornamentation that is now common only among savage peoples; by their aid the imagination preserves symbols of space to resign itself entirely and unconditionally to their influence. It is from his tattoo that the savage recognizes his fellow

tribesman even in far-distant lands; and this token has such power over the disposition that persons similarly tattooed do not fight against one another. As contrasted with this, according to Starcke, *within the tribe*, tattooing is an apt means of differentiation and creating distances, and of leading to the formation of "classes" by striking and permanent accentuation. It is in this way that nobility developed among the Gnyakurus. In general men and women are tattooed differently—a person of higher rank usually more richly. McGee gives us similar data concerning the Seri Indians. But all these tokens are restricted in scope, and yet excessively trivial; we can recognize the tendency to differentiation in them, but they are incapable of refinement, and are conspicuously unsuitable for the sentimental conquest of groups more extensive than clans and secret associations. There is a certain monotonous insipidity in these integrating and differentiating ornamentations of the body—something of material rigidity; and they are wanting in capability of development.

As it increases in numbers, becomes permanent, and dismembered, society continually narrows the sphere of the prestige of momentary excitement. The means of direct sensual influence are soon worn out; the dissociations it creates are rapidly overtaken; and the town, the Press, and the telegraph soon probe its depths. The development of industry facilitated the imitation and reproduction of the brilliancy of yore at pleasure; it was only the severity of the law that for the moment restrained the *libertini*, the emancipated, the courtesans, from dressing and strutting about just like those endowed with old prestige. Pompous differentiation is always on the heels of prestige; nor has any one succeeded in isolating or seizing by right of rank a grain of it. On the one hand conception, on the other imitation, is continually on the watch for this prestige, this



sentimental provocation, to deprive it of its personal tinge and make it material, to make of the somebody an anybody. Just because it is a democratic possibility, and because everybody may desire it, it is not adapted to the conquest of democracy, of the everybody. The footman sitting on the box, the crowd of silk-stockinged lackeys, the bejewelled ornaments, the thoroughbred coach-horses, and the clothes of dazzling colours, have lost their power to create prestige, ever since everybody has found out the registry office, the jeweller's shop, the horsedealer, the tailor, etc., who supplied them; ever since they have become conceivable and appraisable; ever since the distance separating the owner of brilliance from the recipient of prestige has become expressible in money and working days. It was in sumptuous banquets that the rich inhabitant of primitive Columbia paraded his wealth, to make it more permanent by the aid of dazzling show. The primitive warrior and the women of savage tribes cover themselves with all kinds of coloured trash and paint their faces and bodies to secure a special place in the public consciousness. The Habsburgs of Spain spent 130,000 ducats a year in livery. All in vain! Life observes the materialistic and easily overtakes it.

§ 34. *Words and taciturnity*.—Permanent and numerous societies are kept together *from within*, when the bounds of society have already exceeded the limits of mere penetration, by the organically developed uniformity of languages. Words being the most far-reaching and accommodating means of effectiveness, prestige from the beginning turns them to its advantage. A large vocabulary ensures chieftainship with primitive peoples, and political leadership with backward countries and large masses; a peasant desirous of securing prestige in gentlemen's society becomes garrulous. But even here the difference is evident. A chief who is a splendid manipulator of words stands face to face

with the other members of his tribe, and as it were strives with them, like Eskimos in their word-duels; unless he hypnotizes them, he will be compelled to accommodate himself to the opinion and patience of his hearers; in a primitive stage anybody may get up and gainsay him. From his words the tribesman probably expects a superstitious effect, or communications of importance for the tribal life, as well as harmonizing sentiments; the orator-chief probably only expresses more clearly what is dimly latent in the others, for, if he does not express that, any one of the tribesmen taking part in the council may contradict him. But the political leader and the garrulous peasant talk in accordance with quite different psychological laws. The latter does not know whom he is addressing, but desires to affect according to his own ideas and to assert himself; and as gentleman = "many words," it is with a flow of language that the peasant endeavours to resemble those whom he scarcely knows at all except by their deluge of words in politics, at the bar, and in the Press. The peasant desires to acquire prestige by words, for he must see that a man who to the end of his days ploughs the fields, breeds animals, and prunes vines, may indeed become a well-to-do farmer, but that the well-dressed "gents" who are his masters and with whom even the king converses, are recruited (by means of some incomprehensible spell) only from those who possess a vocabulary. This peasant conception assumes a positive shape and is incarnated in the politician. The latter feels that, as between two men, words mean merely a possibility of inter-consciousness, not necessarily understanding; he feels that there are not only "*voices crying in the wilderness*," dead letters, but that on the other side there is an echo, and that letters do not merely spring into being, but are able to kill too. The significance of speech is twofold. It gives man what

Nature has denied him ; it affords equal signs in systematic connection for our observations that are partly uniform, partly changing ; and thereby “our reflection obtains a control of things that is infinitely more thorough and at the same time more comprehensive.” But the social significance of speech shows a deviation. Here speech has to *condescend* ; the words no longer flow with the compulsoriness of tears and sweat, but get themselves ready, and, as far as possible, accommodate themselves to the consciousness of others. And the more the distance increases and the difference of consciousness becomes distended, the greater the forcedness or self-management of words. The directness of gesture, movement, play of features, is lacking in written and printed words ; words tire in the unequal race, and even though not intended for an end in themselves, they reach the goal quite out of breath ; their colour and aroma are gone ; the dust of phrases and commonplaces overruns reflection. Words crumbling to pieces and vacillating in their meaning, words running hither and thither and inconstant—enormous masses of such words belie the definition of Leibniz, that words are the mirror of intellect. Words are, as it is, a tremendous humiliation of the *individual* mind, the most magnificent democratic experiment in the life of the human tribe, the search after *others*, accommodation to the other and the more, a sacrifice of colours and nuances, an indistinct reduction of psychical niceties to the rude movements of the organs of speech and hearing : a man is never so profoundly an opportunist as the first time he speaks. And what happens when words break loose from their essence, when words no longer mould our experiences, but time and tedium ?—this syntax of words thrown out at random, underlined, smuggled in, flattering and capable of turning us aside—the speech of *non-*

*understanding* and *misunderstanding*—how completely it has clouded over and obscured our contemplation of man! Speech continues to afford an increasing number of negatives for the use of extensive and permanent groups of men; and *this defensive position characterizes the part played by speech among the means of prestige*. All that in dealing with which we may reasonably expect that the future will be a mere repetition of the past, in words obtains an integrating means; but all that is personal, of the future of which we are not in a position to presume that it will be a mere repetition of the past, in words is naturally and artificially differentiated and set apart. This second, *defensive* position appears in two opposite extremes, of which the loquacious politician and the taciturn diplomat, French *causerie* and English reserve, are perhaps not bad examples.

Words have acquired for man excellent possibilities of prestige; by them he is most able to satisfy the two opposing requirements of prestige (interest, dissociation); by words we are enabled to *affect* in such a way that we ourselves *remain at a distance*; in dealing with remarkably large circles of men words are well adapted to call attention to psychical values, at the same time diverting attention from intuitive and intellectual values—how different is the Roosevelt hunting lions in the primeval forest to the Roosevelt hunting for “effect” on the platform of a political meeting! And when the sounds become letters, prestige acquires still better conditions of existence—how much easier it is to watch his psychical values for the statesman who, remaining in the background, “inspires” the *communiqués* of his semi-official organ, than for the half-naked elder whose arguments are listened to with a shaking of the head at the council of an Australian clan!



The abstraction ready to hand in prestige may be cultivated by words, (α) roughly, in masses—*e.g.*, the flood of words, facetiousness, flowery phrases, are only rough prestige-means that easily become universal, which are not capable of more than stupefaction or momentary delusion; simple people listening to a rush of words of the kind generally agree with the man *who happens to be speaking*; there is an entire lack of automatic recurrence of prestige. However, words are capable (β) of inspiring more lasting prestige too, when they connect a person (like a thought) with an unmistakable word-symbol, a name; we are familiar with the complete identification with which savages practically infuse life into a name—and it is no wonder, for it is in names that the tribe, the individual, affects them, peculiarly, not like things; for them a name is the representative image of the incomprehensible; and we have a more developed copy of this behaviour in the name-worship of more recent times. We need only refer to the importance of the name-taboo in a low stage of culture, to the changes of language that here and there accompany the accession or death of the king, when the barbarian tongue replaces with others all the words that are reminiscent of the king's name; and even if we did not agree with the very rational explanation that all these measures form part of the *raffinement* of separation, in the creation of prestige they had to take part even though unintentionally. Finally (γ) prestige is created by the lingual obstructions hindering intercourse by words, where we long for such intercourse; this we find in the prohibitions of address, which reach from the Papuans to the lackeys serving in silence, in the well-known nuances of salutations and titles, in the sacred speech of the sexes, priests, upper classes, the latest freaks of which are the *jargon* of clubs and the facetious slang of the half-

educated; to this category belong all exertions of speech, *the object or effect of which is not understanding, but a failure to understand.*

But words are continually losing their power to bring into being an automatic, lasting prestige. "Sire," said General Richelieu, who had lived during the reigns of three kings, to Louis XVI, "Under Louis XIV no one dared to speak a word, under Louis XV people spoke quite softly, under your majesty they speak quite loud already." The spread of knowledge forces democracy on speech, and it is only the shining, solitary mysticism of religion that tolerates differences of tongue; the rest prove in turn learnable, imitable, purchasable. The hunt after separation here, too, is compelled to create a paradox: prestige escapes from words to taciturnity.

In all of us there is latent an anxiety lest our failings should be discovered—a heap of questions for which we have no answer, and of the putting of which we are afraid—a number of movements and excitements which we cannot account for. A taciturn man is the possibility of the discovery of our hidden failings; he does not mingle his words and movements with ours, and for that reason we feel as if he were not with us, as if he did not mix with us. The intercourse of a taciturn man with a loquacious one arouses a feeling of difference of rank in the latter; speech and bustling movement is not the habit of security, but of defence and struggle. Diplomacy, the calling of which is the suggestion of security, partly for this reason employs aristocrats everywhere. Taciturnity affects with the waxlike softness of unlimited possibilities; a man who keeps silence has the marshal's staff still in his *sabretache*.

Here again we must beware of temptingly rational explanations. If with certain savage tribes a woman has

to maintain silence for a certain time after the celebration of her marriage, there may be numerous reasons for this dating from primitive times. There must have been religio-pedagogical reasons for the Aleutic wizards training their novices to taciturnity ("The others may chatter at will," Elie Reclus tells us of them, "only he must keep silence as befits seers and prophets"). Of St. Louis of Gonzaga we read that at last he failed even to notice his surroundings: conduct of this kind is inspired by mystic motives, not by any hope of prestige; nevertheless there is no denying the prestige-creating power of such conduct. Of St. Joseph we read that "scarcely any words proceeded from his lips; his taciturnity was like the homage we feel towards the ineffable; it was a renunciation of speech in the presence of the unfathomable and immeasurable"; but even these pious words show that "this man buried in silence" created a prestige for himself even in the eyes of the biographer of posterity. The silence of the Senate and the Upper Chamber, the muffled speech of cultured societies, is no doubt the result of sensibility accompanying the refinement of the nerves, but to the outside world, *volens-nolens*, it contains sphinx-like suggestions. The taciturnity of Englishmen is probably the consequence of temperament and historical chance; but has not this nation of dumb men, as Carlyle calls his compatriots, acquired a prestige centuries old due to this taciturnity? Silence may be a sign of individual transfiguration, refinement of nerves, decadence ("I hate movement," Baudelaire makes Beauty say, "which upsets the contour, and I never weep or smile"), but out of this silence, involuntarily, there peeps out upon us the mediaeval prestige of the *maleficium taciturnitatis*, though without any terrible nuance.

Prestige, being no longer able to shelter in hiding behind words, escapes to the twilight of taciturnity. Herewith the

differentiating power and inexhaustible spell of silence joins the ranks of the means of prestige.

§ 35. *Taciturnity and secrecy*.—Taciturnity must be clearly distinguished from secrecy, which “produces a separation of initiated and excluded.” A secret has a sharply defined sphere; it is not an immeasurable possibility; its effect is startling and concentrating, its result a motive, not a quietive. A secret is an objectively localized silence; silence is a personally localized secret, which is thus of unfathomable profundity. A secret, too, may refer to a whole person or circle, as in the case of the African ruler retiring behind a curtain when he speaks with a stranger: but in this case the removal is once more merely localized, measurable, touchable; it is only when—as in some secret associations of savages—the secret is wrapped in the sentiment of the incalculable, the unanalysable, that it deepens to unfathomableness and that other substances of consciousness are unable any more to dissect it.

§ 36. *The prestige of a calm man*.—Calmness is in the world of actions what taciturnity is in that of thoughts; just as the latter enjoys logical prestige, if only endowed in other respects with adequate psychical values, so a calm man too, whatever else may be the cause or result of his calmness, enjoys moral prestige, if only in other respects psychically valuable. Calmness and reserve suggest a presumption of a certain measure of inaccessibility, of completeness, wholeness, unanalysability; on the other hand we feel a skipping, bustling, excited, over-lively person to be as it were a competitor, unprepared, notionally accessible. Naturally there are several varieties of calmness. There is one kind of which we feel intuitively, or see intellectually, that it is necessary; the sympathy or respect due to calmness of this kind is a logical or ethical, or at any rate aesthetic fact, but it is not prestige. The



feeling with which we think of the coolness of the captain of the sinking ship giving his order "Ladies first" is not prestige. We must be conscious that a more profound sentiment has arisen in our minds, which we cannot call prestige. The calmness, the necessity of which we feel, is not accompanied by prestige; but there is prestige attached to the calmness of which we do not know what need there is of it or what it means—and to the reserve the object of which is unknown. Not the calmness in which we are able to trust, but that which reduces our self-confidence, possesses prestige—not the reassuring calmness, but the disquieting calmness, the reserve which is incapable of infecting us.

§ 37. *Manners endowed with prestige.*—The manner of our style and thoughts, as well as the manners of conduct expressed in social intercourse, do not possess prestige, unless they realize all that has been said of words, of silence, of resolution, and of calmness. Manners possess a veritable logical, ethical, and aesthetic value; they are the concrete, simple, elementary, easily observable appearance of a part of our true values; often manners mean taste, tact, refinement; as we cannot probe men's hearts, it is not by any means superficiality but a psychical compulsion that impels us, in our dealings with strangers, to pay special attention to their manners; manners often babble, often play the traitor, often bring up secrets from the depths of individuality, more than once open breaches through which we can survey the whole contingent of tact, taste, and refinement at the disposal of an individual, group, or circle. But just because manners are a concrete, simple, elementary, easily observable phenomenon, they are easily acquirable and appropriable: what we call good manners, unexceptionable behaviour, is often merely a psychological value—not refinement, but *finesse*. Good manners really

mean that a man should not be a burden to his fellows even in social intercourse; behind this reserve, however, there may be hollowness, *want of substance*, which *could* not be a *burden* to others; smoothness may be an end in itself. In essence good manners are the taking into account of the prestige-creating psychical standpoints in writing, speech, and conduct; for this reason it is one of the most elementary, most democratic means of prestige, and there are societies (*e.g.*, English society or international diplomacy) where a man of bad manners is least capable of securing prestige.

§ 38. *Friendship and intercourse*.—In the realm of prestige friendship alternates with *intercourse*. Friendships are contracted by those who are instinctively attracted to one another or capable of co-operating intellectually and ethically; the more they have to say to one another, the better friends they are. Of those who only “hold intercourse” with one another, one party at least looks for nothing else than psychical value; those interests of association and dissociation which in the given case are followed by the most valuable psychical results *externally*, determine the form and frequency of intercourse. They must “hold intercourse,” because prestige has need of opportunities of “clinging” and of a certain frequency of repetition, in order to spread from one man to the other; the plutocrat must “hold intercourse” with aristocrats, the aristocrat with artists, etc. The pretence and ceremoniousness of the intercourse, the lack of freshness and directness, the forcedness of the conversation, shows that here it is not a question of a sovereign meeting of men, but of the mechanical co-operation of psychical means. To be present everywhere where the psychically valuable show themselves, and to be present in such a manner that one’s presence seems to verify, universally but not conspicuously,

that one is in place—that is the conscious or unconscious object of social “intercourse.” The word “intercourse” itself as it were emphasizes the external, physical associative character of men’s meetings; and as it cannot affect inner sentiments, and can have only an object as towards the outside world, it is carried on for the sake, not of the actors themselves, but of others.

§ 39. *The family.*—According to Baldwin, we may establish a *spontaneous* dependence universally in the child; Bain discovers a kind of primitive credulity in children; poets speak of the beautiful trustfulness of children; parents, if they are alive to their responsibility, feel the gravity of the fact that the child makes deities of its father and mother. “The father is more often his first divinity, *since he is not exposed so constantly to the child’s scrutiny.*” In this second sentence Baldwin speaks of the exceptional psychological situation of the father (Herbart explains it by intellectual causes); and his data are supported by a whole mass of facts. And, indeed, even a matriarchate is generally compelled to leave prestige with the father. According to Westermarck, a matriarchate means that the child is called after the mother, not after the father, and further that property and rank are inherited exclusively on the mother’s side; but it certainly does not involve a denial of the father’s right. With those Australian tribes which stand on the basis of female succession, the father is notwithstanding the unconditional master of his children. We have similar data from Melanesia, from Madagascar, etc. The father is the only person in dealing with whom the person-worship of the child is prestige-like, for they are in a common setting of sentiment, without the father bothering to train or to play with the child. Of the primitive worship of China, Farjenal tells us that it ensures the fathers a practically holy character in the

imagination of men and makes them future gods in the eyes of the children. In every country of Islam the father possesses a peculiar prestige. In Morocco, says Westermarck, it is a remarkably curious sight to see even grown-up boys gliding away when they hear their father's steps. The primitive Roman family is compared by Ferrero to a little monarchy, at the head of which stands the father as autocrat: only he can possess property, only he can sell and buy, and make contracts. Of his son—as of his slave—he can demand unconditional obedience without regard for the boy's age or the office he held. He unsparingly made the recalcitrant child feel his power, although opposition, as a result of this state of things practically amounting to servitude, was very rare even in cases of grave humiliation. "A refractory son could be driven away from home, thrust into poverty, sold as a slave or condemned to do menial work, by a Roman father; even a consul commanding the army, if he returned to his parents' home, could be compelled by his father to obey like a child. He was the judge of his wife, his children, grandchildren, and slaves, and in certain cases could condemn them to death."

The father's psychological situation in itself does not make such power (a parallel to which we find among the ancient Germans) intelligible. Here too, as with the Chinese, we must presume a primitive religious cult and a kindly passivity on the part of the State. "The aristocratic republic," says Ferrero, "allowed these little monarchies dating from time immemorial to live on, at the same time setting them under its suzerainty and enlisting them into the service of its aims, for what was required in the interests of moral and political order was much more easily effected through fathers in their family circles than through officials in the State. On the other



hand, by virtue of their enormous power, the fathers were for a long time easily able to suppress the desire for reformation of the growing generations, which in every age brought progress into connection with the degeneration of morals. Thus both boys and girls were ingrafted with an unswerving adherence to traditions and ancient customs." It is the calculating indulgence of the State that in old ages makes possible an unlimited *patria potestas* as an administration of "customs" (Hearn); and indeed the children were only liberated by institutions under those Roman emperors in whose time bureaucracy developed its full splendour.

Among the spontaneous behaviours of the child the father's "prestige," the only fixed point in the spontaneous course of the sentiments, rises up sheer like some solitary rocky headland. As a result of the collapse of the primitive cult and of the formation of a State bureaucracy, we have inherited only the refined, psychological elements of the *patria potestas*; but these elements are for this reason all the more easily investigated. As we have said, the father lives in a common *sentimental* household with his children; Herbart emphasizes the extent to which the father is the centre of interest of the whole family, and Bain and Baldwin lay stress on the dissociatedness of the father's image. With a child the general hindrance to the development of prestige is the fact that it is an end in itself, its pure humanity is still virgin, autonomous: to what instinct or understanding binds it, it approaches with affection, it makes up to it, makes friends with it; its behaviour is most natural and reaches the zenith of its affection just where a presentiment or recognition of *similarity* and *nearness* most impels it. Children are little artists, poets of fine instinct, but there is very little of the servile in them. And where a child is not impelled by its heart, it behaves towards dissociatedness with indiffer-

ence or estrangement. The father's person is the only one which for the child behaves, so to say, eclectically—the first meeting of the two extremes, sentimental generalization and notional abstraction. As it is not restrained by any competition, the spell of the father, particularly in a low stage of culture (tribal or barbarian), is the first fixed point around which the sentiments of the child assemble in the guise of prestige. The primitive chieftain and State power—possessing, as we have seen, no prestige of its own with the younger—forms an alliance with the *patria potestas* in exactly the same way as elsewhere, or later, with magicians.

§ 40. *Old age*.—Older writers spoke of old age as if its all-enchaining spell had been the leading phenomenon of primitive tribal life. In contrast to this, later researches, such as those of Spencer and Gillen, as well as the remarkably thorough Australian memoirs of Howitt, have proved that in the primitive age we can at most speak of the authority of the elders, but that there is no question of prestige, and that the prestige of old age is evidently a later development. Of the tribal life of Central Australia, Spencer and Gillen tell us that the old age of the head of a group, the *alatunja*, does not in itself involve a special distinction for him unless it is coupled with eminent qualities. Although the same *alatunja* is the depositary of the secrets of the *totem* elders, and although approach to the *ertnatalunga*, the shrine of the group, which is under his care, is forbidden, under pain of death, to women, children, and all uninitiated persons, this phenomenon is evidently of a purely religious nature, because the spell does not spread to the depositaries of secrets. With certain tribes of South-East Australia the oldest member of the *totem* is the *pinnaru*, or chief. But this chief personally possesses authority only, which extends within the

limits of his own group. At Lake Hope, Howitt, this accurate authority on tribal life, found that the *pinnaru*, who was made chief of one of the *totems* on account of his age, was in other respects able to acquire only a very moderate personal influence, as he did not distinguish himself either as hero, medicine-man, or orator. Even where superstition or other causalities lend a certain measure of prestige to the elders of savage peoples, this can be produced only artificially, by the aid of secrets and ceremonies, which, however, the excited curiosity of the other tribesmen is not long in getting to the bottom of. We read of a case of a collapse of prestige of this kind in Codrington, who writes as follows of the spell of the old men of Florida: For years no *matambala* festivals had been held; the younger generation knew already how things stood, although the elders had not renounced their faith and remained true to their belief that there was something supernatural about it all. When finally the chief person of the federation too had been baptized, everybody entered the holy precincts without fear; the wooden idols became toys, and only the old men sat there, lamenting the profanity and the loss of their power and privileges. Westermarck, too, is compelled to confess that the spell of old age ceases the moment the old man becomes so feeble that the horde or tribe is no longer able to transport him or keep him, or if his mental faculties suffer conspicuous decay.

As it is just in the lowest stage of culture that we fail to meet with the *prestige* of elders—merely with their *authority*—we may fairly presume that the same does not appear in the child's mind either with the same spontaneous feeling of compulsion as the father's prestige, and that we shall in vain look for traces of the *given, natural* prestige of old age in the requisites of a child's education.

That respect and admiration enjoyed by the elders in the

tribal and barbarian stage of life is least conspicuous in the case of children, and nowhere is it restricted to children only. And this phenomenon has a character partly suggestive of authority, partly religious. Old age, says Westermarck with remarkable aptness, has the value of rarity with savages, as the average age with them is a very low one, and they are compelled either to leave behind or to kill the majority of old men. Further, again in a primitive stage, but as a result of the nature of things, least of all in children's minds, the knowledge of old age too ensures authority: where there is no wide and profound public opinion, tribal traditions, ceremonies, experiences, extensive in area and time, can only be acquired in the course of a long life. This respect, however, is authority, not prestige. And if we add to this authority in thought the fear of the dead characterizing primitive peoples and the propinquity of old age to death, we have arrived at the religious cult of old age. But it is without prestige-hindrances that social development later creates the type of *child-king* and *old servants*. Just as it is desirable that the esteem for old age should finally leave the sacred books and enter life, so is it clear that the reports of the mystic spell of old age do not correspond to the facts, in the primitive stage of culture in particular. Old age may have an intellectual and moral effect on a child's soul; but it has no mystic spell, no prestige.

§ 41. *Education.* (a) *Education tending to lend others prestige in our eyes.*—The direct sincerity of children at all times psychologically prevents the ingrafting of the prestige of those who objectively would have prestige-values on the child's soul—such ingrafting being generally charged against “class-pedagogy.” Prestiges do not appear until later, but for the most part so imperceptibly that when they are already there we attribute their insinuation to the unconscious years



of childhood. A child may be imbued with certain habits (mechanical salutation, casting down of the eyes, etc.), reminiscent of prestige, but the state of mind does not thereby become prestige-influenced, and the child will still continue to gaze with the same admiration at the efforts of the woodcutter, and the skill of the locksmith, as at the cardinal in his robes of state. On a country estate in Hungary, several children engrossed in looking at the squire's coach were asked which they would prefer to be—the squire seated on the soft cushions of the coach or the coachman seated on the box. With remarkable unanimity the children all decided in favour of the latter.

(b) *Education tending to give us prestige in the eyes of others.*—If education is incapable of making children receive prestige, it may prepare the way for the *possession* of prestige; for possession is not a phenomenon playing its part in the *mind* of the child; here the spontaneity of childhood is not a hindrance. One of the main objects of education and instruction with the psychologically valuable men, groups, and circles of all times is to teach knowledge, movements, words, and manners distinguishing them from other men, groups, and circles, but for that reason—or for that very reason only—attracting attention to them; and one of the undeclared cardinal problems of the present education of girls is the creation of prestige in dealings with men. A boy of distinction learns a special tongue not understood by the vulgar; scholarship in Hindustan is a monopoly of the Brahmins, the mystics of the magicians in Persia, etc. The ideal of education of the Greeks was more immediately simpler, more manly. But even Lucian characterizes with biting sarcasm the pedagogy immersed in the hunt after prestige: “Don’t expect of me,” he makes the rhetor of the young man desirous to shine say, “anything that you can compare with this or that, because my business is super-

natural and wonderful." "Your voice must be sonorous, your manners insolent, and your gait like mine; all this is very necessary, in fact it is often enough in itself." "Always walk in the company of many, and always have a book with you. Above all pay special care to your external appearance and be careful to dress tastefully." "Amass a collection of unintelligible, strange expressions rarely occurring even in ancient writers . . . then the general public will esteem you and admire your eminent refinement." Such is the bitter scorn which the dazzling sophistry of the workshops of prestige, the rhetors' schools, compels Lucian to employ. Evolution, in the endeavour to manufacture prestige, had departed very far from the ideal of life of Socrates—the personal identity of philosophers and kings.

Schools enter the service of prestige as menials. The later Greek schools taught less and less with the object of making the children's noblest capacities actual, and of enriching the good and pure life of childhood in the years of the possibilities of moulding. The ideal of thought of Plato degenerated into a prestige-tool hunting after effect; no longer were those the most popular teachers who were wisest and richest in knowledge, but those who were able to train the youth for the most perfect display.

The picture—as a result of the advance of importance of politics—darkens as we look at the pseudo-Greek cultural life of Imperial Rome. Tacitus tells us that even in the days of the Republic no one acquired political power without a command of words. Even in the days of the Empire rhetorical power was required, not only by lawyers and teachers, but by officers and officials of high rank, senators and statesmen, and indeed by all who desired to make a mark. The first public chairs endowed by the emperors in Rome were those of Greek rhetoric; even Vespasian, who was

in other respects eminently practical and closefisted, included this item (100,000 s.) in the Budget. Besides rhetoric, scarcely anything was taught beyond a certain amount of geometry and music; but numerous smaller towns in Italy and the provinces too established a chair of rhetoric. From these costly "chairs" the whole psychology of the *representative man* (of whom a numerous general staff was required in conquering Rome), including, as leading motive, the art of acquiring prestige, was taught to every one who cared to attend the lectures. Even Quintilian—who set up an inevitable connection between morals and eloquence, and demanded that the *rhetor bonus* should be a *vir bonus* too—not only gives orators thorough advice concerning gestures, voice-economy and modulation, but offers detailed instructions in respect of their external appearance and dress; in his opinion the orator required instruction not only of the musician but of the actor too. The subordination of culture to prestige-aims was so general and radical that it was used as a cloak for moral depravity, and Tacitus tells us that it was with his dilettantisms that Nero endeavoured to distract attention from his faults of character. The splendid Greek method of education, the public competition of forces and the palm-branch and ivy won thereby, were succeeded by the rivalry of brilliant pseudo-learning and specious show; the poets' wreaths were now made of gold, and they were readily entwined in the crown of the emperor, however incapable he might be. Many desired to learn rhetoric, "partly for the sake of defence in law courts, partly for glory's sake." Training in grammar and rhetoric formed a part of the *bon ton*; and what preceded the school at home in the house of a distinguished Roman, the *educatio mollis et blanda* so vehemently attacked by Seneca, was the hot-house of the mania for prestige. In these days of garrulous babble the famous maxim of Cicero—*virtutis enim*

*laus omnis in actione consistit*—was merely a faded pedagogic anachronism.

For the analyser of prestige there is scarcely any more instructive source of information than a comparison of the *two ideals of education*—the Greek and the Roman—from the point of view of the highest endeavours and of ethics. The ambition of the Greeks sprang into being from the roots of the physical constitution, morality, and intuition. At the Olympic Games, in public life, in the schools of the philosophers, we see to measure the strength of the youthful body, fresh harmony, and clear logic. The victory, applause, and respect which the youth of Sparta and Athens prepared themselves, with tension of muscle and earnestness of eye, to reap, which was the prize of the ivy-crowned victory won in the presence of an interested, but at the same time understanding, crowd of spectators, did not mean a break with the physical, with the moral, aesthetic, and logical basis. The hot-house laurel, the gigantic palms of winter gardens, were unknown to classical Greek education. In the days of Athens' glory the greatest of all distinctions attainable was the *authority* which was democratically controllable because it was understood. *With the Greeks the competition, with the Romans the effect, was the main principle:* in the education of Sparta and Athens authority was the object to be attained by much labour—in the schools of rhetoric and noble houses of Rome the personal distinction that could be obtained with a certain amount of skill, the externals, and prestige obtained the predominance, and later became ends in themselves. Yet, right up to a short time ago, the essence of our system of education, and more particularly of instruction (with certain sound fibres into the bargain), was inherited from Rome—not merely from Cicero, but from the prestige-centuries of decadence and rhetoric



practised for itself. But this hunt after effect was in Rome for a fairly long period a State-forming force, an imperialistic necessity, a political compulsion in her dealings with the barbarians. Only Rome has passed away, and the pedagogy of effectomania has remained as our legacy. Men continued to pose and recite in the little *duodec* States and in county assemblies, in schools and in the forum, as if nothing had happened in the meantime; people continued to accommodate themselves to the acoustics of the world empire that had long become a thing of the past. Even to-day we are inclined to regard pose as at most a want of taste, an aesthetic fault, which has no profound ethical meaning, and to punish which a mild derision is enough. Yet the time will come when not only the Spencerian theory but the sarcasm of history itself will destroy that ornamental plaster of pose laid on the columns of Greek gaiety and the simplicity of Jesus by a decadent Rome, when eyes of reproach will glance back over two thousand years which ancient Rome helped to fill with *poseurs* raising prestige to the dignity of an end in itself with the *charlatans* of literature, science, philosophy, law and politics. Education aiming at imitation and externals is the inheritance of Rome in her decay; its only object is to differentiate from the masses and to win applause; its relation to real knowledge is characterized by the words of Bruno: *la vedova di buone lettere*.

§ 42. *Prestige in public opinion*.—Of old, grown-up men were educated by the crowd, the market-place, the forum; to-day, grown-up men (we refer, of course, in both cases to the average men) are educated by the Press. The crowd, the market-place, the forum are means of actual, the Press of virtual, prestige. To-day the most conspicuous kinds of *communiqués* and leading-article epithets are rather detrimental than beneficial to the prestige of

politicians, bankers, and writers in the eyes of those more intellectual persons who possess a decisive importance; since the severity of the limits of public opinion and advertisement has relaxed, since the managers of daily papers have come into intimate connection with the editors, and more particularly since this propinquity has become a part of the public consciousness, the prestige-creation of the leading journals has been obliged to resort to two negative fields of action. First, they pass by men in silence, and thereby prevent the mere association of names, the starting-point of sentiment. Secondly, they help to dissociate, ignoring, in connection with certain persons, circles, classes, and countries, news that would present the same before public opinion as prestige-less. Even to-day the Press is a scarcely appreciable power in this negative prestige creation. It is only of the public who read *boulevard* journals (Yellow Press) with their thirst for up-to-date sensations that we can accept as true to-day the words of Bismarck concerning the prestige of the printed letter. ("Everybody," he said, "who reads only the official gazette in the country, not to speak of the Bible and the Psalms, considered the printed letter to be true, *because it was printed*.") Prestige is not so much created, as preserved, by the important journal of to-day; we have already spoken of the detrimental effect of the tinge of the manager's office on vacillating judgments. The authority which a journal—for objective reasons, for the individual weight of the person in question—is compelled to frequently mention or to help in attaining universality, remains exempt from the externals of forced "puff"; the beginner passed over in silence by the Press is incapable of acquiring prestige; the man of prestige praised to death by a journal excites suspicion among a continually widening circle of men, and challenges the

attention of analysis; finally, the automatism of prestige is served by the Press when (for whatever motive) it maintains silence about what in the personal is vulgar, clumsy, ridiculous, when it "touches up" the commonplace toast of the politician and "omits to record" all that might create a prejudice against the personal or facilitate the analysis of the personal to a conception. No doubt the *Temps* is much more likely to restrict itself to the negative, to the preservation of prestige, than the *boulevard* journals deifying Boulanger; probably the *Osservatore Romano* writes more nobly drafted, more reserved articles on the birthday of the Pope, than the provincial paper writing about the parish priest; the prestige of the house of Rothschild is no doubt enhanced by quite different literary means to those employed by a bank desirous of disposing of its lottery tickets. It is when even the negative activity lacks any conspicuous tendency, when people cannot perceive the personal bias of public opinion or of the series of articles, that the Press affords the highest quality of aid towards prestige.

With a refinement of sensibility, when, as Tarde says, the mass has already been crystallized to a public and attention is more concentrated, the creation of brand-new prestige becomes more and more difficult and improbable as a spontaneous sentimental association. The zenith of reckless creation of prestige is reached in the case of a town rabble; but in a prestige of this kind there is already something materialistic, something provokingly vulgar; personal differentiation sinks to a minimum—and the crowds of the Vienna streets assemble and gape in astonishment at the sound of the bell of an ambulance car or at the news of the bursting of a waterpipe, as they do when they see a procession of big-wigs driving in full gala or the carriage of an archduke.

Modern imperialism—one of the most difficult and most artistic problems of prestige—could scarcely be solved by a mere imitation of the pomp of rajahs and maharajahs; the secret of the psychological success of imperialism does not culminate in the question as to what the European does and says, but in what he does not do and does not say, in the question how far he is able to keep his person aloof from the storm of prejudices just as much as from the indifference attending on triviality. As modern imperialism, if it desires to live, has need of prestige, no doubt it is right in sending into the colonies cool, reserved, keen-sighted officials more or less familiar with the psychology of the natives; a part of the colonizing successes of the English is no doubt due to this psychological quality so strongly developed in them—just as the troubles of government in the German colonies are to a great extent owing to the reckless prestige-“economy” of certain high officials.

In the *crowd* the man in search of prestige has direct intercourse with the recipient; in the *public* direct intercourse is not necessary, and, generally speaking, the journals are not written by those whose prestige they preserve. We distinguish between crowds too (by the standard of coolness and discipline, and of behaviour *qua public*) according to the amount of calmness which they display, for a disciplined crowd is not the product of the moment, or of chance; the prestige it ensures may be automatically recurring and of social importance. The public which reads the news of Parliament, literature, and art is only half a mass, till finally judgment (at *premières*, *vernissages*, horse-races) develops and appreciation spreads by imitation. After this formation of “public opinion,” or, more correctly, *public disposition*, the chief task in dealing with the public is that of *preservation*; sentimental generalization is already



in existence, all that has to be done now is to keep away everything that is *not prestige*; a successful writer desirous of crowning his work with prestige is scarcely likely to undertake a provincial tour, where people observe that this mystical being is blessed with a badly cut dress-coat, a brazen nose, and an unpleasant voice, and that the difference they presumed to exist between reading the printed *feuilleton* and listening to the author's personal presentation of the same was scarcely worth the twenty-five pounds they paid for it. The prestige power of the principle of *épater le bourgeois* has long passed its zenith. The bulk of the public have discovered that these long-haired eccentricities are producible at will; and where to-day you see a long "mane" topping a carbonari cloak, you may presume it to be a teacher of drawing—not an artist. It is a certain reserve, avoidance of "puff," and natural calm that preserves prestige in the eyes of the public of to-day, both in the columns dealing with politicians and at aristocratic balls; the less the "push," placard-puff, provocativeness, and dramatic pose, the better; in prestige the age of pictures has been succeeded by the age of statues—not of statues reciting with outstretched arms, but of merry, calm bronze faces; the public is beginning to feel that everybody dares to recite, very few to speak simply. But positive prestige, which social persecution is thus more and more compelling to use negative tactics, does not give up the old game readily, but retires to social intercourse as to some hidden card-room. The narrow limits of intercourse unite the directness of the crowd to the permanency of the public: a society of intercourse is, so to say, a *tribal crowd* cultivating in a hot-house the palms that are dying out in the open. However, the observer will soon perceive the signs of psychological dissolution even on this "society" life—to the outside world the irritating isolatedness of the

secret impelling us to analyse, within, the faded monotony of imitability and learnability (we have only to think of what has already been said of "intercourse"). Now the only object of people's ambition is quiet—the "not"; now that waiters are more accurately informed concerning the rules of eating in England than archdukes; now that dancing-masters move more unexceptionably than Don Juans; now that every counter-jumper is a George Brummel extremely difficult to distinguish from his customers at the races; now that the distinguished restaurants are crowded with the Brillat-Savarins of the *petite bourgeoisie* and that the smile of lackeys is more refined, more subtle than that of diplomats—exceptional differentiation has shrunk to nuances that are becoming more and more *immaterial* and *imponderable*.

§ 43. *Retrospect*.—"Totalizations and generalizations," says Professor Höffding, "are derived either from the reflective elaboration of experience, or from the involuntary accentuation of one single kind of experience or of a single experience as decisive and all determining." "It is in the nature of sentiment that, brought into being by a single event, it endeavours to spread over the whole consciousness and to communicate its own colouring to every other element, whether these elements are in connection with the said event or not." "As a result of this spread of sentiment, inner conditions which in themselves have nothing to do with one another may obtain a common stamp, and of the series of inner experiences a whole may arise, even though this series in itself has not come to a veritable conclusion." "We take every element of consciousness that arises at first involuntarily as valid, the expression of the true: it appears practically with the quality of existence, *which is not weakened, unless contradictory elements appear similarly with their quality of existence*." The means of prestige

between the psychical processes could hardly be more accurately denoted than in these sentences. To overbalance *intuition*, to overbalance *intellectual* judgment, and *desire* assuming the form of *will*—these are the eternal and unchanging negative conditions. On the other hand, to remain interesting, to escape indifference and oblivion—these are the ever-changing positive conditions. Positive variation and negative permanency are the ideals of prestige-means. The former makes possible the spread of sentiment and the involuntary accentuation of a single experience; the latter prevents “the appearance of contradictory elements similarly equipped with their quality of existence.”

## PART VI

### OBJECTIONS

§ 44. (a) *Terminological objections*.—From Cicero to Simmel, and from Hobbes to Balfour, many writers have approached the province of speculation which we have endeavoured to analyse in this book. As in these preliminaries we are able to discover, not only points of agreement, but latent or express objections, let us try to reconcile these objections, or, if that is impossible, to overcome them. On closer examination we shall find that a part of these objections are merely differences of terminology—a question of a divergent use of words—and that thus the matter may be cleared up without impairing the essence. Another part of the objections laments the further results of the sources of error contained in the differences of terminology; a rigid adherence to an older (or to either) word, a notional concatenation of things essentially differing from one another, which can be reduced to a common denominator only in far more divergent relations, the interchange resulting from indistinct terminology of words essentially differing from one another and the use of the one for the other—all this may at the outset condemn to failure theories in themselves the result of excellent deduction, and drive them into indistinct analogies and contradictions. Not touching on such differences of terminology as, in view of



the present development of terminology and theory, are merely of historical interest, we should like to point to a few terminological inaccuracies of the more recent principle of authority. In the practical life of society a clearing up of terminological questions of this kind may dispel very many misunderstandings; even to-day hundreds of thousands who really wish to defend authority actually defend prestige, while hundreds of thousands attack authority, whereas it is only prestige that they wish to attack. Some writers (perhaps we are justified in including Balfour, too) regard authority as an irrational phenomenon. We have endeavoured to show that, of authority-like sentiments, really only those may be styled irrational which we have subordinated to the notion of prestige, while the other kind of authority is a conclusion, a reasoned judgment, a psychological category subject to the direction of logic and will. On the other hand, Professor Stein makes the mistake of regarding this higher subordination of the psychological category as universal and does not segregate prestige from the notion of authority, thus coming to erroneously generalizing conclusions. "The accustomed judgment which we apply without previous investigation to a new case we call *prejudice*. Who is not familiar with its terrible power? We more rarely think of the possibility of prejudice becoming important and useful. As no one could live physically if he were obliged to introduce and keep in working the circulation of his blood, his breathing and digestion by arbitrary, premeditated actions, so nobody could live intellectually, if he were forced to judge of everything that happens without often allowing himself to be guided by prejudice. Prejudice is a kind of reflex action in the world of intellect." To this nice reflection of Professor Mach, Professor Stein adds his tenet (discussed in several places, but nowhere fully explained) of pre-

volition, which he regards authority as being. According to him, authority is a biological necessity, the contraction of will, motives, compressed confidence. Authority is an "economy" of will, like grammar or logic, a saving of strength, a psychological category.

This specious philosophy has one great fault. It does not perceive the radical difference between *prejudice* and *pre-volition*. *Prejudice* is sovereign—an amassed, piled-up autonomy, which has succeeded in entering the blood; prejudice is the most perfect subjectivity, the *Ego* speaking after its own heart, the frankness of speech of our ancestors and our past. On the other hand, the authority called *pre-volition* is heteronomous; in *pre-volition* it is not the man himself who desires or sets up objects, but *some one else*; in prejudice it is our own ancestors who speak, in *pre-volition* the ancestors and yesterdays of others too, not only ours; prejudice is naturally our own biological economy, the biological economy caused by *pre-volition*, on the other hand, does not necessarily serve our interests. It is only when we separate authority from prestige, and from the primitive sovereign behests of prejudice, and regard it as a sentiment of preponderance not intellectually deduced, but capable of being transferred to the intellectual, that authority acquires a quality of will-economy. Mach's reflection—though it insists on the biological interests of the *Ego*—evidently misled Stein, who therefore attributes to *pre-volition* just as decidedly an economic importance in the history of humanity as Mach does to prejudice. No; the authority to which Stein gives the name may be the greatest possible biological waste as far as the *Ego* is concerned: for beyond the spontaneous, autonomic prejudice the crowd generally follows the track of the *hedonism* of mind, and only rarely the appreciations of the "economy" of thought.

Professor Simmel was one of the very first of those who—even if only in a few lines—drew attention to the difference separating prestige from authority. Only his highly coloured views of prestige are absolutely inaccurate. What he calls prestige is the phenomenon-like *association* accompanied by *élan*; in fact, however, we generally *stand* under the prestige of some one—and that in what is by far the most important series of phenomena. And what he says, without mentioning the word “prestige,” of the psychological value of *individuality*, of the ideal sphere surrounding every man, into which we cannot intrude without overturning its value, of the restraining effect of *important* men, of the superior effectiveness of absolutely exclusive and unconfoundable individuality, of the personal *cachet*, the personal *radius*, etc., arbitrarily (so to say, indivisibly) connects the superiority of prestige-like effect with *individuality*. Yet prestige is a result of psychological laws, while the individual is “never the mere result of law” (Royce),—there is prestige without individuality, and vice-versa: the *individuality* of St. Francis of Assisi—or, as Simmel has it, the *cachet* of his individuality—did not enable him to dispense with the *prestige* of the cardinal and the vicars. Prestige is not a quality of individuality, not a psychological surplus due to individuality; the main principle of prestige is a psychical one: there are individualities—really indivisible—incapable of keeping aloof or attaining a *radius*—such as the scholar who is pelted by peasant children, or the recluse who is laughed at; and there are commonplaces which keep aloof and attain a *radius*—such as the *poseur* or the taciturn man.

(b) *Theoretical objections*.—Does the sentiment of psychological valuation in reference to men entirely cover the notion of prestige? Are there no species of such sentiment opposed to prestige? Do all those whom we are no

longer able to appreciate except under the guidance of the psychical necessarily possess prestige? It would seem as if those of our prejudices which are exclusively or mostly driven to have recourse to associative investigation displayed the *pendant* of prestige. Only that is not the case; for either (1) the primitive security of prejudice is still really the decisive, the preponderant element, in which case, however, the psychical value has as yet been unable to assert itself; or (2) the psychical value having already asserted itself, the primitive security of mind is thrust into the background, and the feeling of this security afforded by prejudice has to yield in strength and decisiveness to the uncertainty, perplexity, and confusion caused by the psychical value. We need only think of the scarcely perceptible, subtle psychological dislocation that has been going on for the last ten years in England in respect of the sentiment of value relating to Germans, converting prejudice into prestige and estrangement into nervous panic.

Another objection is: the great majority of the mass of mankind who are no longer to be judged either intuitively or intellectually do not share in prestige; are not the indifference, the soulless habit, the soulless imitation which we feel or practise in dealing with these prestige-less *vielzuvielen*, of psychical origin as well as prestige? Only, here is just the *sentiment of value* that is lacking, here we have *no more psychical phenomena* to deal with, because the psychical value itself is missing too: *ignoti nulla cupido*.



## PART VII

### THE UTILITY OF PRESTIGE

§ 45. (a) *The profit of the possessor of prestige.*—Our prestige means that somebody is interested in us, but his self-confidence decreases, while he is thinking of us. In all those cases where it is our interest that some one should think highly of us but occupy himself in thought but little with us, prestige means profit to us, whether we are conscious of our prestige or not. Whenever holding aloof serves the interest of our self-preservation better than ease of access; whenever analysis is detrimental to our interests, in periods and relations where we gain more by prestige than we lose by it—prestige is an advantage. A few instances will clearly illustrate the fact that, on the other hand, the balance-sheet of prestige may show a loss too. Even for a young royal princess political and social prestige means great advantages. But the same princess is bitterly conscious of the dead-weight of prestige, when compelled to overcome all her youthful whims for the sake of representation. What youth dares to approach her in a ball-room without feeling awkward? How rarely can she enjoy the sweet frivolities of a *flirt*! What a painful scandal arises if she now and then presumes to abandon herself to enjoyment! Tedium is a good neighbour to prestige. But these troubles have graver and more exacting forms too. Taine writes as follows of the distinguished

French families of the days preceding the Revolution : "The son addressed his father as '*sir*' ! . . . condescending pleasantry, it seems, was a rarity and a peculiar favour." "My mother and my sister and I," writes Chateaubriand, "in my father's presence were petrified to statues, and only began to revive after his departure." "I was never allowed," writes Mirabeau of his father, "to kiss that estimable man's face." A lack of pleasantry in the nursery—revival after a father's departure—a prohibition of kissing his parent's face ! Does not this all mean unhappiness or at least a *lucrum cessans* of a great part of earthly happiness for the unfortunate possessor of prestige ? To-day the situation of *gentlemen farmers* in Hungary is a deplorable one. If, with the capital they possess, they were to lease large properties as *tenants*, they would get on well enough. But prestige compels them to choose the former alternative, and restrains them from prospering. With his "prestige" fortune the inhabitant of Eastern Europe contents himself with a 3 per cent. interest, whereas other forms of fortune devoid of prestige (which, however, are neither illegal nor immoral) produce 6 per cent. : this means practically that the gentleman farmer of Eastern Europe appraises his prestige at the same figure as his fortune.

(b) *The profit of the person under the influence of prestige.*—A far more important question is : what is the balance-sheet of profit and loss of the recipient resulting from prestige ? This question, to be more precise, should be drafted as follows : What profit may accrue to me if I am perplexed and helpless in dealing with a person who interests me, if I am unable either to match or compete with him, and am not capable even of imitating him ?

During the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, a special Jewish national legion was formed to help to maintain order in the streets of the capital. Francis Pulszky, one

of the keenest-eyed observers of those days, in his *Memoirs*, says that this legion was composed of intelligent men, but that nothing could be done with them because each legionary had his own ideas and criticized the schemes of the leader. These Jewish soldiers would have done their duty in a more satisfactory manner if they had received the prestige of their leader; the source of their worthlessness was a deplacéd analysis. The prestige of Gautama, of Moses, of Jesus, abstracts these preachers of moral commandments from our intuition relative to men and from our trivial conceptions of man, the predominance of which would only obstruct an objective recognition of their moral commandments. Even with the best intentions it is hardly possible to observe accurately the measures and views of a bank-director, an editor of a paper, or a university professor, if they are on too intimate terms with their subordinates—*frère et cochin*: our best comrade can scarcely prove our best leader. In speaking of merchants as destructive elements, because they have no prejudices, Paulsen probably meant to include prestige. On the other side, we see the damage wrought by prestige, the realization of the poet's bitter wish—

“Sucht nur die Menschen zu verwirren—  
Sie zu befriedigen ist schwer;”

we see the new idolatry (“Lordolatry,” writes Thackeray, in his *Book of Snobs*, “is part of our creed, and our children are brought up to respect the *Peerage* as the Englishman's second Bible”), to which we make sacrifices without gaining any profit; at thousands of points we see men groping about in helpless perplexity, where, if they were not under the influence of prestige, they might do creative work.

Prestige is profitable to the recipient, where a uniform

contemplation and undisturbed effectiveness is more important than thorough knowledge ; further, prestige is profitable to the recipient where his mistrust in himself is more productive, more incitive to a tension of his forces, than if he were self-confident. On the other hand, prestige is detrimental in all cases where a freedom of selection would be more favourable to the recipient than a single possibility, or when the recipient has need of self-confidence. No one will deny that among the conditions prevailing in Eastern Europe during the last fifty years, the prestige of Francis Joseph I has exercised an invaluable beneficial influence on the state of affairs at home and abroad, that the inner consolidation of Great Britain was in great measure facilitated by the prestige of Queen Victoria, and that for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, diplomacy has been compelled to watch over the prestige of Turkey. But the detrimental effect of the prestige of the typical Eastern despot is equally clear : for it affects conditions of life in which freedom of selection, of investigation and criticism were more valuable, and in which it would be more desirable to consolidate the self-confidence, the moral and intellectual autonomy of the subjects.

§ 46. *Prestige in laws and moral rules.*—A part of the laws and moral rules in vogue is dictated by intuition or logical conviction ; such regulation of conduct is still generally best suited to the vital needs of the individuals thus regulated : the rules generally refer to the smaller spheres of interest or date from primeval times, and have been brought into being by the common sense of men who for one reason or another are familiar with one another and still understand each other. However, the bulk of such rules of conduct, in substance, origin, and execution, have peculiarly a psychical value ; their conceptions, promises,



propositions, their theoretical bases and executive ordinances are so many illusive shreds of consciousness in the dull primitive rumble of society. In substance do not the great majority of these rules of conduct mean, if not soulless habitudes, the rule of standpoints of prestige? Do we not think of the prestige of the owners of private property when we speak of the "sacredness" of private property? Do we not treat with exceptional lenity the victor of a fatal duel, the murderers inspired by jealousy, and the usurers whose manipulations are confined to real estate? Of the propositions of public law practically the only ones to enter life are moments of prestige: and international law—in the nature of things—is nothing but prestige, in its substance and its sanction. Does not the greater part of our legislation, of our ethical inventions, proceed from persons whom the masses have not understood, in dealing with whom the masses have been unable to trust in themselves? Professor Münsterberg goes so far as to trace the origin of ethics to the commands and prohibitions of influential men. In connection with legislation, we need only think of the composition of Parliaments, of the prestige-elements of *leadership*, of the Upper House and the prerogatives of the Crown. Does not the assertion of morality mean mostly a fear of prestige-less associations and dissociations? And are not men afraid of the members of their surroundings endowed with prestige rather than compelled to obey any moral rule—from conviction? It is prestige, too, that carries into effect the great majority of legal ordinances: to reduce the matter to its final analysis, it is prestige that gives its sanction to the legal order; and to what the codifier moulds into legal formulae, it is the uniform, the judge's wig, bureaucracy, the administrative power, the military, etc., that give its psychological—*i.e.*, its practical—value. The regulation

of legal or moral conduct, however, is but an island, a sand-bank, in the ocean of society—holidays in the long round of working days: the fluctuating, rolling life of society where intuition and intellect are no longer able to guide it, is either soulless habit or under the influence of prestige. Herewith we enter the world of *cliques*, intrigues, and quarrels: the political “imponderables,” the economic “conjunctures,” inter-state relations still needing regulation, the Press, mass meetings, coffee-houses, *salons*, academies, fashions, etc., all have their daily bread of prestige to show; gazing at us from behind the modest paragraphs of the rules of conduct we see the stiff formality of the justice of assize, the gravity of the public prosecutor, the witness with his load of prestige, the *haruspex* face of the expert, and it seems as if certain crimes had been invented exclusively for the prestige-less—so persistently does suspicion shun those who are possessed of prestige. Does not the *bourgeois* of a provincial town fear the opinion of the pharmacist and the postmaster quite as much as he does his own conscience? No: prestige is not *association* accompanied by a brilliant *élan*, as Professor Simmel thinks: prestige is the daily bread of society.

§ 47. *The balance-sheet of prestige.*—The source of prestige is permanent settlement in large numbers connected with the division of labour. As prestige involves a decay of self-confidence and, in proportion to the accomplishment of intuitive or logical work, a decadence of the quality of work, it is desirable in the interest of the recipients and of a more differentiated development of society, that this permanent settlement in large numbers and the division of labour should be as far as possible reduced. Politically, local self-government should be developed; economically, self-help and co-operation should be encouraged; demographically, smaller provincial towns should

be favoured in their competition with the central mammoth towns; the material means of moral and intellectual independence should be evenly distributed; of "needs," those which are superfluous should be dropped, etc. But this reduction cannot be extended to every line of social life without inflicting wounds too. Where the decay of the self-confidence of individuality, the elimination of selection, and a leadership not subject to criticism, is a higher interest of culture, the decadence of prestige is decidedly equivalent to the decadence of society. Kant's ideal is a system of politics bowing before law and morality: according to Kant, this noble connection may be recognized by the publicity of political action. "*Unfair is every action which relates to the rights of our fellows in such a manner as not to tolerate publicity.*" Fichte pronounces a heteronomous action carried out under the weight of authority to be simply unscrupulous, and, like Kant, he looks upon the deed as a moral value in proportion to the independent participation of the individual.

This familiar main principle of publicity, set up by Kant for politics, appears to us no bad starting-point. Its execution in practice, however, is a more hazardous business. How is the control of the main principle of publicity practicable in a country with forty million inhabitants? How can we approach this moral standard, which in itself is quite correct among men who do not understand each other, or where only one particular individual understands only another particular individual? Accepting the self-government of morality as the main principle and fundamental value, what fate is in store for this principle, this fundamental value, among forty millions of moral persons *settled permanently in large numbers* who do not know one another? The neglect of another's will in favour, not of self-conceit but of moral autonomy, is a superb fixed

point, but it does not solve the cardinal ethical questions of permanent settlement in groups. It is just on the impracticability of this teaching that the social philosophy of the anarchists suffers shipwreck.

Seeing that the decadence of prestige is hopelessly connected with a measure of decadence of permanency and of division of labour, we must find some expedient that will reconcile the two contradictions and—if it does not lead to a solution—that will at least lead us towards an ideal of a solution.



## PART VIII

### PRESTIGE AND DEMAGOGY

§ 48. *Demagogy as the antitoxin of prestige: its strong points and faults.*—If we investigate what is the psychical reaction that assails the prestiges not attacked by conception, we meet everywhere with the activity of demagogy.

Demagogy, like alcohol, produces self-confidence, even where the objective cause is lacking: it is able to destroy distances of prestige. Democracy is merely an empty, notional skeleton, in which life is kept by demagogy the moment it is a question not of autonomous little groups, but of permanent settlement in large numbers. The psychological lessons of demagogy are more profound, more important than the morphological lessons of democracy. For democracy is merely a hypothesis; but demagogy is a living, measurable reality.

Demagogy re-establishes the self-confidence of the recipient of prestige; in fact, it swells it, making him at the same time suspicious in his dealings with the possessor of prestige. How does the demagogue attain this? By exciting, with the easy possibilities of words and letters, the prepossessions and prejudices of the recipient, and by creating their despotic rule. It is in this that the formidable power of demagogy consists; and of this power

the great Revolution and the American democracy furnish dark examples. The great fault of demagoguery is that it makes the individual anti-social, conscious only of self and desirous only of self. For this reason it attacks everything with the same unsparing roughness; it may often merely destroy our values instead of saving them.

But the possibility of demagoguery is a great lesson. Is it not possible to conceive of the armour of demagoguery in the service of society—just as people have succeeded in recruiting storms and electricity, etc., that were once *only* harmful, into the service of society? Is it not possible to secure the self-confidence of the individual in a permanent settlement in large numbers in such a manner that it should not luxuriate to the detriment of society, it being opposed, as a moderating influence, by sentiments which are in the service of public interests—sentiments that are *moderating* but *democratic*, *restraining* but *impartial*?

Man thus saved and unimpaired in essence is—*individuality*. And the Persuader, who, while indulgent to the values of permanent settlement in large numbers, may perhaps one day lead us to the reconciliation of society and individuality is—*the divine tribune*.

§ 49. *Individuality*.—Social success is only one dimension of our instincts of self-preservation. Individuality means harmony and the quiet of equilibrium among all dimensions. The azure of the sky, the child's eye, the good humour of Socrates, peeps out at us from within it. Under the psychological stress of *self-assertion* we generally fail to see it clearly. But it is there. At times it speaks, at others it is virtual, slumbering. Sometimes it still brings the coolie, the pariah, the sybarite, the prostitute, the "human material" to a standstill; and then it peeps in at every

window with the democracy of the sun's rays. But it begs us all not to look upon it, the merely human, as a metaphysical wonder.

Let us observe the man of society, when he is expending the energy left him in play. Let us observe him as a child—the grown-up man, as he goes his walks, amid his friends, on the tennis-court, or when he is telling a tale. Behold! yonder is Lord Rosebery, yonder Lord Kitchener; of an afternoon he appears on the golf-links and leaves the exceptional associations relating to his person at home; nothing would distress him more than if, in the simple directness of the game, he should be made to feel that he is a statesman and a lord, or a hero and a politician; in sunny gardens boys of ten, on the warm sandy shore rosy-faced old men are walking; oarsmen are starting for a race, and their eyes are gaily fixed on the stroke; in the gymnasium the awkward, clumsy man of eminence impresses no one; the man who works hard makes no fuss—he goes quietly home and plays with his children; the May morning is welcomed with a fresh uniformity by the duchess and the pupil-teacher alike, who both listen with equal rapture to the chanted salutations of the little children or the princely sonata sweeping over the piano keys; the candles and golden nuts of the Christmas-trees twinkle and sparkle, and are set up by thousands who never dream of suffrage—it is from those moments, quarter hours and days, in and on which men possess an overflow of energy, that we can read *the natural golden number of the dimensions of self-preservation*, that we get a glimpse, not of the materiality, the animal of the primeval forest, or the atom of society, but of the individual, *as man*, who may select and go where he pleases, whose future is not necessarily a mere repetition, a mere imitation of the past. At such times we must believe that every life has a furled flag, that beneath all

their social disguise men are at bottom uniformly frank, gay, open-hearted, simple: there is scarcely a man who is ill-humoured or malicious when he is playing without an audience, without indirect interests. Had we only the power to carry the simple gaiety of the overflow of energy from the playgrounds to the Parliament, the workshop, the writing-table—to introduce the directness of the holidays into school; had we only the power to make the spirit of football that of the performance of duties; if scholars would only dare to speak as poets, and poets as children; then individuality might be the main principle of society, instead of the psychological, the principle of appearances. As, however, openness and directness cannot prevail over the objects of permanency and universality, *let us endeavour to obtain at least the maximum amount of openness and directness possible within the limits of these aims.* If in society we cannot be Socratically intellectual, let us at least be *simple*; if our logical rules fail us, at least let us be as *economical* as we can with what is unintelligible as concerning men. The word *proletary* must be understood to mean *least childish*—*least a child* of all grown-up persons. What they have taken away from him is—if we analyse it to its depths—the bare subsistence of childishness. Let us give him back that intuition, spontaneity, gaiety, sincerity, which is meant by the *childish*, and we have expropriated for his use not the fallen leaves of the heath, not the faggots fit only for firewood, but the root of individuality. And let us reduce all our appreciation, all our sentences, with redoubled energy to the minimum distance from the *childish*. Let us remove ourselves only as far as is inevitable from this *alpha* of the divine scheme. Confucius, Gautama, Jesus, when they began their tragic war against prestige, thought of children and led their tired hosts towards the child. Every condition and means is



valuable that serves this primitive end. Every condition and means is to be rejected that carries us still farther from this end. The child is the standard of everything.

To the man to whom intellect cannot lead us back, we may perhaps be led back by impartial irrationalism, by the religious unintelligible, "a man's total reaction upon life"; by that prestige which is not of this world, that demagoguery which leads to the infinite. Prestige is dangerous only as an aim and end in itself: if it *takes the field* against the divine values, the sound instincts, the sober sense, and childish good heart of individuality, prestige is a decadence, because it is a source of enjoyment which is fatal to more permanent and higher pleasures, an illusion which washes away values. Yet a demagoguery existing for its own sake is also not a deliverance from prestige, but thrusts us back into the primeval forest from the merely social. Is the *divine leader* able, by replacing both, to save us *from both*?—the divine leader who merely inspires but does not take advantage, and in the whirlpool of society permits us to *see*, who maybe awaits us at the end of time as a child waits on the doorstep for his comrade to accompany him to the meadows.

Granting to man—and *man alone*—the privilege of being able to affect, even from the distances of time and space, with the independent signs of words and writing, we are raised from the exclusive sphere of the reactions of our instincts; and man—and *only man*—was enabled for the first time not necessarily to forget him who remains at a distance, it being provided at the same time that the indifference should not necessarily increase in proportion to the increase of the distance.

We forget objects if we are long without seeing them; the most distant stars are the palest; and for our intuition the things farthest removed from us are the most insignifi-

cant. But God has given us intellect to see things in their objective connection, independent of the *actual* needs of our existence; to prepare for the future and learn from the past; to recognize the essence and grasp the causality. At the same time He has made possible sentimental life in connection with conditions of which we have no direct, intuitive knowledge, which are not instinctively exclusive, divinely limited reactions, but which, torn asunder from the vital interests of our constitution, and no longer connected with these interests, run about unowned and are, so to say, guided by physical laws. In our dealings with all those interesting men and with the human, where the primitive opinion of our intuition is unable to guide us, whom our intellect does not throw light upon, as it does upon objects and the objective, *our psychical economy is subjective, but not sovereign*. It is with this that we have explained prestige and the phenomena of prestige. And the dissolution of permanent settlement in large numbers and of the division of labour into atoms—that is the result achieved by demagoguery in its dealings with prestige.

Before our very eyes the war between prestige and demagoguery—to-day at its height—is being constantly waged. Are not revolutions heralded by thousands of pamphlets and pasquils? Has not the revolutionary policy of Europe been furthered, more than anything else, by personal libel, the defamation of the “historical” classes, the disclosure of the intrigues of Court life, and the scandals of traffic in public interests? Has not the irresistible ridiculousness of parliamentary revolutionism brought into being the syndicalists? Has any republican agitation contributed so much to discredit monarchy as those sexual scandals which of recent years have given several Courts of Europe an unwelcome publicity?

Demagoguery is often beneficial, just as prestige is. Often it incites our healthy instincts, and kindles a spark of life in the rigid "human material" driven hither and thither at will: there is a demagoguery which reminds the working woman that she is a mother, which reminds the labourer of his child, the miner of sunshine, the fawning slave of his human self-respect. There is a demagoguery, too, which, with the overflow of the power of selection, of instinct, overwhelms worthless liars and puffed-up hollowness.

Only demagoguery isolates; it is incapable of the inner selection of our instincts that takes others too into account (except a selection of this kind derived from nature), it is not a social but merely a revolutionary force; changing, transforming, not ordering. Demagoguery is incapable of building up a society on the ruins of prestige; both demagoguery and prestige mean the triumphal return of chance; yet our belief concerning man and society was that the latter means progress in the direction of permanency and universality—greater security and preparedness than the primeval forest. And all that has happened is that outer chance has been replaced by inner chance.

This *return of chance* is felt or seen by a continually increasing number of men. The best of men are overwhelmed by disquietude or a presentiment of grave crises. But there is one thing we must not forget: once it was the divine "prestige" and the divine "demagoguery" democratically affecting *every* man that made possible the birth of societies. The *myths* and *legends* were not particularistic. May it not be that the further evolution and regeneration of society, too, will be rendered possible by the alternating tension of prestige and demagoguery, and by *impartial irrationalism* taking the place of helpless rationalism? Maybe we are not too old yet to once more have a mythology and legends of our own; maybe demo-

cracy too will find its religion, the inspiration of which will always enable the individual, the One Man, to feel at which point he begins to become the tool of other men, and at which point he begins to use other men as his tools, *and which will make every feeling of this kind a suffering*. We await new myths, new legends at the hands of the great Narrator of the Infinite—a prestige which belongs to all of us alike, a demagoguery which exists for us all.





### BOOK III



## PRESTIGE AS REGULATOR OF SOCIAL CONDUCT

§ 50. The object of these chapters, selected at random from the infinite variety of the manifestations of prestige, is not to *prove* any law, but merely to serve as *illustrations*. We have endeavoured to offer a sketch of the psychology of the inflexible bonds between men, not for scholars, but for thinkers, to serve as a basis for further reflection. We had no desire to measure or express in figures; we could not; and such a course is out of the question. And, even if we do try to survey some several groups of the phenomena of permanent gregariousness, our object is not to prove, but to act as a finger-post. Yet, even when acting merely as such, it is our duty to endeavour to the best of our power to avoid being misled by specious probabilities, and to *point with the care of one engaged in the work of demonstration*. So we have confined ourselves to the well-sifted material only in dealing with the enormous mass of sources, following the example of the farmer when he selects the seed he is to sow; and we have ignored, as far as we could, rash and out-of-date conclusions and human or personal suppositions. Everywhere we have striven to find the *exception* who is not *exceptional*, and the *unanalysable* which is not *indifferent*. We have only just glanced at the bulk of the phenomena, and we had neither reason, space, nor knowledge to occupy ourselves with particularized conclusions.



The chapters here following are the best proof that this book does not offer a solution of, but merely opens the discussion of, the problem set before us. *What is it that causes men to congregate together permanently even in places where such gregation is not explained either by habit, bias, or conceptions? What is the psychological difference between the Other and the Diverse, between prestige and prejudice? And how does prestige divert our values, feelings, and qualities?* After drafting these questions we proceed to examine their practical significance. Yet we do not look for our justification in these chapters—rather in those who shall come *after us*. We believe that the creative power of the great problem will attract persons to deal with it who will put the questions in a more correct form and be happier in the answers they give.

## PART I

### PRESTIGE AND LOVE

“ . . . And she after a while fell in love with him, because she could not understand him.”

KIPLING.

IN love, the task of prestige is (1) to enhance the tension of the strife of the sexes ; (2) to preserve virginity till the time of maturity ; and (3) to preserve faithfulness in love even after the awakening of the sexual instinct. Women and man, writes Crawley in *The Mystic Rose*, differ from one another ; and this difference is attended by the same religious consequences as everything that man does not understand.

And as the selection of love and the self-forgetfulness of devotion may result in a line of conduct that reacts on the prestige of the selector or devotee, not only does prestige play a part in love, but love plays one also in prestige.

§ 51. *Exogamy and co-education*.—It would scarcely be correct to trace exogamy as a whole to prestige, though the charm of a distant unknown woman may contribute to the general and permanent observance of this rule, which is in many respects inconvenient and often difficult to carry into effect. The horror of incest is known to be almost universal, and it is only in the case of the most savage and immoral tribes that we find some exceptions. Even

in regard to such degrees of blood relationship which we regard as not prohibitive to marriage, savages and barbarians of a lower order often punish by death sexual intercourse, which they look upon in such cases as horrible. In fact, the prohibition of sexual intercourse very frequently extends to whole clans, tribes, etc. With regard to Australia, where the permission and prohibition of sexual intercourse are regulated within limits equally wide and strict, we find it recorded by Spencer and Gillen that sexual intercourse with the female members of the prohibited group is considered to be a heinous crime, punishable by death or other severe penalties. But we find similar prohibitions, too, in the case of barbarians in a more advanced state of culture. In explanation of this consistent severity of the principle of exogamy, Professor Westermarck in several places refers to the love-killing influence of cohabitation and propinquity, which is reflected in the tribal laws: we often light upon rules imposing exogamy, not on blood relations, but on those living in the same parish or under the same roof. Yet the explanation that what is distant has charms, whereas propinquity breaks the spell and kills desire, is not sufficient to account for the severity with which incest is suppressed, in some cases by even the most primitive tribes. It is more correct to explain the origin of exogamy as due to the fact that savage tribes are quicker to discern degeneration in the issue of incest than civilized people are (Westermarck): though we may perhaps add to this probability the suggestion that exogamy would hardly have become an almost popular rule, automatically observed, were the *distant* woman, the group of strictly *isolated* women, not rendered more fascinating by the spell of struggle and the beautifying power of distance.

We may approach the question of co-education on the

same lines. I believe, writes Professor Westermarck, one of the most accomplished investigators of this question, that love between a man and his foster-daughter is almost as extraordinary as that between a father and his own daughter; and numerous peoples disapprove of and prohibit marriages between persons not related, where such have been brought up together in the same family or belong to the same local group. Even among boys and girls who have been educated in a mixed school we may remark a conspicuous lack of erotic feelings. Madame Lucina Hayman, who was for years at the head of a school of this kind in Finland, was assured by a young man that it would never occur to him or to any of his friends to wed a girl who had been a former schoolfellow. I, too, says Westermarck, have heard of a boy who made a nice difference between girls who were his schoolfellows and others; the latter he spoke of as *real girls*.

§ 52. *Virginity*.—In the relations of the two sexes the most mysterious given force of distance is a “prestige” established *by nature*—viz., virginity. But there are in regard to virginity questions of perspective, too, propounded *by men*. The glory of virginity, its accentuated appreciation, appears, as Sutherland defines it, first in the half-evolved society of savages, but with clear precision only in the stage of barbarism.

Owing to the lack of religious forces, the prestige of virginity lasts only until the period of puberty; after that has been reached the prestige suddenly dwindles to prejudice; the spell of yesterday is denounced and becomes the object of a scornful smile. In the case of savages, marriage is generally made obligatory in maturity. According to Sir Stamford Raffles, an old maid is a curiosity even among the Malays of Java. *Manu* (ix. 88) speaks of it as a disgrace for a girl not to be married by her twelfth year. By



all Aryan peoples old maids are looked down upon. These are variations of opinion which—not to speak of the differences of the value attached to virginity in the cases of men and women respectively—suggest that the primitive cult of virginity was that of a moral quality rather than a genuine prestige.

§ 53. *Marriage*.—Of the two original sources from which the institution of marriage sprang, purchase and rape, the latter must have more considerably enhanced the mystic spell of the woman, whereas purchase results in the connection with the conception of the maiden of associations reminding us of the objects of everyday commerce. The relations between the man and the woman are preserved undisturbed, quite apart from any moral valuation, if care is taken to avoid the entire levelling of the psychical difference organically developed between them, and if due precaution is taken to preserve what Professor Simmel calls the psychological reserve of marriage. The value even primitive peoples attach to the perspective effect of the two sexes, and the psychological importance attributed by them to the isolation and difficulty of access of the woman to be won, is proved by a mass of examples that offer no reason for assuming any rational protection of virginity. Thus—according to Darinsky—in the Caucasus the newly-married husband may not approach his wife except at night in robberwise; sometimes he is obliged to live for a year or even eighteen months after his marriage separated from his wife. In the case of all the Indo-Germanic peoples, traces of the defence of the women by distance, originally connected with marriage by rape, are found in periods when rape was already a thing of the past. Such traces are: the lifting of the young bride over the threshold of her bridal house; the wailing preceding the wedding; the bridal veil (probably a psychologically applicable relic of the covering of the face

indispensable in the case of a rape), etc. With several Indo-Germanic peoples, says Professor Schrader, the bride is forbidden to enter the bridal bed of her own free will; on the contrary, the wedding guests *drive* her into the bridal chamber and *throw* her into her husband's bed. At Rome, when the bridal procession started, the bride had to be torn by main force from her mother's arms, whither she had fled for refuge. With the Slavs the bride has to make the house ring with wailings and dirges—over the due performance of which a strict watch is kept, from her betrothal to her wedding-day. In short, says Schrader, everything tends to symbolize a use of force that could only have been taken seriously and been understood in days when rape was the fashion. Marriage demands the preservation of the prestige or moral value of love, even after the sexual desires have been satisfied. Love is an imperative, primary instinct, all vagaries of which are held under control by prestige, sometimes far better than by morality. At weddings the bridal pair have to listen to a sermon on unity. What should be prayed for is that *they should not understand one another entirely*, that both of the parties should retain something that has not yet developed into an experience. Perhaps nothing applies so aptly to love as that fine saying of Sidgwick with reference to pleasures—that they are genuinely attainable only when we forget them.

§ 54. *Love and religion*.—The connection of religion with virginity is seen in particular accompanying the formation of barbarian societies. As Professor Schrader points out in his book on the Indo-Germanic peoples, etymology proves that virginity in general first assumed a social importance in religious forms. The German *keusch* (chuski) probably means the same as the Latin *castus* (= "clean, suitable for sacrifice"); and the Russian *cêlomâdrennyj* (virgin) is

derived from the Slav church-tongue. Religion is accompanied by capacities for prestige, either voluntary or involuntary; distances arise, and a spongy slough of mysticism, in which love too is able to ensconce itself away from the varied changes of passing moments. Even in the case of barbarians, religion, generally speaking, is in favour of the preservation of love, and in many cases makes an ideal of virginity. But, according to Zarathustra, a married man stands far higher than an ascetic who has renounced sexual intercourse; a man who has a household is far above a man who has none; a man who has children is far more of a man than one who has none. The prestige of marriage is enhanced by religion by means of the marriage ceremonies, which surround the union of man and woman with a haze of sentimentality; and the religious prohibitions of divorce and adultery also emphasize this inaccessible, isolated personality of marriage. Love steals in behind the prestige of the church, inherits the spell of the church, and so is enabled to remain permanent and inaccessible even where rational morality could not have thrived. The support thus given to prestige by religion cannot be appraised too highly. No doubt this support does produce faulty and unsatisfactory results; and of course religious marriages, in all stages of development, are accompanied by sufferings and injustice. But, if the prestige of love can be saved by religion only, love sanctioned by religion is after all preferable to love degenerated to prostitution. Corruption must set in in every society in which love has been robbed of distance, that fine, old-world haze without which permanency and civilization are inconceivable: *without virginity no society can exist at all*. The Bechuanas can get on without having any expressions to distinguish "maiden" and "woman"; the New Zealanders or the Cree Indians, the Kaffirs, the Kam families, the

Thracians, and certain Slav tribes, without looking upon the virginity of unmarried women as a virtue : but not so the thriving societies of enlightened individuals whose social system is built up on a solid basis—the Incas, the Hindus, the Jews, the ancient Germans, the Romans, or the English. For this reason, in the various stages of culture, the ministers of religion at the same time render service to the prestige of virginity. The asceticism of mediæval Christianity no doubt led in many cases to opposite extremes ; but any one who investigates in an unbiassed manner the moral results of Christianity will be compelled to admit that the cult of the Madonna, like the legend of the virginity of Buddha's mother, introduced a sentimental ray of self-restraint and springtide ascetism into many a grade of society which would otherwise have been beyond the reach of any prohibition of the kind or have been incapable of any such reflection.

But there are two sides to the picture. The ecclesiastical orders of all times have lived a life of virginity, we may say, principally with a view to using their virginity as a weapon. The Patagonian sorcerers and the Shamans are under a vow of celibacy. The priestesses of ancient Mexico and Peru who sacrificed to the sun were virgins, as were the heliolatrous nuns of old Persia. In dealing with ancient Europe, Strabo speaks of the misogynous Thracians, who were looked upon as saints by reason of their chastity ; and Pomponius Mela mentions the nine eternal virgins living on an island in the Atlantic Ocean. In many places in Greece the orders of priestesses were distinguished by virginity. At Rome the Vestal Virgins vowed to preserve their chastity for thirty years ; in Tibet, Ceylon, and China the priests of Buddha are celibates. The establishment of celibacy among the clergy is connected with the name of Pope Gregory VII : “ Priests, deacons,



and subdeacons who live in lechery, we forbid, in the name of God and by the authority of St. Peter, to cross the threshold of the church until they have done penance and reformed. If, however, there should be any among them who persist in sinning, no one shall presume to take part in the services of the same, for their blessing turns to a curse, their prayers to sins. . . ." However, the proclamation of celibacy was merely a consequence of the ancient spirit of Christianity extolling virginity accommodated to numerous sayings and to the example of the Saviour, the prophets, and the apostles.

But what do we desire to signify by the statement that the connection of virginity with the service of the church—apart from enhancing the nimbus of virginity—has at all times appeared as a means to attain an end? This prohibition evidently preserves a certain perspective in judging of the ecclesiastical order, of priestesses and friars. The special emphasizing of the prohibition of marriage, added to the enjoining of virginity, points clearly and convincingly to the character of the institution. The conscious or unconscious object of the celibacy of priests and the virginity of priestesses is a withdrawal from that state and an exclusion from that institution which is best calculated to make individuals familiar, accessible, analysable, and everyday, and which—by virtue of its stormy outbreaks and family burdens—is more apt than anything else to make us forget that the individual in question is *different* from ourselves. According to St. Ambrose, the virgin Thecla was respected by even the hungry lions, which did not dare to look upon her. The renunciation of virginity, and still more the breach of celibacy, involves a break with distance, and an approach to the everyday relations of ordinary humanity, whereas the mystic, special, and society-reforming force of religion requires inaccessible, intact priests—such as are

distinguished from the masses without in any way irritating or incensing them.

While, on the one hand, virginity serves to enhance the prestige of the priesthood, on the other hand privileged persons have often employed the prestige of religion to indulge in sexual licence, shrouding lechery in the folds of a mystic spell, and equipped the wildest orgies, the rape of maidens, and the *jus primae noctis* with a character absolutely at variance with the principles of ordinary morality. In Babylon and Assyria, female licence formed the basis of a special Istar worship, for Istar, the goddess of love, was at the same time the patroness of prostitutes; and we more than once find the goddess among these *protégées* of hers. For this reason, the latter were called not only "samhati," but "harimati" too. Elie Reclus compares the temples and shrines of the ancient East to perfumed *boudoirs*. The high priest of Eleusis was only too pleased to have his bayaderes wait on him. The holy city of Mecca is still full of *demi-mondes*, who pay taxes to the Grand Shereef. The chronicles tell us that the founder of Buddhism was received in one of the Hindu towns by the chief courtesan. The Brahman priests too have bayaderes in their pagodas, whom they teach music and singing, and who later on sell themselves. In olden times in Asia Minor prostitution was a consecrated institution. Hetairism was developed at the foot of the altars; and the Aphrodite of Abydos was called Πορνή. Juvenal asks the question, "Where is the temple in which there are no prostitutes?" In Nicaragua no girl can wed until she has spent at least one night with the priest. In certain pagodas, too, religious prostitution is carried on in the most open manner. Some high-born barbarian would not enter into a *liaison* with a plebeian woman; but the priests override such prejudices. The itinerant priests of Siva are generally unmarried: when one

of them enters the house of a member of his flock, all the male members of the house retire and are under an obligation to move to another dwelling, leaving the female members of their family to the holy person. Distinguished Burman families send girls, before marriage, to their spiritual father, "that they may enjoy the honour of being deprived of their virginity." The *jus primae noctis* is the due of the Cambodian priests too, who, moreover, receive presents in these days. In the Roman Empire, women of distinction offered their favours to the crafty *thaumaturgi*, who were conceived to be demigods (Reclus). In its compendium of ancient Hindu books, Vatsyayama's *Kamasutram*—the Hindu *Ars Amatoria*—contains detailed instructions for the Brahmans as to how to preserve their prestige in the midst of their sexual licence. It brands as "eunuch love" the intercourse of any of them with a water-carrier or servant of inferior rank, where such intercourse extends to *complete satisfaction* of the sensual appetite; in such cases, the advice given is that men should avoid paying court or seeking to win the grace of the women in advance, for—thus runs the commentary—intercourses of this kind can only be a question of the calming of a momentary excitement, not of real pleasure. And *hetairas* are instructed to abstain alike from familiarity and complete *abandon* in *liaisons* with peasants. It forbids Brahmans and royal officials to indulge in any of the prestige-corrupting varieties of the perversities of the *demi-mondes*: "neque vero auparistakum illud brahmanus sapiens vel socius et administer consiliorum regis vel qui fiducia utitur sibi fieri permittat." The scruples here expressed are—as we see from Yasodhara's commentary—not due to any moral or aesthetic, but to psychological considerations: "qui si apud illas feminas auparistakum sibi fieri permittunt, gloria qui apud homines utuntur, et auctoritas

dirimuntur. Itaque vitiosam oris contactionem evitent.” The refinement of moral sensibility does indeed make a rough outspokenness of this kind seem something unusual; but there can be no doubt that the idea of preserving prestige has at all times played a part in the sexual restraint of the priesthood. In this respect, the nice distinction made between *meretrices* and *cortesanae honestae* by Joannes Burchardus, the private secretary of Pope Sixtus IV, is characteristic; the latter are to include the favourites of prelates and ambassadors.

§ 55. *Love and the different forms of prestige.*—All kinds of prestige are found meddling with the primitive laws of love. The women, writes Lane in his work on *The Aborigines of Australia*, are generally appropriated by the old and powerful, some of whom have four or even seven wives; on the other hand, the young men do not get wives, unless they have sisters to give in exchange, or if they are strong and brave enough to prevent their sisters being taken away without receiving other women in exchange. The *jus primae noctis* exists not merely in the brutal customs of the Middle Ages, but still more among the secret motives of sexual intercourse. “Is it not easier,” asks Professor Gross, “to choose the soldier in his smart uniform, than the same man in a coarse workman’s frock? Is it not easier for a gymnast or singer who has just distinguished himself to ‘make a hit’ than for the same man in ordinary life?” We find, for instance, the restriction of the natural safeguards of sexual “choice” in favour of a certain prestige, where some ruling dynasty refuses to recognize as mediatized any but those families which were in direct connection with the Holy Roman Empire and had seats and votes among the magnates in the Diet. Perhaps, when we see a royal prince who has contracted a morganatic marriage resigning his right to use the family arms, his privileges, and his estates



in entail, in his own name and that of his wife and children, we can form some conception of the enormous force of distance, in the interest of which such sacrifices are made by husband and father. When we see the daughters of American millionaires swept into the arms of the aristocracy of Europe by the interdependence of prestige and wealth, when we see the revolutionary magnetism of name, position, exclusiveness, and exoticism in the sexual interest of classes on the upward or downward grade, we shall judge more leniently of the erotic absolutism of the princes and nobles of the old world and the Middle Ages, which was met by so much complaisance on the other side. Sexual desire often obtains satisfaction without love: (a) by rape, (b) by means of threats, (c) by latent menaces (authority, official power, *jus primae noctis*, the barbarian husband's right, etc.), and (d) without any force or compulsion, by virtue of the prestige of the person desiring. The part played by prestige in sexual "choice" is far more important than is generally believed. The active faults of "choice" are without doubt far surpassed in gravity by the damage wrought by the interference of prestige—in the form of prohibitions and restrictions—in the sexual struggle for life of the primeval forest. Historians, poets, and ethnographers have given us an abundant description of the dramatic conflicts between love and prestige. But that these conflicts are due to the desire to preserve distance, not to any eugenic insight, is proved clearly enough by the following instance taken from the classical scene of such dramas, India, where the *varnasamkara*, the mixing of castes, is treated as a crime. Life having provided for the commission of such crimes *en masse*, it became necessary to create the institution of *mixed castes*. The rank of these mixed castes was determined by the *distance* separating the castes of mother and father respectively. The higher the

caste of the mother, and the lower that of the father, the lower the mixed caste of the issue. The lowest and most despised caste was the *Candala*, consisting of *the issue of the marriage of a Sudra man with a Brahman woman*. They were employed as executioners and bearers of the dead. It is true that, in the Hindu faith, the influence of the father is predominant in the begetting of children; yet the question arises, Why is a child of the marriage of a Sudra man with a Sudra woman not regarded as of *still* lower rank? Why is the issue of a Sudra-Brahman mixed marriage considered of meaner origin than a full-blood Sudra, even though the predominant importance be assigned to the inheritance of the father? In the case of the crossings usual with our domestic animals, every surplus drop of blood of a better breed enhances the value of the issue. An English half-blooded horse is of more value than an English quarter-blooded horse, etc. What are the reasons that gave rise to the distorted system of "caste-eugenetics," which is no exception, but merely a classical instance of its kind? It is quite evident that what is here protected is not race, but prestige, not blood, but distance! We need not confine ourselves to India. Imperial Rome was compelled to issue prohibitions by way of the Senate to restrict the love affairs of patrician ladies with the slaves and *histriones* whom in other respects they scarcely regarded as human beings. Care and consideration of genealogic trees are not always identical with care and appreciation of the *best blood*.

§ 56. *Prestige in prostitution*.—The part played by prestige in prostitution is fourfold: (a) the difference in prestige between "honest" women and prostitutes; (b) the prestige of prostitutes due to their origin; (c) the grades of prestige among prostitutes; (d) prostitution as a means for acquiring prestige.

(a) In societies which get over the dangers accompanying their moral looseness by the institution of secondary or auxiliary wives, very particular care is taken to preserve the distance between "wife" and "concubines." The auxiliary wife in China has no claim to the marks of prestige. Her entry into the house is strictly simple, in contrast to that of the real wife; she crosses the threshold of her new home without any display of fireworks, without music or escort. Although she may have been wedded to bear children to her husband in place of the barren wife, she is relegated to the lot of a servant. She has to wear mourning for a year if the real wife dies, though the latter is not expected to wear mourning for her. She cannot approach her master oftener than every fifth day, and before she does so must purify herself inwardly and outwardly by fasting and taking a bath in the manner of all Chinese who undertake holy work. The auxiliary wife does not call her master *chang-fu* (husband), but *kia-chang* (head of the family), and she must call the true wife *kia-chu-mu* (mother-queen of the family). Where the existing family order is protected against dissolution by prostitution, rigid distances are set up between the world at large and the *demi-monde*; the associations, the externals reminding persons of one another are, as far as possible, eliminated by the anxiety to preserve the prestige of the "respectable" woman, the strongly dissociative distinctions being instead emphasized and increased. *Meretrixes* were tolerated at Rome, but they were under a ban of *infamia*; they could not give evidence before a court of law; they were not allowed to wear the *stola*, only a short *tunica*; their faces, necks, and shoulders—in contrast to respectable *matronae*—were uncovered, etc. "Respectable" women at first distinguished themselves by wearing magnificent dresses; later on—as women living by making themselves conspicuous have no difficulty in imitating

this fashion—they resorted to the use of a Puritanical, “lady-like” simplicity in order that they might be distinguished from women living by *loudness* and smartness of dress.

(b) Among prostitutes, *origin* is an important factor in enhancing their market value. Difficulty of access at the outset, the spell exercised by a real “lady” in the sad haunts of prostitution, the success of the fast actress—from Babylon to Paris—as contrasted with women prostituted outside the stage, the pampering of a fallen star of the “high life” world by the *jeunesse dorée* of the resorts of the demireps—all these are signs of prestige errant in the depths of life. The spell exercised by the distant, the mysticism, has been familiar to the artists and hyenas of prostitution from time immemorial. The *élite* prostitutes of ancient Rome all came from abroad; the *unskilled* members of the *demi-monde* were natives. The flutists (*tibicinae*) swarmed to Rome from Asia Minor and the Ionian Islands, the dancers (*ambubaiae*) from Spain and Syria. Their inexplicable charm, half erotic, half mere-psychological, finds remarkable expression in the action of the Roman authorities, who did not regard them as prostitutes proper. In his *Anthropophyteia*, Professor F. S. Krausz tells us that the Croatian brothel-keepers (the brothels of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, far-famed for their excessive licence, are for the most part in their hands) “prefer to sell their own countrywomen to German-Austria, for use in towns where there is a large garrison, for at home and among Servians and Bulgarians Croatian girls offer but few attractions.” It may be that the demand for “*hungaras*”—a trade that, to the disgrace of Hungary, has at all times flourished—and the enormous part played by the Jewish proletariat in prostitution, may partly be attributed to the spell exercised by isolation among strangers and by an



unknown exotic race. While the German pedagogists persisted in believing that Apollo, Siegfried, or, in the worst case, Goethe was the manly ideal of their maidens, hundreds of young Prussian girls were carrying on a love correspondence with—South African negroes.

(c) It is difficult not to be moved when we survey the desperate struggle made by the various grades of prostitutes in their endeavour to clutch at the last relics of distance. The spell of inaccessibility is nowhere so powerful as in sensuality pure and simple. Every day this is felt by the mercenary host of love, who instinctively take precautions that, even if they have burned down every bridge, a small psychological ford should be left to enable them one day—not merely in fact, but in their own eyes and in those of their acquaintances—to return again and take their places at any rate in the ranks of wives and mothers. A fallen woman, when all is lost and seemingly frittered away, often strives in an agony of sickly sorrow to save a little trace of distance or to enforce the recognition of some minute distinction. It is the man in search of sexual enjoyment who marks out for her the direction her belated ambition must take. In the eyes of the average man the prestige of a prostitute increases in proportion to her inaccessibility. He is scarcely interested by one who can be bought for a trifle, but he takes more interest in expensive harlots. He becomes a prey to the secret meeting-places rather than to the brothel or the street. A woman who offers her favours for a present or for a supper after the theatre is able, under like conditions, to suggest greater enjoyment than one who can be had for money. The instincts of most men place the courtesan a trifle nearer to a virgin than the cocotte. In ancient Greece a sharp distinction was made between the “commoners” of the public *dikterion*, who could be had for the payment of an *obolus*, as defined by law, and the *aule*

*tridae*, whose greed was often as incalculable and as adventurous as that of a modern music-hall "star." The *hetairai* mark the zenith of *demi-monde* prestige; their influence and money, their pretensions, tended towards the immense and dizzy possibilities of the world of emotion, and there was scarcely anything of a commercial character in their position. On the contrary, seeing them exempt from household worries, from the indifference due to matter-of-factness, and from the trials and pettiness of the everyday world, the Greeks looked upon them almost as wives in the abstract. In Rome, from the *diobolae* to be bought at a cheap price near the circus enclosure to the *delicatae* and the loves of flutists and dancers wrapped in transparent silks, gold, gems, and purple, from the two obols to financial ruin, from the visit lasting ten minutes to the *liaison* of years and the appearance of a mortal love, there stretch vast gaps of intrinsic distance. The growth and thriving of prestige rises from the marketable article to the person, from the trivial to the scarcely accessible, from the conception to the mystery, from the object to the subject; and even among those relegated to an inferior grade we come across the pearls of the self-protection of personality. This protection manifests itself even within the narrowest bounds of prostitution itself in clever and spiteful, artful and forced tricks and adherence to rights (careful avoidance of a certain manner, voice, or dress, rejection of common men, etc.). The lowest type of Parisian street-girls—the *filles de barrières*, the *pierreuses*, or *femmes de terrains*—who live in the filth of the street and on waste plots of land, hiding behind scaffoldings or bridges, favouring anybody and everybody, are scorned and despised by the prostitutes in brothels, the *filles de maison*, who are just as much the object of the contempt of the *filles isolées* (Parent Duchatelet).

(d) Fallen women often look upon prostitution as a transitional means to attain prestige. The figures relating to the wealth of prostitutes collected at Copenhagen, Mannheim, and elsewhere, prove that, in the midst of their sad employment, harlots often try to put money aside, merely with a view to securing the costs of acquiring prestige. And the police of all large cities know all the "society" women of the "elegant" meeting-places, who are, *almost without exception*, tempted to enter the path of evil, not by the cares of subsistence or the difficulty of maintaining their families, but by an anxiety to acquire the means of securing prestige—dresses, boxes at theatres, etc.

## PART II

### PRESTIGE IN ECONOMIC LIFE

§ 57. *Occupation*.—Whole libraries have been written already concerning the external causes of the division of labour. Mention is made of economic “development,” of the interdependence of settlement and the *terra libera*, of inventions, the refinement of demand, etc., etc. For the spiritualization of all these causes into motives, some kind of insight is generally hinted at. And yet the manner in which, in real life, the division of labour is carried out by persons—the *division of labour as the choice of a career*—does not by any means reflect that logical order of which those who identify causes and motives dream. The mass of external causes of the division of labour merely draws our attention to the objectively favourable conditions and endeavours to eliminate the greatest possible number of existences that gainsay them. But one of the cardinal errors of our economic order is the anomaly which confuses the economic category of the division of labour with the psychological category of the choice of a career. This anomaly is not so easy to understand as it at first sight seems to be. It would scarcely be desirable to regulate the division of labour purely and simply in accordance with economic reasons. Logical feeling, moral nobility, and aesthetic pleasures are special motives of a



higher order, the subordination of which to purely economic motives would not be of advantage even to the cohesion and nice nuances of economic order. The accuracy of laboratories, the patience of hospitals, the unselfishness of missionaries, cannot be either accounted for, or the proper gratitude expressed for them, by "the great apostle of equality," money: yet *unlearnable* professions such as these are of more value to humanity than either the *unlearned* or *learned* occupations. However, in the case of the average man, the motives for the choice of a career are just as far from being such valuations of nobleness as from being simply appraisements of economic profitability. The bulk of men choose their careers, their spheres of work, from the point of view of appearance too. We must not forget that the choice of a career generally means only attaching oneself to a particular sphere of work, and not a conscious and decisive undertaking of that sphere. The choice of a career does not necessarily involve the choice of work too; and in idling away one's time in some attractive career, organic hedonism may become reconciled to psychological hedonism. Yet even behind the necessities there is always a mere psychological value latent; wherever it is possible, it shows signs of life; and wherever he can find a means of securing a moiety of distance, the devotee of appearances rushes to the spot, and for him the smallest salary, if accompanied by a little prestige, is of more value than a certain increase of salary. In thousands of cases where work is undertaken prestige plays the same part as brandy does in the payment of the Slovak navy; all other forms of recompensation are relegated to an inferior position. We must not confound moral or aesthetic abhorrence with the restraint of prestige. Guyau is right in saying that no manner of material remuneration is able to tempt the bulk

of mankind to undertake the career of executioner, and that even the prospect of enormous wealth would be insufficient to prevail upon numberless men to become butchers. But is it really true that we find only such cases of avoidance of a particular career as can be explained morally and aesthetically? Would the aesthetic manifestations of sympathy displayed by the peoples of modern times, by bucolic poetry and French pastoral plays, prevail upon these sympathizers to put their hands to the plough-beam and sweep out the courtyard? Do we not find, even among the working-classes themselves, psychological motives latent behind the decisions of the labour market—motives which are neither logical, moral, nor aesthetic, but exclusively due to a fear of associations or dissociations? Can we explain the numerous gaps and overcrowdings of the labour market, the numerous disturbances of the capillary attraction of supply and demand, by anything else than an irrationality of this kind? “Not only the ruling classes, but, times without number, even his fellow-labourers engaged in other branches, ignore the *peasant*,” is the complaint of Alexander Csizmadia, the Hungarian leader of the “peasant-socialists.” Is this contempt of aesthetic origin? It is scarcely credible. Work in factories, tenement houses, common lodging-houses, suburban inns—all these give rise to so much that is anti-aesthetic, both in persons and situations, that there cannot be much question of an aesthetic distinction—it being here a matter, not of the several individuals, but of aesthetics as between occupations. Therefore we must include among the laws of the labour market the decisional motives of association and dissociation, as was done by Brown-Pope, the President of the Georgian Farmers’ Society, when he complained to the Industrial Commission that, ever since the negroes had begun to work as field labourers, the white

men had begun to despise farm labour and preferred living "on air and water" in towns to working on farms at a fixed wage.

There is scarcely any reason for denying that the cause of the overcrowding of certain careers and branches is the psychological choiceness of the same. As prestige is not capable of directing a concentrated, careful, and energetic chain of action, its part in the choice of career would be pre-eminently a negative one. However, as we have said, the choice of a career is not identical with the choice of work; the former is a decision, often the result of a single moment, a single effort of enthusiasm, a single impression; in choosing a career, every young man enters a foreign legion, for the most part with unknown duties and prospects; for this reason prestige may exercise a decisive influence on the choice of a career, even in an active direction.

Wherever an occupation begins to make fresh headway, or a primitive sphere of work starts to become paralysed and to sink into decay, it endeavours, by the aid of irrational sacrifices and spasmodic exertions, to create, acquire, or preserve a prestige of its own. No mother could display more tender care in taking her child out of a burning house than that displayed by decaying professions in their efforts to save their prestige at least. "Nothing is more difficult," writes Professor Goldziher, "than to persuade the inhabitants of the desert to undertake the cultivation of the soil; the endeavours of certain pashas in this direction have been frustrated by the pride of the Bedouin, who looks upon town life as a contemptible state, a degradation. In his eyes, that Bedouin tribe which leaves the privations of the desert for the comforts of the town is worthy of contempt and derision." When a new occupation meets a violent prejudice of this kind, how is it to secure its position beside

or even above older occupations? By slowly eliminating primitive views, together with the habitual moral mechanicalness? That is a hopeless undertaking. Not unless distance, unless some emotional power supports the logical and ethical persuasion, can there be any prospect of the new sphere of work becoming rapidly able to exist or obtaining the predominance. For the choice of the older occupations also proceeds for the most part from alogical and anethical motives. The barbarian choice of a career is just as exclusive as it is soullessly automatic. With the Hindus, in the clothing branch, the turban-makers refuse to have anything to do with the girdle-makers; and you cannot see the same man sowing and pasturing. The coolie, who carries a burden on his head, would not undertake to carry the same burden on his shoulder. Obstinate adherence to a trade—as, for example, in the case of the weavers of East Bengal—is often carried to the extreme of starvation. In dealing with irrationalities of this kind, the reaction rendered imperative with such tragic rapidity is generally counterbalanced by another irrationality—habit by prestige, the mechanizing power of the near, the repeated, and the everyday by the mechanizing power of the distant, the different, and the isolated. The first trafficker is generally the priest, who, when selling amulets, begins to buy and sell industrial articles too. In Polynesia the monopoly of commerce is reserved for the high priest. And the more universal the contempt and prejudice shown towards a new occupation, the more natural and untiring the efforts of the merchants and manufacturers to take shelter under some prestige; and their artful and complicated hunt for prestige reaches its height in the mystical exclusiveness of guilds. The new occupations cannot confine themselves to the protection of the dues and charges of princes and burgraves:



they are compelled to surround themselves with the bastions of psychological protection too. The greater their intercourse with men at a distance from their headquarters, the more particular and direct their relations with the thousands of their customers, and the less the feasibility of contenting themselves with the aid offered by princes and burgraves, which is only of local effect, and is more particularly effective in questions of life and death. New occupations further require psychological protection that shall be transportable in the manner of an accumulator, and that is renewed and spread automatically : this accounts for the enormous increase of snobs, parvenus, and toadies, as soon as a new occupation is found endeavouring to wedge its way in among the older ones.

Men, as a rule, appraise not the occupation, but *the individuals engaged in it*. When he heard that Ismenios was a splendid flutist, Antisthenes remarked : "What a low *man* he must be, otherwise he would not be such an excellent flutist." And Philip, adds Plutarch, said to his son, who had shown himself a clever and agreeable zither-player at a banquet : "Are you not ashamed of playing the zither so well?" The antipathy for new occupations, if not the result of economic jealousy, is, as a rule, identical with the antipathy felt for a foreign invader. If there is no prejudice or indignation of the kind, the new competitor is surrounded by a kind of mystic spell. On the other hand, a new land-owner, although his occupation is an old one, is received with prejudice and indignation, whereas for instance the merchants of Hamburg have, practically ever since the beginning of the Middle Ages, been surrounded with prestige in Germany. A man choosing a *new career*, who is *of us* and differs from us only by the novelty of his occupation, not by his traditions, connections, and tastes, the new merchant and manufacturer, who is *of us* without our being

able to confound him with those whom our prejudice has rejected, if we are only able to dissociate him from everything that is annoying and vulgar, will enjoy prestige and not have to run the gauntlet of prejudice. Of the economic activity of the Hungarian statesman Hegedüs, Mikszáth writes as follows: "At that time (in the seventies) Hungarian political activity began to be diverted into this field. The only trouble was, that very few understood it. The list of those who did is practically exhausted if we quote the names of Melchior Lonyay and of the young Kálmán Széll. And these were regarded by their fellows as exceptional prodigies who had been initiated into unintelligible mysteries." These had all originally been among the old "*gentry*," on a basis of real estate, with the rays of ancient ancestry on their brows. They did not approach or intrude; they annoyed no one. Nor did they get into such close propinquity to their fellows as to blunt the edge of their personal spell; there was no question of any blot on the escutcheon of an ancient family, such as would have been the result of the hanging out of a signboard with the name, "*Count X. Y., Shoemaker*."

The mere choice of person is anticipated in two cases only by the psychological appraisement of the occupation itself. One of these cases is the prejudice, the invincible abhorrence of the constitution for certain occupations referred to already in connection with Guyau's remark. The other case of anticipation is, as we have seen, the vulgarity of the new occupation, and the commercial character and possibility of confounding with the same. Such obstacles to prestige are physical labour and trafficking in money—the *sordidae artes*.

Muscular labour is the consumption of forces expanding in area and materially replaceable, whereas qualitative work

employs forces expanding in time, amassed in point of development, and materially unreplaceable. Mechanism has no personality; it is conceivable, appraisable, accessible at will. Intellectual work has a personal stamp, its appraisal and conception are impossible beyond certain limits; all that we can assert of it is merely approximate; all that we see of it is deficient, indivisible, and isolated. Prestige cannot be intensified by the knowledge acquired concerning an occupation the products of which may be measured by horse-power and calories, and the sphere of work of which may be replaced by yokes of oxen or horses, by steam, dynamos, ploughing, harvesting, and threshing machines, by typewriters and automata. Uncertainty is only one—economic—result of the vulgarity of these employments. In this uncertainty there is manifested, physically, the depreciating effect of frequency. But even in cases where physical labour is rarer, more in request, and surer than mental work, the psychological shirking of the same loses scarcely any of its power. Never has the struggle of the prestige of the intellect against the utilitarian appraisal of physical labour shown itself more dramatically—a fact due to the circumstance that it has never been more abstract—than in the early centuries of Christianity. During the fourth century, in the flourishing monasteries of North Africa, the opinion began to make headway that the occupation of asceticism, which subordinated man entirely to God, excluded physical labour. This prestige simulating pathos under the mask of an appraisal of nobility drew from St. Augustine a protest that is still fresh and up to date. “It is true,” he says in his book, *De opere monachorum*, “that the final aim and true reward of every activity of a Christian is intellectual. But if we ask whether the Apostle Paul, the model of Christian intellectuality,

despised physical labour, must we not answer the arguments of the African ascetics by a decided *no*? One thing I know," goes on St. Augustine, "the Apostle Paul was no thief, no burglar or robber, no professional runner, gladiator, or comedian, and no dirty speculator; he was honestly and honourably engaged in an occupation such as is of value and profit in the habits of mankind—such a one as that of the smiths, carpenters, shoemakers, or agricultural labourers. For *truly distinguished men* do not find fault with in what the arrogance of the *so-called*—though not genuine—people of distinction despises. The apostle would not have considered it beneath his dignity to undertake the work of peasants or to engage in handicrafts. If in one place he says, 'Avoid everything that would scandalize the Jews and Greeks and the Church of God,' I do not know to whom he would have been ashamed to own his connection with such work. Not to the Jews—for their patriarchs had watched their flocks. Not to the Greeks—for they had famous philosophers who had been shoemakers. Nor to the Church either, for that true man, the husband of Mary, was—a carpenter."

Yet the contempt for the *sordidae artes*—which is after all the indirect result of the prestige of intellectual work and the elasticity of its distance—is far too general in the present day for much harm to be done to it even by such wise words. The immeasurability of intellectual work as compared with measurable physical labour, the want of a *tertium comparationis* between intellectual and physical production, the clear outspokenness of physical strength as compared with the suggestive capacity of intellectual force—these things have always served as a splendid usufructuary means to all forms of power. Whereas the products of physical labour are as transparent as the glass of a window, in those of intellectual work there



is something opalescent, a brightness alternating with dimness. Consequently, in choosing a career emotional persons crowd to the intellectual one which suggests more mysterious possibilities; and the general run of mankind is, under equal conditions, less able to comprehend, to transform to a fixed value, the profession which at some point is unanalysable, than muscular occupation. The intellectual career is able to make people forget that it is a means of subsistence; it as it were suggests an aim without defining that aim. But, for the same reason, the intellectual sphere of work is less responsible; and it is only in the crowds that it is possible to lie latent with as little responsibility as in intellectual careers. *Prestige of intellectual career paralyses a good many possibilities of proletarian self-consciousness.*

With the recognition of the possibility of competition the prestige of intellectual work gradually fades away: it withers and loses its psychological value. We find a good example of this gradual decay of the prestige of intellectuality in the workmen's movements of our days. As the mechanical organization of parties advances, and the skilled leader begins to do familiar and vulgar work, the number of labourers alarmed by Turati's famous saying about the isolated illiterate decreases in proportion. The ancient protest of St. Augustine is exotically revived in the modern labour movement, where the muscular workman protests, with the bitter rigour of a Puritan, against the leadership of *intellect*.

In Greece, where we find perhaps the finest susceptibility towards the prestige of occupations, it would seem as if there were some contradiction concerning the psychological functions of money. "The wealth of a man," says Cephalos in Plato's *Polity*, "contributes considerably to enable its owner, when facing death, not to be forced to

cudgel his brains as to whether he has deceived or outwitted anybody, even involuntarily. He has not to lament having remained in the debt of any god with sacrifices or of any single fellow-man with his money." In direct contrast to this, the *acquisition* of money, the engaging in any intellectual pursuit for money, is looked upon as degrading. Aristoteles included Aristippos of Cyrene among the Sophists, because he accepted money for teaching. At Rome we find even the *lex Cincia* (204 B.C.) declaring—*ne quis ob causam orandam donum munisve caperet*. This prohibition was renewed by Augustus; and finally, in the reign of Trajan, the parties to a suit were made to swear that they had not paid or encouraged the advocates by promises, and the advocates could not claim their fees (fixed by law) until after the conclusion of the trial. The ideal aim was the raising of the moral standard of advocates—an appraisement of nobility—and the abstraction from all motives excitable by money and the attraction of the same to more objective and moral points of view. But what mysterious sources of subsistence are supposed by this appraisement of nobility, when Greek and Roman orators and advocates are reproached for accepting money for their work? After so many centuries of simplifying development, what is it that prevails upon the English *barrister* to consider the mere mention of a fee *unfair*—not to speak of bringing a suit for the recovery of a fee, a course which is looked upon as actually immoral? It is the irrationality of prestige, the chief point of view in which is sentiment.

So wealth is regarded as capable of prestige, whereas the earning of money is not. The difference is evidently a psychological one, neither logical nor moral, not even aesthetic. A wealthy man is therefore surrounded with a respect which does not—as most people believe—originate

from the independence of conduct accompanying material independence. Wealthy politicians, county councillors, etc., are just as little independent as the poor ones: only the former depend upon their own wealth, the latter on that of others. Participation in the decisions of a democratic party, for example, can be carried out more independently by unmoneyed members than by wealthy ones; it is not wealthy newspaper proprietors, but poor journalists, who are wont to suffer for airing what they consider an injustice: even those who look at things from a cynical standpoint will scarcely be able to establish anything else than that the motives underlying the silence of a wealthy politician are in the great majority of cases no more moral than those inciting the poor politician to beat the big drum—only that the blunders of the *pauvre chevalier* of public life are conspicuous, which the conservatism of the wealthy, which is probably just as immoral, is not. The by-flavour of morality introduced into the conception of “material independence” is mostly the work of prestige. Wealth already *in possession* does not *smell of money*; the sweat of the brow by which it was acquired has dried up; the grass of oblivion has overgrown the tricks once resorted to; the toiling, lowly, slaving beginning, the servile fawning on individuals and groups with power to grant an opportunity for amassing money, has been forgotten. The deeds of misery and selfishness have been buried for ever in the iron crypts of the safe-deposits, and in such real estate as reminds us of impregnable ancestral power; the warning disturbances of disquietude caused by every effort to acquire money have been replaced by the cold, exclusive calm of wealth: in the former case money symbolized subordination, marketable accessibility for anybody and everybody, in the latter case it stands for *class*; the money-getting man appears to those outside as an automaton,

ready to supply familiar wares for a certain sum without the least shred of personal peculiarity, whereas the *wealthy* man's money has become an absorbed element of his personality, which, far from forcing motives upon him, abjectly serves his motives.

Artists, doctors, surgeons, says Escott of England, receive fees, or send in their accounts and obtain—or at least expect—the payment of the sum charged. But the same is done by tailors, wine-merchants, butchers, grocers, and all other tradesmen. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the social disadvantages under which the artists and the rest have to labour arise from the same source as the socially unfavourable position of those individuals who obtain their income from sources which cannot in any respect be qualified as either noble or scientific. Could even Aesculapius, he adds, in his most sanguine moment expect a dignity on a level with that of the episcopal mitre?

The acquisition of money makes persons accessible, almost negotiable and of well-known value; and however they may become ennobled and spiritualized, logically, morally, and aesthetically, their behaviour is associable with a vulgarly mechanical employment and with marketable services. Therefore, even among wealthy people prestige is obtainable only by such of whose wealth the world has forgotten that it was *acquired*, whose wealth is ancient, its origin buried in the mist of oblivion—a concrete mass with no dynamic tension—a wealth regarded as natural, as self-evident, the absence of which would cause a stir, whereas its existence passes unobserved, which the world takes note of without criticism or doubt, without shaking of the head or surprise—just as naturally as it looks upon the inevitable events of the world. Money still on its way leads to an easy analysis; in its ringing



path it affects interests and feelings; wherever its influence is felt, it disturbs peace and causes exciting changes: it is a well-known object, inciting to competition. Money which is safely stored at home and has found its harbour, has come to its owner in the character of an instrument, the pressure it exercises is scarcely noticeable and psychologically insignificant; it gives rise to admiration and jealousy, but not to contempt.

§ 58. *Adam Smith on the sympathetic character of wealth.*—According to Smith, in wealth accompanied by a definite social power, we regard with sympathy the pleasures fulfilled, the fulfilment of which we should desire for our own persons. Rich men interest us, even if we do not expect any benefits from them; men are far more ready to sympathize with our joy than with our sorrow, and for this reason we are ashamed of our poverty and make a show of our wealth.

On the contrary, it is certain that wealth is generally not sympathetic in the eyes of the masses, but an object of jealousy and hatred; the only remarkable thing is, that *this jealousy and hatred is rarely intensified into contempt and indignation* the moment it is a question of wealth and not of the acquisition of money, *i.e.*, wealth, generally speaking, possesses prestige. However, this prestige is not within the reach of loosely rooted, freshly acquired parvenu wealth; personal estate has less chance of obtaining it than real estate; and historical wealth is more apt to do so than wealth dating from yesterday. Only wealth of mystic origin has the power of intensifying sentiment—just as the first *safe-deposit* was hidden behind the intoxicating smoke and riddling oracles of Delphi. In opposition to the proposition of Smith, there can be no doubt that quasi-aesthetic impressions would be incapable of making slaves of millions and of inciting them to undertake a maximum of work and

to reduce their consumption, to engage in monotonous, soul-killing, aimless occupations, and to tolerate servility and uncertainty. Does the idling, open-mouthed snobbism referred to by Smith justify the long suffering of poor men all through history, and the unceasing upheaval of the system of mankind created by God? The suggestiveness of pomp is calculated to arouse sentimental generalities, but does not lead to sentimental automaticness.

§ 59. *Of classes.*—At the time when Smith was preaching the sentimental distinction of the wealthy, there was as yet not a trace of that brilliantly conceived theory set up a hundred years later by Marx and Engels in reference to the struggle of the economic classes. This thesis is in direct opposition to what Smith preaches about the sentimental value of wealth. Marxism looks upon the toleration of wealth produced by the industrial revolution as a tragic tension, which bears its own fate in its womb, and which, until that fate has been accomplished, forces the rich and the poor into classes sharply distinguished. Since then another fifty years have passed away. Were a Marxist guard to go, let us say, from end to end of all three classes on a train in East Europe, and to take a good look at the passengers, it is scarcely probable that the theory of Marx would be supported by the data he would be able to collect, which, though, we must admit, roughly empirical, tell much more than any theory. In the three classes of the train we should find a demonstration of the Marxian distribution of the various stages of material prosperity—the wealthy, the people of moderate means, and the victims of expropriation. As the tickets for the three classes are issued according to a strictly progressive scale, the logical distribution should evidently be, that the wealthy travel first, the people of moderate means second, and the proletariat third class. We admit that, with a mechanical or logical carrying into

effect of the Marxist tariff of persons, it is quite conceivable that certain persons, from the point of view either of comfort or of health, go up one class, while others go down one owing to their leaning towards economy. But, even if we do not take all this into consideration, what do we see? In the first class we find the many-acred magnate, the wealthy gentry, the moneyed man on 'Change, the devout prelate sitting next to the country recorder, whose large family is as much a burden to him as his enormous debts, the petty county magistrate, who at home denies himself the most elementary requirements of culture that he may be able to travel first class, the member of Parliament, whose "first-class" expenses are so heavy that he is hardly able to attend the sessions where he has duties to perform, the "acreless" titled gentleman, whom the difference of cost between the two classes would long ago have enabled to furnish a bathroom, the judge of an inferior court, who with blushing servility fawns upon the Jewish usurer to prolong his bills. But in the same class we see the stingy tenant, the director of some provincial bank, the president of a country club, whose eyes beam with pleasure as they speak of the "historical" familiarity of some "big gun," and jealously watch the opportunity for an introduction. The whole compartment is under the spell of the dull monotony of *una eademque nobilitas*; drawling speech is followed by violent altercation; there is but little *causerie*; and there is just the same obligatory uniformity of clothes, manners, sport, and accent as of opinion and appraisement.

If we pass to the second and third classes, we find, *mutatis mutandis*, the same picture. In these classes we come across numbers of passengers who are kept out of the higher class by the prestige of its occupants; men of refined tastes, well-to-do, maybe of indifferent

health, who would gladly pay for the greater comfort if the prestige of the passengers travelling in the first or second class did not restrain them. They can give no reason for their conduct; but there can be no doubt that *they are ill at ease* in the higher classes. In fast trains, which have no third-class carriages, we have often seen well-to-do peasants in the corridors who evidently *do not presume* to take their seats among the gentlemen. In the third class we find farmers, master workmen, and tradesmen, whose wealth exceeds that of more than one passenger travelling first. In America, negroes are confined in separate compartments. For the East-European peasant prestige does the same. A clerk of a court of justice, who may possess a considerable fortune, would cause no small indignation if he were to travel first class, whereas a president of a tribunal, even if over his ears in debt, would render himself liable to social contempt if he did not travel first. This instantaneous photograph does not claim to be an ante-Marxist argument, but it seems to point the way to the obtaining of arguments! Without doubt there are certain points, moments important from the point of view of *arousing sentiments*, to which the "acreless" titled gentleman is just as much compelled to bow as the "many-acred" magnate; the expensive mechanism of the associations of *una eademque nobilitas* opens a first-floor room in a hotel for the East-European landlord in need of family assistance, takes him to a box at the theatre and to the fashionable club, and, with a severity reminding us of moral prohibitions, restrains him from taking a "one-horse" cab. And all these differentiations are not characteristic of any particular age or country. The primitive distributions into tribes, the secret societies, are not grades of population divided off according to wealth or occupation, but associations in which the members of



tribes combined for the object of celebrating festivals. In its most primitive stage, when even its outlines were scarcely observable, nobility—in the form of special places assigned at festivals, more pompous presents, higher weregeld, etc.—was already at work fashioning the stupid, ungainly instruments of its prestige. Although Professor Breysig, who establishes this fact concerning the redskins of Columbia, adds, quite correctly, that so expensive a securing of authority is inconceivable without possessions, it is evident that here wealth does not create obedience in the sense of Marxian causality, but is merely an instrument of psychological influence, just as the prestige of the East-European gentry is costly without being capitalistic.

The first groupings within the tribe originate from the *exclusivéness* of people of the same age, blood relations, and sexes. In the case of peoples suffering from a lack of even the most primitive means of subsistence, we occasionally meet the multifarious organizations and ceremonies of *cliqués*. In the case of cannibals and of savages living from hand to mouth we find *cliqués* which are organs for anticipating or avoiding competition, essentially similar to those Paris *cliqués* spoken of by Bashkirtseff. Ratzel is quite right in saying that we find the conditions of a secret association even in those societies which are without the great, open motives of distribution into orders. We may add, that even societies distributed by orders possess elements and processes of life not so distributed: what Ratzel says, applies to these too. Those who desire to avoid competition draw artificial boundary lines, wear masks, surround themselves with religious forms, and monopolize certain important functions, such as initiation and retaliation for breaches of right. Mixed feelings of curiosity, fear, and devotion, says Webster Hutton, are aroused; they envelop themselves in that mysterious

veil, which has so much attraction for primitive minds all the world over, and, with continually increasing power, keep alive what tends to incline human nature to social intercourse and cohabitation—the feelings of prestige and exclusiveness, and the consciousness of the essentially material advantages accruing to the members. In this way, he adds, side by side with the family and the tribe they create an organization the power and cohesion of which surpasses that of the former. By means of the special signs and language of such secret associations, even inter-tribal quarrels may sometimes be settled. Although economic interests play a part in the cohesion of these associations, supremacy and recognition is evidently acquired by psychological means: “prestige and exclusiveness” form the first orders. “*Cliqués*” were in existence even before “classes” were heard of.

Secret associations are only amateur attempts at a primitive cohesion of masses and permanency. Men are still for the most part well acquainted with one another; and that is why they *practise secrecy*: but a secret is provocative, negative, and strictly local; and that is why, in the case of more differentiated and populous societies, prestige comes more and more to the front. In Hawaii the upper classes have a separate language, which plays the same part as French does among the “upper ten” in Russia, or as, in other cultures, Sumerian, Sanskrit, the spirit language of the Malayans, Greek, Latin, and Arabic. Modern views in general endeavour to make the preservative force of ceremonies appear subordinate and complementary. Yet, in default of sentimental motives, as well as of blood unity and abhorrence, the first permanencies of “classes” can only be explained by the creative power of ceremonies. Nachtigall supplies us with remarkably instructive data relative to a ceremony scarcely

noticed at all in the bustle of modern life, viz., that of salutation. He gives a detailed description of the long-drawn-out and extremely tiring process of salutation between two members of the Tubu tribe unknown to one another, which an outsider would be far more likely to take for a diplomatic ceremony of decisive importance than for a simple greeting. Where a society has already been split up into orders, the part played by the salutation is, among other things, that of a condensed acknowledgment of "class." A man of an inferior order makes his figure smaller, bows, kneels down, or prostrates himself. The Oriental crosses his arms, in expression of his defencelessness; the Kaffir covers his head with dust or soils himself; the negro of West Africa bares himself to the waist; the Oriental takes off his shoes; the Western European takes off his hat—as if in contrast to the independence accompanying complete dress. The master sits; the servant stands. Sitting, crouching, a position of rest, is therefore at the same time a sign of power (on a chair, sofa, throne, etc.). All this may be of *subordinatè* character, the associative emphasizing of a state already in existence. However, different forms of salutation, with their rich variety, serve directly to prevent analysis. These forms of salutation "treat the person greeted as some saint or inaccessible individuality, whom to look at even is a profanity; before persons of a higher rank, inferiors make way, fix their eyes on the ground, cover or turn away their faces, or turn their backs, signifying by this their inability to exercise any criticism on the person thus respected." Similarly, the festivals of primitive peoples, their ceremonies of eating and fighting, of burial and peace-making, of magic, for distinguishing age and the sexes, possess an important significance as creating "classes."

No doubt all these ceremonies have the power of creating groups only in a naïve society, under the supreme rule of superstition and in modest surroundings. But in "class-like" beginnings we find, not economic motives, but psychological ones, come to the front. This is all we desired to prove.

Let us now glance at the two classical homes of "class" rule, where we find the stiffest formations of non-related groups—to India and China; this involves the arguments contained in the conduct of some seven hundred million people.

What are the conditions of a Hindu caste? One of the clearest and most accurate definitions of the Hindu caste is from the pen of Professor Bouglé: "Castes are found prevailing in a society, when that society is distributed into a large number of groups hereditarily specialized, arranged one above the other in ranks and mutually opposed." The primary fundamental condition of a caste is that it is the right and duty of the child to carry on the occupation of his father. But, besides this, there are various grades among the several castes. One is worth a hundred gold pieces before the law, the other fifty: the gold rings, red robes, yellow boots worn by the one are forbidden fruit to the other. Strict isolation and exclusiveness, the prohibition of mixed marriages, the defiling effect of intercourse with, or even the sight of, certain castes; decrees forbidding the members of a higher caste to eat of the same dish, to live under the same roof, or enter into conversation with those of a lower caste, compelling members of certain castes to make a wide detour to avoid meeting those of a higher caste, etc.—these are regulations which *economically* (from the point of view of the powerful and on the given level of economic development) *are just as inopportune as they*



*are opportune psychologically.* The exploitation of slave labour would evidently be more effectual by means of direct intercourse and control than by the employment of hidden faces, wide detours, and artificial dumbness. But the management and control of labour would result in an involuntary recognition of the divine analogies of common human features and involve an observance of the masters: and therewith the emotional basis of the exclusive castes would break down with volcanic force. That is why, all over India, what is economically desirable is subordinated to what is psychologically valuable, and the supremacy of psychological selection for the moment limits the intensity even of British imperialism.

If we investigate the composition of the Chinese nobility, we find a similar impediment to economic selection. According to Farjenel, the Chinese nobility is distributed into eight classes, viz.: (a) the relatives of the monarch to the fifth degree of mourning; the relatives of the empress to the fourth degree; the family of the consort of the heir apparent to the third degree; (b) those persons who have held long intercourse with the holy person of the sovereign, who have been long in his service and *see him from a short distance*; (c) those who have rendered great services in peace or in war; (d) those who give proofs of eminent wisdom or virtue; (e) those who are prominent in the imperial council; (f) those who have displayed meritorious activity in public offices; (g) nobility holding certain offices, by virtue of which they acquire noble rank; (h) the descendants of previous ruling dynasties, who are regarded as guests and whom the monarch guarantees prestige. Of all these categories of the Chinese nobility, not one is purely economic, probably because a purely economic category is objectively impossible, there being no one to tolerate it: while the nobility of the

categories (a), (b), (g) and (h) was the result of purely associative distinctions, about the intrinsic justification of which people do not care.

At this point the objection will be raised, that the "caste" cannot be identified with the "class," as the intrinsic logic of the origin of classes—according to Marxism—is absolutely at variance with the motives of the creation and maintenance of castes.

Let us therefore put the question with regard to the classic zone of Marxism—Are there any purely economic classes at all, in sharply isolated entity, and with a common economic denominator, the members of which clutch at one another and contradict everything else by consciousness of class? Are there any other "classes" at all besides psychological ones? Do not men group—are they not compelled to group—rather according to social effectiveness, capacity for self-assertion, psychological gravity, than in proportion to the economic power concentrated by them?

Economic power undoubtedly means social power too. But this is only possible in an extreme degree, because at the same time it forms a rich supply of means for the creation of prestige. With its own logic, Marxism may object that psychological effectiveness merely *survives* intrinsic justification, just as, in the Middle Ages, privileges throve in caste-like exclusiveness when the economic order of mediaeval times had already fallen into decay. The fault of arguments of this kind is, that this *survival* is conceived of and propounded as a sort of transition, as a breach of regularity, and as an exception. Only it is extraordinary that, ever since the world has existed, and since the days of the industrial revolution in England, these transitions, breaches, and irregularities have continued in unbroken succession: *survivals* of this kind always break the intrinsic causalities, but these *survivals* are

found flourishing without intrinsic justification. If we take our stand on the reasoning of the Marxists, we must confess that the "irregularities" are more lasting and more eternal than the "rule."

Russia's progress has been hampered by her Germanophobia and her pogroms, China by her "Boxer" insurrections: the lack of prestige prevents the thriving of the productive half of commerce in Hungary. In Europe, whole peoples are lounging their time away on the threshold of capitalism; whole classes are found conducting themselves for centuries like the *lazzaroni* of Naples. Races and families of eminent talents live in misery, break up and dissipate, because the prestige of real estate and of the civil service is the only one they recognize. In fact, the economic unity of "classes," and their rational homogeneity, is not to be demonstrated anywhere in the world: no small part of the "classes" consists of renegades. Although the inventions of last century started a process of splendid fermentation in feudal society, (a) this fermentation meets with constant psychological obstacles, and (b) it results in a succession of new psychological organizations, for without the latter no power can be built up.

(a) The principle of nobility proves disproportionately more enduring than is generally supposed by the theory of classes. We see a renewal of the second flowering of the decadent Roman aristocracy which "remained in men's minds long after the process of destruction had begun." If the English knight or noble exercised any influence on government at the close of the eighteenth century, he did so, according to Taine, "by influence, not by power." On the eve of the Revolution, French nobles were entitled to "their honorary and useful rights" even when they had, for the most part, been deprived of their share in public affairs. They still have their distinctive seats in the

churches ; they are buried in the sanctuary ; their crests are to be seen on the carpets ; and they are given the honours of incense and the presentation of holy water. At the opening of the modern age, when the scaffoldings of the old order were ready to collapse—even in 1789—the numerous petitions presented by the French nobility all ask for certain distinctive emblems. It was only for a moment that the French Revolution gave the lie to these urgent demands for distinctive marks : the model European constitutional State, England, confirmed the prerogatives of its king and Upper House, and the psychological standpoint is still an important motive in the selection of its government and the election of the members of its Lower House. The principle of nobility has been deeply imbibed by the bourgeois democracy too ; generalizing, automatic discrimination is still the sole basis, the tower of refuge, and the closely pursued aim of capitalism. After fifty years of Marxism, the socialists of England are still fighting against the “Lords,” those of Germany against the “Junkers,” those of Hungary against the “casinos,” for the psychological power proves to be more enduring than that of economic concentration. Psychological concentration seems to be the primary force ; it keeps economic concentration too alive ; it is more universal, wider, more automatic, more unobserved than the latter. For this reason, as soon as it is attacked, the concentration of capital seeks refuge in the organizations and instruments of psychological capitalists. The socialist parties are naïve or hypocritical when they speak of “cowardly” capitalism or of capitalism “unacquainted with its interests,” which, accommodating itself to the feudal-nobility, “impedes development” and stands in the way of “the inevitable.” The whole potentiality of capital is due to the fact that it is tolerated. With the decline of tolerance, the potentiality of capital declines too. A



capitalism which has been deprived of all mines may be conceived of as existing in some manner; but we can scarcely conceive the possibility of maintaining a capitalism deprived of the support of the whole Press, or left in the lurch by all the old nobility. Where there is no system of orders, the potentiality of capital cannot become automatic or permanent unless it acquires psychological values. The abundance or insufficiency of these values—*caeteris paribus*—may secure capital more or less vitality and effectiveness.

(b) Among the remarkable data that have come to us from America relative to trusts, we find included, besides economic uncertainty, psychological uncertainty too. According to the bitter remark of Buonaparte, legitimacy may allow itself five times more foolishness than a new dynasty. The economical logic of Old World capitalism asserts itself late and only in a confused manner; its productiveness, its markets, its wages are overshadowed by a dense cloud of sentiments. The millionaires of America are bitterly sensible of this disparity of forces due to automatism. In May, 1906, a great American review gave a detailed account of how American capitalism endeavoured to create a basis for its trusts and its billions. Until people begin to regard it as *matter-of-course*, American capital must feel itself to be a merely accidental historical category; for this reason the acquirement of permanency and universality is the aim of the American trust-kings, an aim that offers continually increasing incentives. When the rich American *globe-trotters* start out in masses to tour the world and get into connection (by marriage, politics, etc.) with the old families of Europe, the necessity arises for an elimination of the disparities of permanency by creating an equal prestige for American capital. Apart from the "aping of Europe" of snobs and parvenus, serious thinkers too

divert attention to the Old World. The fixed capital of Europe is never in danger of a *crisis*, only of a *revolution*. And there are technical precautions that may be used against *revolutions*, to counteract which masses may still be recruited. Capitalism overtaken by a *crisis* has no masses to support it; only shouting depositors and shareholders surround the offices of the bankrupt capitalist in thousands, and he has none to protect him.

However, one fine day the delegates of the *American Historical Research Society* made their appearance in England, and began to search among the faded documents of English libraries—emphasizing as their plea that they were investigating the question of the original colonization of America—for the “prestige-bringing” aristocratic forefathers. In Maryland and Virginia they discovered traces of an American nobility in no way inferior in point of antiquity and respectability to the old aristocracy of England. Already, in Maryland and Virginia, more than five hundred families have discovered their heraldic bearings, and thousands of descendants of original colonists know their genealogical trees. Whether this belated hunting after prestige will have the effect anticipated on the American working-classes of mixed origin, or whether it merely serves to flatter the self-satisfaction of the interested millionaires, is a question that only the future will be able to answer. Every sign seems to point to the bulk of the “prestiges” being extremely vital. And in the case of prestige, everything depends on the gain of time and the minimum period of oblivion, beyond which “its clear lustre grows continually in power, as it recedes in distance of time and space.” Though some people, as, for instance, Michels, exaggerate its oligarchic tendency, the labour movement of our time is characterized by the formation of a conservative and exclusive aristocracy of

workmen. A Slav immigrant does not regard his American foreman with more rational wonder than the vassal did his lord, or than the savage does a "paleface." It would seem as if "*cliques*" were stronger and more popular than "classes."

§ 60. *Prestige and capital*.—Among the elements of a capitalistic order, we see materials that are conducted in an unchanging manner amid indifferent and varying conditions; we see the life given to capital by work, and the conduct varying amid varying changes; and, finally, we see the psychological element, the social-like behaviour—the tolerance of life, by which it becomes the co-ordinate of matter. *Without materials, instruments, tools, there is no capital. Nor is there any without work; nor without toleration. The three elements of capital are: materials, work, toleration.* The permanent supremacy of the unrestricted owner of the *res rustica*, of the feudal lord, of the capitalist, is caused ultimately, neither by the instruments of production, nor by the notional regulation of the possession of those instruments, *i.e.*, by right, but *by the possibility of their remaining by right permanently and hereditarily in the hands of the slave-owner, the feudal lord, the capitalist.* The material and legal automatism of rule must derive from a psychological source.

Prestige hinders the elasticity and economic self-possession of capital, as well as its welding with labour; and at the same time it furthers its permanency and its automatic character. The more labour the material interests and concentrates, the more the objective effectiveness of the capital that thus arises. The more the prestige connected with the material, the more the personal effectiveness of the capital thus brought into being. American or Jewish capital is more expansive and accommodating than English capital: but the latter is more permanent. The more we

are reminded by the psychological position of a capital of that of a real estate, the more historical and sentimental the effect it produces, the less conceivable those who have it in their possession, the greater the dissociation of its origin, its dependence and the mass of its aims—the more permanent and automatic the potentiality of that capital. Even with an enormous national wealth, capital is incapable of becoming permanent, unless those who wish to organize it are possessed of prestige. A great number of East-European peasants are still perversely mistrustful of even the best credit institutes. In many villages in East-Europe, several millions of crowns, roubles, etc., are lying idle in drawers, a phenomenon which Bagehot mentions as having existed in the seventies in French villages.

§ 61. *Prestige and credit*.—Ever since the development of financial economy, credit has been the backbone of modern trade in goods and of the establishment of value. Nay, more ; we may say that, the moment people settle down and begin to think of the future, they have need of credit.

It is impossible to avoid noticing the number of cognate features connecting prestige and credit.

Credit too, like prestige, is the due of forces recognized but not analysed ; its vitality and its injurability have both associative and dissociative sources. It lives by exclusive inaccessibility, just like prestige. A debtor may protect or prolong his credit, and remain on the surface of business confidence, even when the intrinsic, economic justifiability of that credit has ceased : he must only be able to continue to take into consideration the moments that are of value sentimentally and by appearance. Many business men have credit even with particular bankers without this granting of credit being sufficiently justified by genuine



values, if they are only able to create an impression of security, order, and productive work. On the other hand, a psychologically false step, or a gap scarcely observable economically, is sufficient to relegate to the background in appearances the values that are really to hand and to undermine credit. The creditor cannot act logically beyond a certain point: once that point is reached, he is driven to resort to rougher, more emotional methods of inquiry and investigation, and will be unable to separate the whispers of intrigue from among the informations and impressions he receives, or to discriminate between mere gossip and correct observations. For this reason he is compelled to rely on sentiment: and sentiments are influenced, not only by conceptions, but by simple associations as well. So far does credit resemble prestige. When, for instance, people speak of the financial prestige of a country, they refer to these associative motives of credit. The difference between prestige and credit is a twofold one. In the first place, credit is a strictly economic moment, and a banker is only too ready to offer credit to such persons whom he would not be pleased to welcome as his guests or take as his clerks. In the second place, the subject of the relation is the *creditor*; the relation is at best co-ordinate, and the creditor, even if unable to analyse, very carefully examines all the possibilities of analysis: the defined limit of credit is comparable and measurable; it does not contain any generalization or any dynamic power of automatism, as prestige does. Credit is not sentimental: the security of a man of medium rank and fortune means more than the friendship of the wealthiest.

§ 62. *Prestige and advertisement*.—The economic role of prestige is very apt to cross the conception of advertising. Advertisement, if it applies to goods or persons, is

generally considered as a vital condition of "getting on." Advertising employs psychological means; it selects what is conspicuous and prominent, remarkable and easily associable—not what is the essence. Advertisement is the demagoguery of economic life, marked and decided; it points out, emphasizes, declares something; it is the record of positive judgment. In this respect the restrained, distant, exclusive character of prestige is the exact opposite of advertisement; there is something severely negative in prestige, a modesty either obligatory or voluntary in the choice of instruments: advertisement, the pushing of the unknown to get observed, comes into being in the constantly expanding tension of competition; prestige, we may say, has a historical flavour, and is characterized by the subdued silence of drawing-rooms, churches, and graveyards—there is something European about it, just as there is something Asiatic in habit and something American about advertisement. Advertisement—associatively—may avail itself of prestige, as with the advertisement reign of Napoleon III, or the "we-have-conquered-the-world" poster of the American typewriter—just as the common American soap called "Ivory Soap" attained an unexampled sale merely because its posters were displayed by elegantly dressed men and women (cf. V. Mataja: *Die Reklame*)—or just as Pierpont Morgan thought no sacrifice too great to enable him to get into connection with the Pope's treasury. For the same reason the banks and industrial enterprises of Eastern Europe crowd their boards with counts; and thousands are paid for the title of "purveyor to the court," which the court, in order to mask its marketable character, awards to persons only. Prestige cannot avail itself of advertisement as an instrument, for it cannot tolerate its loud ephemerality and deafening noise: if we look for the names of old

firms possessing prestige among the advertisements of papers and on the posters, we find it practically a rule that those firms hardly advertise at all; loud and conspicuous advertisements are absent from their windows and price-lists, their signboards and notepaper—the real City scarcely avails itself at all of advertisement, has a horror of all sorts of conspicuousness, and carefully avoids every nuance of exaggeration. The City, in its relations with the public, concentrates its attention on preventing any assault on its exclusive, inaccessible position, on being everywhere in the markets where people are wont to see it, and an absence or exclusion from which would give rise to astonishment or criticism. Every little defect may be exaggerated emotionally in the public consciousness; and the City must avoid being forgotten just as carefully as it must be careful not to make itself conspicuous. It watches over every little breach in its position, and does not allow any one either to enter or to go out; it is aware of the decisive power of mental imponderables and the psychological importance of trifles that can and are scarcely appraised logically. For this reason it is wont to measure businesses not merely by their soundness or ethical correctness, but also from the point of view of their capability of prestige; in fact even reckless and incorrect City banks carefully nurse their prestige. When, at the close of 1909, the Austrian Government placed a loan of 140,000,000 crowns through the Post Office Savings Bank without asking the co-operation of the Rothschild-group, the following passage occurred in a letter (dated from Vienna) published in the *Pester Lloyd* relative to the feelings of the banking circles thus passed over: “The depression caused by this slight originates not from the loss of business but from the loss of prestige. They feel that they have been ignored and treated as a

*quantité négligeable* by the Government; and they feel hurt."

If prestige does not tolerate advertisement, if the latter makes the former commonplace and takes away its value even within the bounds of economic life, the restraint of prestige in intellectual fields and in the independent *rayons* of morality and its horror of the poster flavour of advertisement is all the more striking. Not to speak of the civil service, any breach of the personal exclusiveness of the professions of lawyer, doctor, or parson apt to give them the character of marketable values, is severely denounced by the "public spirit" of the branch in question. A lawyer who puts out a signboard similar to that of a tradesman, endeavours to "catch" clients like some agent, or advertises in the papers, etc., is guilty of profaning those numerous social, legal, economic, and moral distinctions everywhere enjoyed by the members of his profession by virtue of their education, their moral obligations, and the constant control to which they are subject. He endangers their existence by reason of the associative sentiment attaching to that profession. The Chamber of Advocates and the public opinion of the medical profession inflicts just as severe a retaliation for every approach to the methods of tradesmen as it does for every approach to dishonesty. The Budapest Chamber of Advocates has, through its disciplinary committee, more than once given moral grounds for sentences inflicting punishment for the use by a lawyer of a plate of the character of a placard. A lawyer who may safely sit on the board of a bank would scarcely dare to start a corn commission business under his own name or to open a shop where bargaining was done openly, involving publicity and advertising: signboards profane the profession — not the immorality of the ledger or the aesthetic inferiority of the



proceedings. The Chamber of Advocates would hardly be likely to forbid its members to start a dairy farm a mile outside the town, even under their own names: but a disciplinary examination would be the fate of a lawyer who presumed to open a dairy in the town, to hang out a signboard, to expose himself to the petty worries of purchase and sale, and thereby to load his own person and those of his fellow-members with the infamy of materialism.

§ 63. *Necessities and prestige.*—The primitive order of necessities, that is, feelings of a want, whether they appear physiologically, logically, morally, aesthetically, or economically, is upset by prestige in manifold ways. Where the scale arranged by prestige is used as a direct instrument, certain necessities may irrationally be thrust into the foreground, while others may be irrationally set back. Not a single Budapest or Bucharest dandy would buy a hat that did not contain the name of a London firm with its prestige of distance; and the prestige of Parisian fashions is so strong, that people are not willing to pay half as much for the finest products of home saloons, however completely they may be able to compete with the best Paris models, as for those created in the saloons of a Worth or a Paquin. But the prestige of necessities is still more conspicuous in its less deductive form. Every one must needs be struck by the disproportionately large sums expended on representative buildings by less wealthy States, such as Hungary, and by the smaller towns in East-Europe—and that despite the restricted character of their budgets. The Houses of Parliament at Budapest, the palace of the Governor of Fiume, the East-European pavilions erected for international exhibitions, in fact all those creations of architecture intended to emphasize the power, develop-

ment, and independence of the country as an inaccessible entity, are quite out of proportion to the logical items of the budget. Country towns in Hungary which possess neither drainage nor waterworks, erect "palaces of culture" and museums that cost hundreds of thousand crowns. The typical East-European country towns create a monopoly of representative main streets, which they pave, light, water, and beautify; and few more crying psychological lessons can be learned than if we leave the principal squares and elegant main streets of Belgrade, Jassy, Szeged, Szabadka, or Debreczen, and turn into the side streets, which are not in all cases a bit less busy. Millions are offered for the purposes of a university by Hungarian towns in which only every other person is able to read and write, the bulk of the inhabitants of which scarcely ever get letters, and never receive telegrams or read newspapers. And if we leave public budgets to examine the balance-sheets of families, we meet with symptoms of the value of appearances that are often pitiable: the expenses involved by the struggle to keep up a position, to keep pace with neighbours, and to make a show, are just as formidable as are the items of cost resulting on the other side from restraint, retirement, and the keeping up of appearances. "What kind of gentleman," asks Taine of the Frenchmen at the close of the eighteenth century, "interests oneself for the *price* of things? The less a man of money some one is, the more is he a gentleman." The drawing-rooms of Eastern Europe and of America are filled with books superbly bound but never read—just as the Hungarian peasant locks up his five or six "state" rooms and lives with his family, day and night, in one room. We are familiar with the upsetting of the balance-sheet caused by the "prestige" of army officers, of marriageable daughters,

and in fact of "gentlefolk" in general who are not moneyed. If we examine the accounts of even the most unpretentious workman, says Adam Smith, we shall find that a part even of his modest wages is spent on luxuries that might easily be regarded as superfluous; in fact, he will by way of exception actually spend something to satisfy his vanity and secure distinction.

Prestige raises the psychological situation to a higher power; poor men, too, feel that prestige is a something of incalculable depth. For this reason even persons struggling with want are capable of making enormous sacrifices. A girl whose family has preserved its prestige, feels that, even without any intellectual, moral, aesthetic, or economic surplus, she will probably make a better match than one who possesses all these advantages but lacks prestige. Poor people watch over prestige with the same eagerness as they buy lottery tickets: in both the greatest possibilities are latent. A poor man has a dim notion that prestige is a quite different social value to suffrage, that prestige spreads finely like a spring mist, which covers everything alike and is practically boundless.

Prestige is followed by the upsetting of the order of necessities. As long as the shifting of necessities is autonomous, as long as it remains within the bounds of self-government and fails to correspond only to the average standard, the scale of values of the public conception, this shifting does not necessarily affect the balance of individuality. A doctor would scarcely approve of the action of the intellectual proletarian, who makes his supper of dry bread to be able to spend an evening in the gallery of the opera-house or in the glittering corner of a café: but this confusion of necessities is still autonomous, an action done out of free choice and carried out within the bounds of a restricted

compulsion. It is the *Ego* that acts and sacrifices itself; it might have acted otherwise, and no one compelled it to adopt this irregular order of the feelings of want. But the majority of cases where the order of necessities is upset, where prime wants are subordinated to others of second-, third-, or fourth-rate importance, are not autonomous phenomena at all, but heteronomous processes carried out for the sake of the opinion of others. Such a shifting may involve an incalculable waste of energy and an absolute lowering of the value of the individual. On the other hand, prestige may—without endangering the constitution—introduce a modicum of impulse of nobility into the rough-and-ready succession of necessities.

§ 64. *Taboo*.—The psychological deformation of the primitive order of necessities may be concluded from the mass of familiar data relative to *taboo*, without the latter being entirely covered by the evidence to hand in this respect. Taboo is a prohibition prevailing among savages, which is not supported by any motives or accompanied by any menacing legislative intervention (Reinach). By a wealth of data, Frazer shows how the taboo solves the gravest questions of social economy by the dissociating and irrational separating in consciousness of the plant or animal to be consumed. A savage descended from a “totem” takes good care not to shoot his totem or to eat of it, except in case of famine. The Ozag tribe believes that a man who brings down a totem while hunting has killed his brother. A tribe of Bengal, whose totem is the kujran tree, refuses to eat of its fruit or sit in its shade, etc. However, the taboo protecting the totem sometimes goes farther still; the totem or certain parts of the same must not be touched; at other times it must not even be looked on. The totemist clans of Bengal are said not to allow their totems to



be eaten, burned, or used. The Bechuanas do not eat a totem animal or wear its skin; in some places they take care to avoid even seeing it, etc. In their work on the tribes of North Australia, Spencer and Gillen point to the voluntary or involuntary rationality of these totem-taboos. After the union of the clans, the totems resulted in a kind of skilled practice of plant growing and animal rearing, each clan sparing the breeding material of its own totem. Every other clan might eat of its flesh. After the union of the clans, totemism appeared in a veritable exchange of products. They produced for the use of one another their totems, which they could not touch themselves. "I have," says the chieftain to the other clans, "reared my totem; eat it: in return rear yours that I may eat it." This is the intentional or unintentional rationality of the taboo of primitive peoples. But this characteristic of tribal life does not exhaust the whole material of the taboo. For instance, the taboo extends to all things possessing a name similar to that tabooed; this accounts for the frequent change of the languages of savage peoples, especially where the name of the dead or of a parent is at the same time the term expressing some everyday object. There are, moreover, seasons and circumstances during and under which the use of certain words is forbidden; and certain works and processes, during the execution of which it is forbidden to speak in everyday terms. All these transferences of the taboo are either of religious significance or the results of the peculiarity of primitive logic, a point that will be dealt with more thoroughly in connection with magic. But the pivot is nowhere of a personal character; and the starting-point is instinctively or rationally democratic. The situation changes completely in the barbarous stage. Here the

pivot of the taboo is a powerful person or group: the privileged persons eat apart in mystical exclusion, for meals in this stage are only too liable to offer an opportunity for analogies and competition—it being a question of prime necessities. In Dahomey and Loango it is improper to look on the king while eating and drinking; any one caught doing so is put to death. In Monbuttu the king has to eat his dinner alone, and no one is allowed to see the contents of the dishes brought to his table; what is not eaten by him is thrown into a pit made specially for this purpose. If a pariah looks into any kitchen, all vessels have to be broken to pieces. One of the kings of Dahomey, on his accession to the throne, had all his subjects who had the same name as himself put to death. When a new king succeeds to the throne in Tahiti, the language is subjected to numerous changes, for all words reminding people of the king's name are replaced by others. In Polynesia the taboo is employed for the psychological foundation of the strictest caste system. Professor Ratzel calls our attention—quite correctly—to the fact that behind this political and social employment of the taboo, we can still find a religious basis: “We have here to deal with a formation originating from a religious atmosphere, the usefulness of which in the art of government secured its early employment as a political instrument used both cunningly and unsparingly.” An extreme—yet characteristic—instance illustrating this usefulness of the taboo is the edict issued by Kamehameha I, King of Honolulu. He declared a hill rising near Honolulu, the quartz crystals of which he thought were diamonds, to be taboo. In fact, in 1840, Ratzel tells us, the taboo was raised to the dignity of an ordinance of Government in Hawaii, for the mercilessly decimated live stock was pronounced

to be taboo for a period of five years. The breach of even strictly religious taboos is not punished unless the doer is a person of low rank or a woman. Persons of distinction have their own means of avoiding all disagreeable consequences. In the barbaric stage, the taboo loses its rational, religious, or primitively logical character and assumes the character of prestige. This form of taboo is one of the ancestors of modern prestige; the taboo of manifold origin, taken over, however, with tacit unanimity, means an exclusive inaccessibility and the replacing of competition by sentimental potentiality.

Yet the taboo is scarcely fitted to fight with abstract reflection or sharply defined conceptions. This grave contest, this deadly combat, is left for its refined, differentiated late offspring, with elastic and cunning armour—prestige.

## PART III

### PRESTIGE AND RELIGION

§ 65. *Primitive religions*.—“The first requisite,” says E. B. Taylor, “in a systematic study of the religions of the lower races, is to lay down a rudimentary definition of religion. It seems best to fall back at once on this essential source, and simply to claim, as a minimum definition of Religion, *the belief in Spiritual Beings*.”

The associative emotional values of analogy and the dissociative emotional values of unintelligibility are included in rich units, for the imagination of the savage, by the animal world. The world of emotions of savage peoples tends towards animals in two directions. Some tribes believe in the transmigration of family souls into animal forms, these souls being benevolent towards men, suffering and fighting for them, and dying with them. This is known as *nahualism*; in the language of the Quiches, namely, where this belief is universal, *nahual* means animal. *Totemism* is another variety of animal belief, which derives the tribe from a totem. Totems are for the most part animals; according to Breysig, among the redskins of Columbia only some two or three legends have been preserved relative to stones and plants, while celestial bodies play a very insignificant part in totemism. Unless we are mistaken, most of elder explanations commit



the common mistake of endeavouring to find a logical, moral, or religious basis apart from the historical and geographical, intellectual and moral developments of the most diverse extent and effect. An explanation of this kind is scarcely possible. If the various animal faiths possess any common denominator at all, it must be a psychological one. Professor Breysig proposes some excellent arguments in favour of this view. After emphasizing the fact that the relative propinquity of animals felt by savage peoples renders the arising of an animal belief possible, he adds that "animals undoubtedly do not advance to the degree of initial reverence until they are felt to be distant and strange, though still familiar and near. It has never occurred to them," he goes on, "to reverence living men in this way *by memory*; probably they were too near, too familiar, and not pre-eminent enough to form the object of worship." With the spread of domestication, animal mysticism dies out. There are evidently more psychological opportunities for the deification of animals in the case of savage peoples, with whom domestication is rarer. Lubbock declares that when men began to spread over the earth, not only did they not possess any useful domestic animals, they had no dogs either. According to Hahn, in the whole of North America, before the Europeans came, dogs were the only domestic animals. The men of to-day, with their wealth of practically bred domestic animals, their zoological gardens, pedigree-tables, and scientific systems of feeding, are scarce able to imagine what an enormous terror was inspired in the hearts of savage men by the howling, strength, fleetness, and silence of the animals haunting primeval forests. The frame, sight, movements, feeding, pairing, birth, and death of animals reminded primitive men of themselves; but their dumbness, unintelligibility, and invincible strength gave

animals a place among higher beings. They were similar, yet different; more intensive and at the same time more mysterious than man: and if to the psychological readiness was added chance, misunderstanding, superstition, the magician's cunning, or the desire to mark out the differences or unity of tribes, the creation of an animal belief was the work of a moment. The racial consciousness of primitive man, his national feeling, his religion, begin with these germs of prestige: primitive men do not create a human prestige, but in their minds animals are a *given* prestige which weighs on primitive reflection with all the weight of fatality. In opposition to Herbert Spencer, N. W. Thomas sums up the latest investigations by saying that the most primitive focus of savages' sentimental attention was the animal, in consequence not merely of a recognition of its qualities but of its special abilities too.

In the primitive stage there is not a trace of human prestige. In order to secure prestige-like respect, men must divorce themselves from life and become *naturally* unintelligible. It is thus that the imagination of primitive men is captivated by the *concretely visible* abstractness of sleep, dreams, death, shadow, and echoes, which reaches its zenith in primitive ancestor-worship.

§ 66. *Foundation of mass-religions and prestige.*—Without a concrete, personal standpoint, mass-religion has been unable to develop in any age or in any part of the world. Everywhere the popularizer and inspirer of mass-religion is personal; however, by founders of mass-religion we do not mean the "hocus-pocus" prophets of Indian tribes or the religious demagogues of Russian sects, but those creative forces concentrated in a person which have been able to suggest the latent identical in millions of diversities.

The great founders of mass-religions whose teachings have proved able to assemble and unite masses not dreamed

of even by the most daring Caesar, owe their deep and wide influence to their genius *and* prestige. In genius we find a union of moral hyper-refinement with a brilliant intellectual superiority which renders their thoughts still pregnant and refreshing: prestige makes them popular and tears them from the solitude of asceticism and scholastics, just as the wind carries away the pollen.

The founders of ancient Hindu religions who preceded Gautama owed their prestige to their record of suffering, patience, and solitude, just as Gautama himself won over his first disciples by the same means, as well as that irresistible spell, "the bell of which is hung in heaven." Legend made Zoroaster the scion of a royal house. Moses had to perform miracle after miracle before he convinced the people of the desert. And in the pale gold of Jesus's prestige we see the glitter of the gems of miracles. "And John answered and said, Master, we saw one casting out devils in Thy name; and we forbid him, because he followeth not with us. And Jesus said unto him, Forbid him not; for he that is not against us is for us" (Luke ix. 49, 50). The sayings of Mahomet owe their inspiring force to the prophet's fits of ecstasy, the thrilling report of which passed from mouth to mouth. But the prestige of Gautama, Zoroaster, Moses, Jesus, and Mahomet never descended to a *selfish aim*; prestige is here only the hedonic aspect of a moral revolution, just as the tightly drawn string serves the aims of Beethoven's sonata. "The pious Buddhist," says Professor Rhys-Davids, who is so eminently familiar with the psychology of Buddhism, "would consider it a profanity to speak of Gautama by a simple, human name; so he employs one of the numerous epithets usually applied to Buddha, the Enlightened." The object of the employment of these rich, picturesque epithets by the Buddhists is by no means "to give a more

accurate conception of Gautama's personality, but rather to veil it in uncertainty." The birth, death, and genealogy of founders of religion are also generally lost in obscurity. But behind their prestige there must be a moral value, to enable them, in addition to associative expansibleness, to liberate *autonomous* creation from house to house, soul to soul, generation to generation.

Prophets of sects are separated from founders of religions by a *basis of value*. If behind a prophet's prestige there is no intuition that sees through the heart of the masses; if he only enchants, but does not bring people to their senses; if he merely carries people away, but does not compel them to look into their own souls; if he only flatters our passions and fails to force the whole of our individuality into harmony—then that prophet's power is built on sand. For prestige is *not enough* for religion—for religion above all things; religion is absolute autonomy, the freest of experiences, and the prophet can only suggest the requisite spirit—"for we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth" (2 Cor. xiii. 8).

This use of prestige as an instrument does not exhaust the abundant connection of founders of religions with the hedonistic appraisalment of men. The very fact that founders of religions use prestige merely as an instrument gives them, with more or less success, the moral power necessary to an investigation of the appraisalment of men by appearances and a criticism of the same in every grade of life.

If we analyse the moral contents of the classical foundations of religions, we shall find them to contain both active values and destructive forces. The active values preserve the affirmative rules of morality. The part played by the prestige of the founders of religions relative to the popularizing of these latter has been that of a guardian plant.



Destructive ethics include a criticism of false authorities and apparent human values. Gautama teaches us that men should prefer to walk alone, like elephants wandering in solitude, rather than be compelled to migrate in the company of simpletons. In those remarkable subtle socio-psychological observations preserved in such abundance by the Hindu, Chinese, and Hebrew sacred books, many hints and numerous instances of intuition relating to prestige are contained; and we shall probably not be far wrong in deriving the first philosophical contrasting of prestige and authority from this religious criticism. The main principle of the founders of religions preceding the Gospel was either the organization of nation and country, or the mild temper unfamiliar with trembling, the "man of peace" whose "thoughts, voice, and deeds are calm"—as the *Dhammapada* says, who resembles "the mudless lake." In the religions of the principle of authority based on reason, or of peace and goodness, it was inevitable that appearances and the hedonic appraisalment of men should be slighted. But the criticism of psychological hedonism becomes a fundamental pillar of the system of thought in the Gospel of Christ only. The Gospel gives to Caesar the things which are Caesar's—but only politically and economically, not psychologically. While deriving all power from God, it warns and restricts power too; it regards sufferings tolerated as coming from the severity of power as a trial sent by God, as opposed to the Middle Ages, which endeavoured to smuggle a potentiality of power. In the General Epistle of St. James the Apostle we find the following teaching (ii. 1-9): "My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons. For if there come unto your assembly a man with a golden ring, in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment; and ye have respect to him

that weareth the gay clothing, and say unto him, Sit thou here in a good place ; and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or sit here *under my footstool* : are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts ? . . . But if ye have respect unto persons, ye commit sin. . . ." The Apostle Peter not only teaches that the younger should submit to the elder (1 Ep. v. 5), but that "all of you be subject one to another, and be clothed with humility." "Woe unto you," is Jesus's attack on prestige (Luke vi. 26) "when all men shall speak well of you ; for so did their fathers to the false prophets." When there "arose a reasoning among" the multitude (Luke ix. 46, 47) "which of them should be greatest, Jesus, perceiving the thought of their heart, took a child, and set him by Him." "Woe unto you, Pharisees !" cried Jesus (Luke xi. 43), "for ye love the uppermost seats in the synagogues, and greetings in the markets. Woe unto you, lawyers ! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge : ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered." "Beware of the scribes," is the warning of Christ to His disciples (Luke xx. 46, 47), "which desire to walk in long robes, and love greetings in the markets, and the highest seats in the synagogues, and the chief rooms at feasts ; which devour widows' houses, and for a show make long prayers ; the same shall receive greater damnation." "For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in his own craftiness" (1 Cor. iii. 19). And, although miracle followed miracle, though in more than one passage in the Gospel we find a reaction against this "prestige-radicalism" and sayings calling for patient obedience, we may accept the old judgment—*nihil praestigiosum in Christo*—as covering the essence and fundamental spirit of the New Testament. The "instrumental" character of any traces of prestige

that may be found in Christ's life, whether in miracle or legend, even so devout a believer as St. Augustine found himself compelled to emphasize. "We might with justice ask," he says in his work *De utilitate credendi*, "how in the case of Jesus a stupid person entirely lacking wisdom can distinguish the true authentic sage from the sophist." But, with His supernatural appearance, and above all by His miracles, Jesus compelled even stupid eyes to a recognition of His authority. Faith is an advancing by suggestion of the truths of the other world. Our weak eyes cannot tolerate the brightness of the sun, so authority leads them away to the cool woods, where they are surrounded by a milder brilliance—the shadows of heavenly truths summarized in miraculous events and biblical teaching (*De more eccl.*). Faith implants in us the seeds of truth, which flower in the life to come; faith is the cradle of the soul. The masses are able to recognize authority only by its outward tokens—miracles and prophecies, ecclesiastical unity, martyrdom, and social deeds of charity. As authority is a fundamental condition of moral purity, the church has need of those outward tokens (*De util. credendi*).

§ 67. *Enchanters, priests.*—The prestige of enchanters and priests must be judged with the greatest caution. Religious sentiment spreads, like a spot of oil, to the imagination of those who serve religion; religious enthusiasm and spontaneity may surround an enchanter and a priest without this sentiment in itself possessing any prestige-like character. Astounding and misexplained, faulty and forced causality, which leads to superstitions, becomes attached to the enchanters connected with these superstitions or who are instrumental in making them harmless. The exception due to prestige, the peculiar personal capacity of enchanters may be reckoned from the moment the believer is able to form an

*objectively* more rational conception of the enchanter, when the glory of the latter means, not incapacity for choice, but an *omission of choice*.

As far as we know, the first traces of an irrational worship of this kind paid *to the person of the enchanter* are to be found in the cases of savages in the most advanced state. Of the enchanters of the savages of the North (tribes in many respects fairly highly developed) Elie Reclus relates that they do not consider everybody an equally suitable candidate for noviceship, and do not by any means leave the choice of their pupils to chance. Distinctions and exceptions are made with prospective candidates practically before they are born. The parents of the enchanter-designate observe frequent fasts, prefer certain eatables, avoid other people, etc. In the training of Aleutian novices there is scarcely any moral principle; the main principle is dissociative and psychological. The object is that they shall be *different* to everybody else. By processes which we had better not describe in detail provision is made that the new-born candidate shall have a permanently characteristic smell, by which he shall be distinguishable even by those of the most inferior power of discrimination. Care is taken that the child shall not be like the other people; his gestures and gait shall show that he is made of different material to any one else.

From the barbarian stage upwards, religions founded on superstition or on divine morals as a rule require priests, who on the one hand exercise executive power and on the other keep alive the enthusiasm of the masses, who always prefer to generalize in persons. The goals of pilgrimages are distant places possessed of a rich and varied past, on arriving at which the minds of pilgrims are tired and confused—such as Rome, Jerusalem, Mecca, Ceylon, Lhassa, and Urga. The ceremonies are at first brilliant, then dim



and obscure; the intensive mental storm of small circles is followed by the autumn shower beating on the heads of teeming masses; the restraint of thought is succeeded by its automatism, its material instruments by an increasing volume of imponderable ones. "The converted German," writes Taine, "trembles with fear before the golden-mitred bishop as if he were in the presence of a sorcerer." The Canon of Seville desired to build a church that "posterity should look upon as a freak." But fervent exaggerations and glittering colours become commonplace, and their effect is merely momentary: they live in the eyes of those that see them, but fade away on the page of history or the records of tradition. This accounts for the commencement of the enormous process of dissociation. A refined twilight descends on churches bathed in splendour; religion is toned down; its priests walk on tiptoe over the stones of history, and withdraw from the world, relations, passion, wealth; behind the oaken gates of monastery, behind smooth-plastered giant walls and gratings, tonsured men of immovable features and white-veiled maidens kneel and pray; they have nothing to communicate either to one another or to the world; their ideal is divine dissociation, the *Apoios*, the exemption from all *qualities*. Everywhere priests are found introducing a special language as if to betoken that their speech is *different* to that of other men; Sumerian, Sanskrit, Old Mexican, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Old Slav, Arabian—these hide away in the holy men those remains their silence could not hide. Every line of thought that is not silken, soft, intellectual, that leads to analogy, categorizing, or criticism, is carefully removed from the mind of the priesthood. Hammurabi long ago had that priestess burned who opened an inn or entered any such for the purpose of drinking. The Roman Church learned at the expense of the Greek gods who were ousted

from their proud position because they were too human. No one is canonized as long as a single contemporary of his is alive; it institutes the vows of virginity, humility, and poverty, and creates distance for its priests without—and in this it is the pioneer—entirely paralysing their activity or eliminating their influence in the outside world. It keeps away from its dogmas the canker of hair-splitting, the mould of scepticism; in fact, one of the most representative intellects of the Catholic Church, Bossuet, actually protests against any philological investigation of the Scriptures. The only ecclesiastical science in his eyes is that of the traditions; the others may be left to the pleasure of the inquisitive. Bossuet's indignation is excited by the fact that the Latin text of the Vulgate, that so absolutely authentic version, was made the object of criticism by philologists. Catholicism consistently withdraws its dogmas, its saints, and priests from the possibility of purely intellectual criticism, not so much from that which is human as from that which is vulgar, competitive, degrading, and trivial, which may give rise to emotional contradiction, *i.e.*, universal contradiction. It is not afraid of exceptions, of pure analysis, which is always isolated—in fact it hopes for fresh tension and elasticity from the same—*oportet haereses esse*: what it fears is popular contradiction, expansive criticism, emotional alienation. In one of his letters, Mendelssohn writes that he considers music far more accurate, more decided, and clearer than words, and that verses written to music only serve to obscure the latter. Some such consciousness of its social and historical position must have impelled Catholicism to mark out the sentimental situation of its saints and priests with such minute care. It eliminates every worldly association—so far as its political or sentimental connections permit—with an anxiety that often seems trivial, and, with

the patience of diamond-cutters, remarks and dissociates every opportunity of identification from the persons of those whose vital element is distance. Even to-day, the Holy Congregations of Rome, from their lofty psychological watch-towers—seen from which the tactics of political clubs must appear to be ridiculous leaps in the dark—note every little dissociative disturbance and endeavour to smooth it over: the clothing and conduct of priests, their mere appearance in public places, is subjected to criticism which can only be explained by purely psychological motives. Quite recently a decree of the *S. Congregatio Consistorialis* strictly forbade the priesthood to accept any office involving financial responsibility or control (“*quae administrationis curas, obligationes, in se recepta pericula secum ferant*”—*Osservatore Romano*, December 3, 1910). This seismographical fineness of observation, which, though powerless in the face of accidents as a preventive, is yet able to remark such accidents in a moment, has secured an exceptional position to the *Catholic priesthood*, the dissociated character of which is superbly watched over by Rome all over the world, in villages nestling behind lofty hills just as well as in the Faubourg St. Germain.

§ 68. *The Papacy*.—In Zola's *Rome*, Cardinal Boccanera gives a splendid summary of the prestige of the Papacy, when he says about the Roman Church:

“It is glorious to die in integrity, yielding nothing, giving up nothing, fearing no one.” In depth and spontaneity this prestige cannot be compared to that of earthly Caesars; its uniform and sincere power, its dissociative purity, is not approached by the spell of even the most ancient dynasty. In the spell of the Papacy, the least significant part is played—despite all its loyalty—by simulation and self-delusion. The inexhaustible sentimental potentiality, by which losses and tactical mistakes are

repaired, derives from the fact that *the material too is sentiment*, not only the motor, that what it desires to develop is not ultimately a matter of character but a religious esoteric quality. In its final purity this prestige is answered only by a flood of tears and the bending of knees. Its intransigency is impregnable because it is able, if attacked, to retire into the measureless wastes of sentiment. There is an essential difference between the pilgrimages to Rome and the massy "shake hands" of President Roosevelt.

It is not our business to appraise logically and ethically the position and history of the Papacy, or to inquire how far the prestige of the Papacy is "instrumental" or selfish as compared with the highest values; but we can scarce conceive even an extreme rationalist failing to stand still in awe-stricken wonder before the psychological colonnade of genius comprised in this institution. The Papacy may err in *what* it says, but it very rarely, if ever, errs in the *manner* of saying it; its views and motives may be at fault, but its voice rarely is mistaken. If there is anything in which it is infallible, it is undoubtedly in the following of psychological accidents and their rapid survey.

If we keep to the history of days not long past we shall come across quite a number of instances of fresh refinements of prestige. Before Rome was occupied Victor Emmanuel wrote a letter to Pius IX, in which he begged him, "with filial affection," to take into account the situation of Italy and renounce his secular power; but Pius IX, though he knew that all was lost, with a sound psychological instinct replied that he would only yield to force. He felt that the integrity of an uncompromising attitude was a more valuable asset in the hands of the Pope than the eleven hundred years old gift of Pepin. When the Italian kingdom guaranteed the Pope, in addition



to prerogatives and the palaces of the Vatican and Lateran, an annuity of over three millions, the Pope accepted the former, as productive of prestige, but refuses the latter even when in pecuniary straits, because his prestige would be seriously dimmed by a measurable material dependence, and the fact is that the item included every year in the Italian Budget—remains in the treasury of the State. In 1895 the *Non expedit* decree expressly forbade the Catholics to take any part in the elections. If this had not been the case, there is no doubt that a considerable group of papists would have been elected members of the Italian Chamber; but a further consequence would have been that the person and problem of the Holy Father would have been transferred from a sphere of unyielding negation and emotional obscurity to the whirlpool of Parliamentary debates, speeches, arguments, and paragraphs—from hearts to committees. That is why the Pope is probably psychologically doing the right thing if he insists on the *Non expedit*, and if he adopts an obstinate attitude towards the Quirinal. Though exaggerated in form, the starting-point of Ollivier's proposition is correct: "A Papacy reconciled to Italy would lose the rest of the world."

§ 69. *The schism.*—But in the more recent history of the Papacy, the rejection of the overtures of the House of Savoy dwindles into a mere episode in comparison with two important dramas of prestige, which, during the past two decades, have absorbed the greater part of the *peculiarly psychological* activity of the Vatican—one is the relation of the Papacy to the *Eastern schism*, the other the dogma of *infallibility*. The former affects the generalizing, the latter the automatizing power of prestige. With regard to the former, it was shown that there is scarcely any important obstacle to the union of the two Churches beyond the exclusive, uniform, dissociated claim to prestige

of the Papacy, while the Orthodox power would have handed the soil in which its own prestige flourished over to strangers by resigning the decisive guidance in Church matters. The Czar's prestige is so completely due to the sea of religious sentiments that his manifesto of October, 1904—for the simple reason that it is merely a manifesto and not a solemn ecclesiastical function—was not taken seriously at all by people familiar with the conditions. "The October manifesto," runs the election declaration of the Old Russian party, "does not in the very slightest degree affect the absolutistic power of the Czar, which remains intact even in the changed conditions. Had the Czar really desired to alter the form of government, such a declaration would have been accompanied by solemnities similar to those used when he was anointed as absolute monarch." "The essence of the question," says the election manifesto of the Slavophiles two years later, "is whether the faith of the people, on which the basis of the Czar's power rests, remains unchanged, and whether the monarchy is able to justify this faith by performing its historical task." All attempts to bring the Eastern Church under the primacy of Rome have suffered shipwreck on the question of prestige; on this one point the rock of Peter the Great has proved just as invincible as that of St. Peter. The starting-point of the Greek schism itself is regarded by both parties as due to a rivalry of prestige: on the one hand the violent assertion of prestige on the part of the Bishop of Rome, on the other the psychological jealousy of the Byzantine emperors, whose power was declining, and of the bishops of Constantinople, who were pressing for co-ordination with the Pope, is brought forward as the cause of the schism. The sincere and clear-seeing champions of both sides regard the liturgical and dogmatic deviations merely as an excuse, a

pretext, behind which are the seething cardinal questions of spiritual centralization and of exclusive, indivisible, unanalysable power. The logical point of view would undoubtedly be that, if the Eastern schism has proved incapable of reconciliation even to the sister Church of Rome, if the organization of habit has proved unable to subordinate itself to the organization of authority, there is all the less chance of any serious attempt to bring its Eastern inflexibility—by ignoring Rome and skipping over the stage of the development of authority—into closer proximity to the free investigation of Protestantism. Yet this illogical, almost unnatural, attempt—though without any enduring success—is being constantly and persistently made on both sides: so serious a factor as the Patriarch Cyril Lucaris is found enthusiastically espousing the cause of a *rapprochement* with the Calvinists. The obstinate attempts of the Jansenists were for a time successful, because it was they who attacked the unlimited prestige of the Holy See, as is proved by the questions of the Russian autocrat Peter on the occasion of his visit to the Sorbonne in 1717.

§ 70. *The dogma of infallibility.*—With the approval of the General Synod of the Vatican, a remarkable resolution relating to the prestige of the Pope was passed on July 18, 1870: the first three chapters of the same deal with the origin of the primacy, its automatic continuity, its legal sphere and character, while in the fourth chapter the infallible magistracy of the Bishop of Rome is declared. By virtue of the dogma dealing with infallibility “the Pope of Rome, when he teaches *ex cathedra*, i.e., when he assumes the office of pastor and teacher of the whole of Christendom, and, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, decides upon a teaching relating to faith or morals (*de fide vel moribus*) to be accepted by the whole

Church, in consequence of the divine aid promised him in the person of St. Peter, possesses an infallibility such as that with which the divine Saviour endowed His own Church for the determining of precepts of faith and morals ; and for this reason such decisions of the Pope of Rome are unalterable." The unwearying attacks and ridicule aimed at this resolution during the past forty years are well known, as is the bitter helplessness with which the wish of Pius IX was received by a part of the Vatican Synod. The main cause for the reluctance of the Austrian, Hungarian, French, and American prelates was the inopportune character of such infallibility. The answer to these objectors is given in the introductory words of the resolution, which speak of "the unbelievers and deniers of authority of the present day" as rendering a solemn emphasizing of such infallibility an urgent necessity. Had the prestige of the Pope not suffered by the renegade public opinion of recent years, which had violently attacked the secular government of Rome, is it conceivable that, in such a grave crisis, the Pope would have thought of renewing his prestige? Indeed, the obstinacy with which Pius finally insisted upon the Synod accepting the resolution practically intact suggests a psychological *restitutio in integrum* ; the Bishop of Rome carefully sealed and separated his primacy and expressly withdrew his spiritual supremacy from the bounds of criticism on the verge of the great conflict. The attacks of Protestantism and free-thinkers on the raising of the infallibility of the Pope to the height of a dogma were naturally more persistent than the opposing arguments of the prelates. These circles began to speak of infallibility as a *novum*, as some abnormal curve in the evolution of the Papacy. However, if we examine the resolution from a psychological point of view we shall be able to form a fairer judgment of



Pius IX's dogma. Is not infallibility a logical sealing of the whole internal development of Catholicism, of the spiritual temper of fifteen hundred years? Do not those who are at heart Catholics gather round the Papacy to believe, trust, and bow?—indeed, do not the Newtons and Pasteurs retire to their laboratories if they wish to carry on unimpeded researches? They may be people who, by virtue of a selection of carefully thought-out or sentimental motives, are enemies to Catholicism, and regard the pontificate of Rome as bleak and barren; but we must doubt the logical capabilities of those whose criticism of this kind dates from the resolution relative to infallibility, who are surprised only by this logical final moment in the psychological withdrawal of the Papacy. One glance at the text of the dogma is sufficient to convince every objective judge of the hollowness of the indignation with which certain people persistently attack the dogma of infallibility. Some Protestant sovereigns are endowed with a prestige which, in the conception of Lutheranism or Calvinism, and in reality too, is more absolutely and inaccessibly circumscribed than the dogma of 1870. The rights of inviolability, appointment to offices, dissolution of Parliament, sanctioning of laws, veto, pardon, and heredity, surround, with an inflexible supposition of practical infallibility, the same sovereign who takes note of the dogma of infallibility with the contemptuous irony of “free inquiry.” Yet this dogma establishes infallibility—defining the same accurately and clearly—only *ex cathedra* and *de fide vel moribus*. This infallibility expressly admits that the Pope is not an authority of the same quality in all fields of life. It is of course problematic whether this restriction has any practical effect. No doubt faith and morals are deep and inexhaustible sources, with difficulty to be forced into any particular bed; but the *theoretical*

restriction to sentimental matters is quite evident, and it is only the internal abundance of sentimental matters that raises the prestige of the Pope, and not the greater illogicality or rougher absolutism of his infallibility.

§ 71. *Protestantism*. — The characteristic feature of Luther's first attack is neither a dogmatic nor a liturgical one; with his whole power of enthusiasm, his hard and bitter logic, he hurled himself against the prestige of the Papacy and the order of the Roman Catholic Church. His success was psychologically possible only at a period when the Papacy and the orders of priests and monks which acknowledged it had all over Europe been lifted out of "beautifying distance" into that critical nearness which shows even spots and unevennesses, causes indignation, gives rise to analogies, prepares for the formation of conceptions, and finally disillusionizes (Macaulay). The historical succession of these preparatory events is well known: the only task left Luther was to point out the gaps, to hurry on the work of dissipating the spell, and to help to overthrow "the false, lying bugbears," as he calls them, "with which the Romans for so many centuries had terrified and stupefied men's minds." In the proclamation addressed by Luther to "the Christian nobility of the German nation," he warns them of "the masks and tricks" of the Papacy, and says of the walls of its power that "they are of straw and paper"; our Christianity is one, he says, we have one and the same gospel and faith, we are all Christians of the same character, yet the central authority and the bishops and priests appointed thereby consider themselves superior Christians with an exceptional sphere of authority. Yet a true Christian bishop was only one of the masses; the religious ceremonies could be performed by any one appointed for that purpose by public confidence to the exclusion of any principle of mystical

authority. This priestly democracy of Luther's did not demand any distinctive treatment or special spiritual denominator. It proclaimed a uniform and equal value for the religion of Christians, whether laymen or priests: "if a priest is killed, the country in question comes under an interdict—why is the same not done if a peasant is killed? Whence this great difference between Christians who are all equal?" He rejected the *exemptio* of the clergy, refused any participation in that exceptional treatment, and declared as absurd the *character spiritualis indelibilis* of the priest's personality. But this attack merely protested against the smuggling of psychological selection into religion only, not against the principle of psychological selection in general; it was as if Luther desired to transfer the prestige which he desired to deprive the Papacy of to the Emperor, and that of the priests and monks to the nobility and public officers. Calvin proclaimed the rule of man ordained by God, the only restriction to which recognized by him was that originating from the existing constitution and the princes' consciousness of their duty. Although Calvin himself "never desired to enter the courts of princes," the dogma of infallibility is not so crudely absolutistic as this tragical declaration of princely prestige. "Those who knew him," he said, "knew very well that he was not barbarian or inhuman enough to wish to diminish the power of the great, the secular nobility and all that belonged to the order of the State"; he evidently avoided causing any psychological upheaval of the social order, and contented himself with reservations of religious ethics. On the other hand, in the organization of the Church itself, both Luther and Calvin were sworn enemies to prestige; and, in ecclesiastical matters, the role of these founders of religions is not prestige-like. Protestantism merely leaves the

prestige of secular powers untouched ; it does not enhance it. Its psychological instruments are poor ; and it is incapable of producing human distances or automatisms and of satisfying new requirements of prestige. Protestantism was only able to help in creating great things where the success of creation and organization *did not depend on prestige*. Without Catholicism, German Lutheranism is unable to make any headway against socialism, and is obliged to puff up the prestige of its junkers and lieutenants to the verge of grotesqueness to be able to hold its own : in Protestant Germany it is only the Catholic anti-organizations that are capable of forming a powerful block to oppose the "red" trade unions ; and, when the Lutheran Emperor borrows prestige of the Pope, we have an obligatory subjection more remarkable than the historical event at Canossa. It is a vital question, wrote—perhaps a little exaggerated—Spencer Jones, an English clergyman, some years ago, for the Church of England to join that Rome which possesses so clearly-defined articles of faith, and a supreme Cathedra, and is so energetically governed. Things are developing in such a manner that the place of a belief in the supernatural is being rapidly taken by the individual views of persons, and in this way all belief will soon fade away. It is impossible, he says, to maintain permanently the present state of things, where the most divergent views even relative to the most essential dogmas, and the unrestricted confusion of souls, are not only tolerated but even welcomed in one and the same parish. The lack of the *prestige of Rome* is felt sensibly, more or less, by every Church and every organization and by every historical moment, which has need rather of unconscious co-operation and patience, than of analysis and criticism.



## PART IV

### POLITICAL PRESTIGE

“ E molte volte il tiranno, massimo nel tempo di abbondanza e quiete, occupa il popolo in spettacoli e feste, acciochè pensi a sè e non a lui.”  
—SAVONAROLA: *Trattato del reggimento di Firenze*.

§ 72. *Chieftainship*.—The beginning of *legal life, of the regulation of conduct realizable by compulsion*, is generally considered to have been contemporaneous with the development of chieftainship. But, in the life of primitive hordes and tribes, the sphere of authority of the chief was sharply defined: his power was a link in the chain of causes, kept in mind and existing for and by the others. In the lower stages of the life of hordes and tribes, mere authority gave the chief his power; the predominantly rational election of chiefs among the aborigines of Australia probably does more justice to the requirements of pure freedom of thought than the hundreds of thousands who crowd to Moscow for every coronation. We may dispute concerning the logical, moral, aesthetic, etc., origin of the qualities that provide the points of view guiding most elections of chieftains, but the election itself is for the most part a rational function; it is a question whether the qualities here esteemed are really of service to the welfare of the whole group, but the appraisal, the process of valuation, can scarcely be omitted. The small number of primitive men, with their

minimum of grades, are compelled to form some conception of one another, since they are mostly living quite close to each other and under the same conditions; distances are supplied them as yet only by Nature, not by men; consequently their behaviour even towards the member of the group chosen as chief (even if due to mistaken causes) is formally rational. In the Guaran tribe of North America the chieftainship is hereditary, but even such candidates may be raised to this dignity as have claims based, not on inheritance, but merely on their eloquence and bravery. A Patagonian chieftain who is endowed with eloquence is very highly esteemed; if he does not possess any such ability he keeps an orator for a substitute. In this stage we find no trace of the grinding pomp of individual tyranny: as Professor Ratzel says, there is a strain of democracy permeating the political institutions of savages. Livingstone tells us that Mönechus, a Manyema chieftain, was rendered happy by the knowledge that his son was an expert smith, and that Lamart, a Namequa chief, was the best smith in his tribe. It is the warrior chieftains who bestow care on pomp and externals, for they have to represent the power of their tribe and inspire fear among strangers; but within the tribe the position and splendour of the chief—even when acting as judge—scarcely differs at all from that of the ordinary members of the tribe—the reason and motive for his exceptional position, and its glory, consists in his being able to *hold his own*. Even where we do find a universal endeavour to attain the splendour of wealth—as, according to Professor Boas, in ancient Columbia—wealth is still a moral category—the product of work and courage, acquired in hunting, fishing, and on the field of battle by the rich chieftain just as much as by the ordinary members of the tribe. Consequently, the rich chief is at the same time industrious and brave, and

sometimes even generous too ; on the other hand, a wealthy coward, a wealthy simpleton, is not very likely to rise to the chieftainship, for in his case wealth represents merely chance.

However, primitive tribal life swells from the hundreds settling beside one another to thousands, and there ensue differentiations of necessities. Rising on the modest ruins of a logical and moral chieftainship, the chief's power becomes rapidly more subtle and scenic. At first the sentimental spell is confined to the obligations of sentiment found only in the stage of development and does not specialize into personal prestige. There is still plenty of opportunity for competition ; the bounds of society are still—though not so easily, may be—surveyable : so the barbarian chieftain at first clothes himself in the spell of supernatural dissociations. But this deviation in development is characterized by the fact that the cause has not yet been able to be eradicated ; the people desire to see and survey supernatural connections and an intellectual peculiarity.

§ 73. *The quasi-religious authority of the barbarian chieftain.*—(a) The strongest form of the religious dissociation of the chief is the *taboo*. The appearance of the taboo as a royal prerogative is of decisive importance for the further development, because it is in this religious form that the role of the abstract chieftainship begins—that of the invisible and intangible monarch who rises into prominence not *ex virtute*, but owing to a lack of measure whereby to appraise him. The taboo is responsible for the first—imperfect—forms of absolutism and the automatism of the irrationally hereditary chieftainship. In Polynesia, says Schurtz, the chieftain is in many cases so holy that he may not touch the ground with his feet, for then others could never touch it any more. Here and in Alaska the

chieftain makes his thoughts public through an officer or a slave. When receiving strangers the chiefs of many African tribes sit invisible behind a curtain, etc. (b) When chieftainship divides off into war leadership rationally selected and peace mock-leadership mystically acknowledged, the mock chieftain is compelled to league himself with a *secret society* and with *magic*. The feeble mock chieftains of Melanesia invoke the aid of the secret *duk-duk* order, that they may not be entirely destitute of power, for, if the magic power of this order were by any chance to turn against them, they have no authority to oppose to it. Those mystical cries, the surprising suddenness of the rushes, the terrifying masks and head-dresses, the deafening noise, and the strictly enclosed holy places which constitute the psychological force of the *duk-duk* and other similar societies, lend a certain emotional potentiality to the power of a chief who is hardly fitted for his post. The two-edged aid of these secret societies makes the chieftain as it were the captive of the oligarchy—as is the case in Hawaii or Samoa. Magic makes the mock chieftains equally dependent on the exclusive order of sorcerers. (c) Of the chieftains of Oceania, who are excellent representatives of this stage of development, we find the following psychological characterization in Ratzel's work: "The hereditary character of the chieftainship is only acknowledged in places where the people believe in the transference of the *mana* (spiritual power). The mystical character of this conception is of great effect on the mind. When a powerful chieftain of the New Hebrides had his son brought up as a Christian, the opinion was at once declared that this bringing up destroyed the power which would have qualified the son for chieftainship." A whole crowd of would-be successors endeavour to catch the last breath of the dying chief, an endeavour



that often leads to a free fight; for, in addition to the son appointed as successor—in Nias, for instance—that person too is regarded as chief who succeeds in inhaling the last breath of the dying chief, which is looked upon as his exhaled spirit.

In this way, in the religious variety of barbarian chieftainship, a search after a cause that may if possible be appraised comes everywhere to the front. The causality is faulty, superstitious, but it does not fail to appear. The power of the mock chieftain only extends as far as the conceivable limits of the taboo, the secret, the *mana*. Side by side with the mock chiefs we find the circles of veritable appraisement have separate chieftains, rationally selected—leaders in war, steersmen of boats, etc. Brave warriors and clever sailors are chosen for this practical chieftainship, and if the chieftains chosen do not belong to the ruling family, they are not seldom adopted.

The chief's power, however it may be strengthened by the taboo, the secret society, and the *mana*, cannot free itself yet from a certain fundamentally democratic character that is continually coming to the surface. "Strangers in Tahiti," says Ratzel, "must have seen the king himself holding the rudder of his boat, and holding free intercourse with men of the meanest rank. We find here a revelation of the softening influence of nature, which grants its favours with equal generosity to poor and rich alike, and of the narrow limits of society." Concealment, the character of holiness, and intangibility are only a religious category, not a peculiarly psychological one; the psychological qualities have not yet become predominant above the religious ones; human distance is wanting, and prestige is not yet able to stand on its own legs.

§ 74. *The prestige of princes.*—The boundaries expand,

and life becomes more difficult. As barbarian society increases, and deepens, the person of the monarch necessarily becomes more distant, more shut off. The superb orchestra of heredity begins to play. The seventy-foot-high statues of the kings of Egypt, its pyramids, rocky caves, and mummies, seem to desire to place a sensuous limit to transitoriness. The muscular excess of Assyrian art, the enormous stone and brick monuments of a primitive age, appear like so many titanic emblems of hereditary kingship. The origin and passing away of kings is lost in the mist of eternity. In the eighth century B.C., Nabocanosar, King of Babylon, a by no means important personage, destroyed the deeds of his predecessors, that the years might in the future be counted as from his reign. "I have been summoned from the god Baal," says Hammurabi at the opening of his book of laws. The Roman myth preserved the fabulous origin of Romulus: the birth of Moses is just as mysterious as his tragic disappearance on the boundaries of the Promised Land. The Iranian legend sings of the solitary disappearance of the Shah Khozru from the summit wreathed in night; the Hun-Magyar tradition tells of the mysterious burial of Attila's coffin. "There were at the same time thirty Turks," writes Clement Mikes of the death of the Prince Rákóczi, "who saw the poor man and knew him well; yet people do not believe that he died, but declare that he went off secretly and that we have put some one else in his place." It is often impossible, even by the greatest exertions, to convince the simple people of the death of princely persons who are endowed with prestige; and this belief in their peculiar qualities, which is so potent to move credulity, has more than once offered an opportunity for excitement and humbug.

It was at Rome that the prestige of sovereigns attained

its modern artisticalness. The refinement of its instruments permeates passing centuries. The scale of prestige reached its zenith in the days of the Empire. The artists sculptured the statues of gods after the image of the emperor: Apollo was represented with the features of Octavianus; the divine Caesars, Caligula and Heliogabalus, did not die, but were glorified. The title of "imperator," formerly given by the soldiers to their leader who had distinguished himself on the field of battle, which had to be won over and over again, was now given to the most cowardly and immoral emperors, without any struggle or appraisement.

When Nero read his commonplace verses in person in the theatre, his delighted hearers decided to immortalize the verses in letters of gold. From Augustus to Hadrian the emperors were all amateur poets, who directly commanded the professional poets to sing sickening hymns of praise in their honour; and even the greatest poets practically felt they had committed a sin if they sang of others. In Book vi. of the *Aeneid* Vergil rendered incalculable services to the prestige of the ruling dynasty; and it is only natural that Augustus should, in return, give him a rich reward. It seemed as if all the subjects of Imperial Rome had nothing to do but lay stress on the fact that the emperor was a man of a different mould to them.

In the life of the Germanic tribes and clans, at the opening of the primitive Middle Ages, the king was only *primus inter pares*—supreme in his personal domain: his murder could be atoned for by the payment of a monetary compensation—he was simply more valuable, by a certain sum, than the other free men. But the restriction to kings chosen only from native noble families (*reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt*) shows traces of prestige even in

earlier monuments. Yet, on the occasion of the election of a king, the family of the former king was often passed over; and, apart from head-dress, we find scarcely any tokens in the earliest times. But with the development of imperialism and by the support of the Church, the number and grades of emblems, ceremonies, and ministers increases. The simple ceremony of raising on the shield and the shout of welcome was replaced by the splendour of a solemn entry, the taking of the oath, the crowning by the Church, etc.: kings were no longer merely raised up, they were abstracted. Modern Caesarism has taken over the velvet-bound inheritance of imperial Rome and imperial Byzantium.

The office of prince is elevated to that of the sentimental representative of the still budding conception of the State; it assumes a separate psychological existence, and divides itself from everything else; and Adam Smith justly smiles at the modern theory by which the king is regarded as the servant of the people, though the said theory would be considered quite natural by most of the tribes of Australia and Africa. Treaties, laws, theories in vain deceive themselves and the people, says Smith quite justly, when all the blood innocently shed in civil wars has not been able to excite so much indignation as the death of Charles I.

§ 75. *The psychological conception of the prestige of princes.*—The imperial lawyers' sophism relative to the prestige of princes, according to which the Roman Emperor is a monarch by virtue of the sole right ordained by God, is spiritualized, with arguments predominantly metaphysical, in Dante's *De Monarchia*. In this work the imperial right, as opposed to the Papacy, is endowed with an ingenious panoply of metaphysical, theological, and philosophical armour. But the deduction is rationalism grafted on



metaphysics and theology; it appeals to reason, endeavours to convince, and tries to causally deduce the "divine-right" monarchy of the Roman Emperors.

The purely psychological conception of princely power, as far as we know, begins with the cynical aphorism of Machiavelli—"Ognun vede quel che tu pari, pochi sentono quel che tu sei." "Alexander the Sixth," he says, "never did anything but mislead men, never thought of anything else, and always found somebody whom he could lead blindly; there was never a man who succeeded in this field more completely than he did." "A prince need not necessarily unite in his person all gracious qualities; but he must make it appear as if he really possessed them. He must simulate graciousness, faith, humaneness, religiousness, reliability." "External appearances are always conspicuous, while the real essence of men is not; everybody is able to see, very few to feel." "In the deeds of every man, particularly in those of princes . . . it is the result that people regard." "Your prime endeavour should be to maintain the existence of your State: the means will be considered respectable and praiseworthy by everybody, for the masses always regard appearances and judge by results." "Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, although they lived most virtuous lives, loved truth, despised cruelty, and were humane and merciful; all, with the exception of Marcus, came to a sad end; Marcus alone lived and died full of glory, for he came to the throne by inheritance . . . no one hated or slighted him." "Marcus's son, Commodus, did not take sufficient care of his dignity; he often appeared in the theatre to fight with gladiators, and was guilty of many other low actions not suitable to the majesty of the monarch, a fact that lost him his influence over his soldiers, who conspired against him and murdered him." In his *Memoirs*, written in 1717, Cardinal Retz

complained as follows: "The people entered the sanctuary. They raised the veil which must at all times cover everything that can be said and all that can be believed of the rights of peoples and the rights of kings, which are nowhere so easily reconciled as in silence." And, in his political testament, Richelieu says of science that "it is not opportune to familiarize everybody, without distinction, with it: if science were made accessible to everybody, there would be more people inclined to doubt than there would be people capable of dissipating those doubts." Here we have the "merely psychological" monarchology—the classical principles of princely conduct based upon appearances. Their practical assertion in the highest degree may be surveyed in the whilom French court.

§ 76. *The prestige of modern autocracy.*—

*Lear*: Dost thou know me, fellow?

*Kent*: No, sir; but you have that in your countenance which I would fain call master.

*Lear*: What's that?

*Kent*: Authority.

SHAKESPEARE: *King Lear*, I, iv.

The psychological "heroic age" of monarchs as representing sentimentally the idea of the State begins with Louis XIV. He surpassed all his courtiers, says his biographer, in the grace of his figure and the princely beauty of his features; the warm and noble ring of his voice won the hearts which his presence overawed. "His gait and carriage suited him only, and would have made any other personality ridiculous." These idle qualities, adds Smith, which were supported by his rank, but which, it seems, scarcely exceeded mediocrity, in the appraisal of his own age made this monarch pre-eminent, and are able to secure him considerable respect even in the eyes

of posterity. Beside the prestige of his appearance, all the virtues of others were dimmed. "Sire," said Vardes to the king, "if we are at a distance from your majesty, we are not only unhappy, but ridiculous too." The capacity for prestige of this age is laconically summarized by Richelieu when he wrote to Maintenon that he would sooner die than be deprived of seeing the king for two months at a time. We can follow the advance to take the place of the logical and moral motives of power, of the purely psychological one, what Dante calls the *virtù formativa*, that power of the soul to appear in a discernible manner. We have a *pendant* to the prestige of the "Sun-king" in the later observation of Buonaparte, that Louis XVI would certainly have been able to win the battle *had he appeared on horseback*. Indeed, the prestige of the French kings was more lasting than the bloody laughter of the Revolution. Even the cursing crowd that rushed into the Temple shrank back and stopped still for a moment, when a spark of princely decision appeared in the irresolute Louis Capet and a flash of Habsburg pride darted across the features of Marie Antoinette. The Revolution itself, and the series of irrational acts, merely prove that the associations and dissociations had become confounded; in consequence of the philosophical criticisms, the irritating excesses of the court, the unfortunate complications abroad, and the neglect of prestige, people began to think of kings *in the manner of pamphleteers*, just as a hundred years before people had thought of them *with the devotion of prayer*. So terrible a fall can overtake *adoratio* only, not *veneratio*; it is not a *logical* or *moral* upheaval that found expression in the Revolution, but merely the confounding and upheaval of the older associations, and it is scarcely a matter of chance that the Revolution was crowned by the appearance of Buonaparte and the consequent

Restoration. The guillotine had hardly finished its work when we see the First Consul among his gold-laced generals in the Place de Carrousel, as a contemporary observer tells us, in a simple blue uniform with white *revers*, without any lace trimmings; on his hat no lace, merely the national cockade; in his particularized dissociatedness avoiding the charge of parade; leaving to the dull colours and laceless simplicity that unpretentiousness which his heart and his schemes so entirely lacked. In examining the effects, it is quite the same whether it was his frame of mind or his psychological calculation that made the mournful hero in later days too so exclusively serious that he forgot how to laugh, never warmed in society, and never made any intimate friends. Talleyrand was wont to complain that Buonaparte could not be amused. Beyond his victories and his army he was continually discomposed by the psychological potentiality which, so to say, *handicapped* his whole struggling and serious life with the feeling of security of legitimate princes. Amid a show of dazzling splendour, surrounded by a wealthy display of legitimacy, he stepped before the Pope in the church of Notre Dame to be crowned. At this sublime moment, when every eye was naturally fixed on him, he desired to be remarkable, to work on the hearts of those present; he availed himself of the borrowed associations of the old Roman church and the court of Vienna; but it was all done merely for the sake of the despised *canaille*, which does after all put the finishing touch to public opinion. He did not expect much for this emotional theatricality; he knew well enough that when Louis XVI ascended the throne the shouts of loyalty rang unceasingly from dawn to nightfall; and he certainly did not think much of the "prestige" and significance of those two thousand odes which were sent to the Tuileries on the birth of the King of Rome. Imperial hunt after



legitimacy would in itself never have inspired Beethoven's music, and would never have roused Heine's grenadier to action: the officers and common soldiers of Grenoble would never have bowed the knee before the exile returned from Elba had he been merely the *emperor*. His earnestness, his distraction—the whole man seemed to incorporate a conception unknown to the million; the melancholy reflectiveness of his whole being, the exclusive fatality of his career, his withdrawal from all that does not belong to history, his rapidity of action, the rareness of his smile—all secured him a kind of psychological legitimacy; his career was one impossible of conception, of appraisement, of desire, inspiring only hatred or wonder. As his early ancestor, Pepin, he too won the throne by conquest, not by the pompous hereditary claims of a Louis: but in this conquest there was something theatrical, something resembling a superbly constructed drama: in the prestige of Buonaparte, the personal and individuality, theatricality and the tragic, meet and are united.

§ 77. *The prestige of constitutional kings.*—Just as the “Sun-king” supplied the most highly developed type of the prestige of a monarch accommodating himself to privileged classes, and Buonaparte that of an emperor conquering in a dramatic manner, the position of the modern English kings too is classical in its way: its prestige is practically confined within constitutional limits, constitutionally secured and employed. The brilliance of great traditions, the solemn pomp of the coronation, the opening of Parliament, and court functions, enrich the English constitution with a kind of psychological royal prerogative.

The fine feeling for the noble depth of this prestige to be found in England is scarcely observable anywhere else in the world. When, thirty years ago, Disraeli informed the

House of Commons that the Queen was to assume the title of "Empress of India," British public opinion pronounced this new ornament to the ancestral name to be "mean and vulgar." A refined judgment, a parallel to which would be sought for in vain in the rougher annals of continental prestige. What in the English constitution saves the fundamental spirit of democracy is *the role of prestige as an instrument*. The prestige of the British monarch can never be demeaned to the level of a *selfish aim* or a usurpation. When George IV died, *The Times* wrote a brusque and unsparing necrologue that most continental papers would not dare to risk writing about a bank director of any standing. And, on the death of the insignificant King William IV, who would not have thought of hurting a fly, the same *Times*, in a rather coarse manner, hinted at the mediocrity of the late monarch. The Puritanic family life of Queen Victoria, her modest household, her retirement, and her long reign once more served to collect the dissociative features; but it was only after many years of mistrust that the fallen prestige was once more restored and the jokes of *Punch* were silenced. The prestige of the British monarch certainly does not expand within accurately defined limits, for it is a phenomenon of sentiment: but, as far as that is humanly possible, care is taken to ensure that this prestige shall not overstep the boundaries of instrumentality. Although the coronation festivities draw to London hundreds of thousands of idlers and gaping wonderers, the composed bulk of public opinion feels that the royal prestige is an emotional epitome of the interests of the nation as a whole, the sails of national life at one time expanded, at another taken in, an emotional gain as opposed to a republic, which is forced to strive towards the attainment of this centralization in conceptions and paragraphs of laws.

§ 78. *Feeling for prestige in young and ancient courts.*—Where the royal power has no root in history, public opinion is brought up short by every trifle that renders sentimental acquiescence difficult. When, in 1893, William II, at the review held on the Prati di Castello, persisted in riding half his horse's length in front of Umberto, the enemies of the House of Savoy wrote leading articles and essays on the incident. In treating of the scene, the *Correspondant*—that eminently serious Catholic periodical—declared that in William II the people involuntarily saw the mighty protector, whose prestige was readily admitted by the subjects of the King of Italy. A similar sensitiveness prevails with regard to the “fresh paint” prestige of the miniature Balkan States; every question of detail concerning the conduct of the older European courts is made the subject of a thorough discussion in the Servian and Bulgarian daily Press; every small slight is received with a storm of passionate indignation; their “prestige”-sensitiveness is like that of a delicate plant exposed to the frosts of spring. England drew back with horror from the title of emperor: the ruler of Bulgaria undertook the risk of a war to obtain it.

At the other end, we see the sickly sensitiveness for senile prestige sick unto death, the autumn pomp of decaying courts, which they endeavour, at the cost of the greatest sacrifice, to save, for which they are ready to give up vital material interests. In recent years the characteristic feature of the history of the Ottoman Empire has been this endeavour to save prestige on the part of rival diplomats, who have acted just like people walking on tip-toe in the sick-chamber. In this psychological contest, the palm was probably carried off by German diplomacy, which, in opposition to Great Britain, was able to ingeniously exploit the “prestige”-sensitiveness of the

Sultan. Germany did not try to force upon Abdul Hamid the reform of the Macedonian government—that outrage on the prestige of the Sultan. Consequently, the melancholy gratitude of the Emperor of Turkey acknowledged Germany's tact by the granting of railway concessions and commercial advantages.

Prestige plays an important part in the making of diplomatic treaties and the conclusion of a diplomatic peace. The Treaty of Berlin, in particular Articles 1 and 25 referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the last phases of the Tripolitan war, are eminent proofs of how diplomacy sets a value by prestige, even when the essence of the same has disappeared. The value of these reservations is further displayed by the boycott of the Austrian Lloyd Company in the Levant in 1908. A similar sickly sensitiveness relative to prestige has possessed the court circles of the Celestial Empire too, ever since the Europeans began to enter that country. It is difficult to take a serious view of those psychological reservations which guard over China's prestige—in the agreement made at Tientsin in 1858 between Napoleon III and the Emperor of China, and elsewhere.

§ 79. *State and monarch*.—The obscure idea of *State* has never been able to compete, in popularity, with the prestige of the monarch's person. So, everywhere, where the interests of the monarch are, at any rate roughly, identical with those of the State, from the point of view of the latter, it is advisable that the prestige of the monarch should be strong and undisturbed. East-European peasants have not taken any particular notice of the theory of political science. On the other hand, they do not dispute with the king, because the person of the king is holy and unanalysable. The peasant's respect for the monarch does not originate from a consciousness of his constitutional reserva-



tion, or from the legal inviolability of the king's person, but from the spell exercised by the exclusiveness and inaccessible distance of personified power. The peasant rising headed by Dózsa, the peasant insurrections of the nationalities of Hungary, left the person of the king intact and as unanalysable as ever. "The people must muster round the king, for the king is invincible," said the peasants of Zemplén to a deputy during the days of agitation in favour of manhood suffrage. The Hungarian peasant is still "the Emperor's soldier"; the Russian village swears by the Czar; in the localities of the Sicilian *fasci*, side by side with the portrait of Marx, we see those of the King of Italy and the Pope; and the room of the penniless pauper who threatens the bailiff with the cudgel is ornamented with a reproduction in oils of the monarch's portrait. The best part of the public opinion of the peasantry still finds expression in persons, without any notion of a "State." Peasants have very little feeling for the nuances of forms of State: between 1883 and 1890, according to the *Archives d'anthropologie criminelle*, the political offenders of Russia were mainly recruited from the nobility, the lower bourgeoisie, and the clergy, while the bulk of common criminals were peasants. The nobility, the lower bourgeoisie, and the clergy supply 50 per cent. of the revolutionaries, but only some 4 per cent. of the common criminals. The life of the peasants is mostly *non-political*.

§ 80. *Prestige in foreign politics*.—The organ of this prestige is diplomacy, with its refinement of taciturnity, suggestion, and "saying nothing." No wonder that the etiquette of diplomacy often attaches supreme importance to the trifles of precedence, salutation, uniform, and style, which in ordinary civil life would probably seem insignificant. A distilled spiritual extract of enormous powers and incalculable events is contained in the officiousness of these

serious men ; every little neglect of precedence, slight, politeness may be of profound significance in that world which has no laws. Ethics are here replaced by etiquette. Severe and subtle combats are fought out ; the importance lies in the effect, in appearances ; unintelligibility and double meaning as it were imply a higher degree of a feeling of security than do openness and accuracy. Diplomacy endeavours to supply the maximum apparent value of the land represented by it, and represents its country as an exclusive and intangible whole. As the task of diplomacy is predominantly a psychological one, every country quite properly chooses the representatives of its foreign policy from such grades of society the psychological position of which is in itself of value, and the manners, education, and intellectual power of which enable them to employ their weapons of calmness and "saying nothing" with the psychological effects of importance and gravity. In its representation of the prestige of a country, diplomacy is supported by all those factors which exercise any influence on the temper of foreign countries. Day by day we may read in the papers : Hungary owes this and that to her prestige in the money-market of Paris, before the public opinion of Western Europe, in the Balkan States, in the Adriatic ; we are told that the country must develop its army and order its finances, as a debt to its prestige ; that the opposition must cease obstruction and vote the Army Bill ; that speculation in futures on 'Change must be restricted ; that the presence of cholera must be concealed as long as possible—for this is all in the interests of the country's prestige. In the interests of the country's prestige the Hungarian white slave traffic—the exportation of Hungarian girls—must be stopped (here the inland-prostitution is only a question of secondary importance) ; the country must take part in this and that

world's exhibition, etc. The prestige of the country presses for a war with Servia, and demands that those taking part in the international automobile competition should find Hungarian roads in the best repair, and that Hungary should appear at all conceivable congresses and sporting events held in the great cities of the world. Besides qualities of value intellectually, morally, aesthetically, and economically, prestige evidently comprises a number of petty externals; and it is quite as evident that the important part of those qualities too is not their essence but their appearance. On the other hand, it is not customary to connect with the prestige of the country any mention of those intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and economic qualities which do not *show* before the outside world. At first sight it seems remarkable that this carefully exclusive prestige very rarely tries to penetrate into the public opinion of the neighbouring ally and competitor, Austria—which is so familiar with every detail of the strong and weak points—or of Germany. It is only in those countries the peoples of which cannot see into Hungary's heart, which, as a result either of geographical distance or of historical or cultural differences, are connected with the country merely sentimentally; those regions of the world which know the land, not by conceptions but by associations and dissociations, that politicians are wont to raise the golden shield of Hungary's prestige. In this, too, national prestige differs from national honour. Many years before the events at Algeciras—in default of any practical object, merely to attain a psychological effect—the Minister representing the Dual Monarchy handed over his papers to the Sultan of Morocco, to the accompaniment of warships and a brilliant assembly of troops. When we consider that a single episode of this kind costs several hundred thousands of crowns—and that

the succession of such episodes is an endless one—some people must involuntarily confront this item of the Budget with the cold indifference displayed by the same Budget towards children, schools, consumptives, and lunatics. Does the imagination of the Moroccans, Chinese, Balkan peoples, etc., deserve the sacrifice of prime necessities for the exotic results achieved? But we must be fair towards our subject. When prestige forces the country to concern itself with white slaves, to modernize its social policy, its finances, and its army—if only for their value as in the eyes of foreign peoples—to undertake to regulate speculation on 'Change, emigration, and pornography; when prestige knocks at the window of our conscience, urges us to reflection, and forces us to exercise our will, we must not fail to see the sunny side too of the efforts to “keep up appearances.” Foreign policy, too, shows prestige to be extravagant or productive of good qualities—politicians, moralists, armies, creditors are compelled at times to respect, at others to curse it. The prestige of foreign policy seems well fitted alike to assert and to simulate values.

§ 81. *Parliamentary prestige*.—It is in England, where the moral weight of the Parliament is greatest, that the utmost jealousy has always been displayed of the prestige of the Lower House. The bulk of its members are recruited from the best English society: their voices and arguments are generally quiet and refined; and the debates are not seasoned with bitter personalities. The atmosphere of the English Parliament is to a certain extent a diplomatic one. The predominance of megalomaniacs, spadassins, and untiring interruptions is unknown. The Parliament is always careful to prevent the analysing, mouldering criticism of public opinion—the flattery and bitterness of which are alike injurious to the standard of the debates—from



reaching its storied precincts, and to hinder the masses from seeing Parliament similar to themselves or descending to triviality. As late as 1771, in the case of John Wilkes, the House of Commons fought with the weapons of a veritable Inquisition against the appearance of the first parliamentary reports in newspapers; in fact, even to-day, if any member calls the attention of the Speaker to "strangers" being in the House, the galleries have to be emptied. This jealousy of prestige is less evident in the internal organization of the House of Commons. Parliament raises the Speaker above party interests; but he is not elected from among the leaders, for in the position of Speaker there is need of authority bounded by conception, not of prestige, the sentimental expansiveness of which might prove detrimental.

What is the origin of the prestige of parliamentary leaders? From what has gone before we may be entitled to state that this prestige does not derive from exclusive logical, ethical, or aesthetic sources. If we look beyond the prestige of *poseurs* and humbugs, do we not find a careful weighing of psychological and apparent standpoints even in the case of such unassailable political and ethical authorities as Francis Deák? "We know," says Csengery of him, "what nervous anxiety possessed the highest circles at the time of the coronation—an anxiety to find due expression for the gratitude they felt towards him. But he neither recognized nor looked for anything greater than the title of simple citizen; and they would have thought it an insult to his character to offer him wealth and orders. He refused even a small souvenir, with the portraits of their Majesties the King and Queen, lest the acceptance of it should give rise to jealousy. Had he accepted it, there might have been a semblance of truth in the world's accusing him of not having acted unselfishly

after all." This rejection is merely the complement of that reservation—more than ethical and only intelligible as serving a psychological object—which characterized Deák's whole career from the beginning until he refused to assert his personality during the Andrassy régime. That he refused to accept any pecuniary advantage is the diploma of the nobleness of his political ethics. But orders were accepted by such Hungarian democrats as Joseph Eötvös and John Arany—and Deák, we must remember, was by no means a republican. And if that composed, calm Puritan lover of simple speech refused besides to accept even their Majesties' portraits, asking as his sole reward that saying of the King—"Francis Deák was an honest man"—we cannot fail to see in this action, not merely an ethical but a psychological sublimity, a horror of associations, and a "prestige" standpoint coupled with the modesty born of scrupulousness. Our object in emphasizing all this is merely to prove that even the most exemplary political integrity strives after dissociative integrity.

Politics are the peculiar atmosphere of psychological values. The mere fact that a Cabinet keeps a Bill on the order of the day for any length of time is at least as important a factor in the upholding of such a measure as the best objective argument or the most urgent necessity. "The prestige of the Government" often prevents the assertion even of scruples, the consideration of which might effect the avoiding of complications that are prolonged for years. The man of practice is of opinion that many people have governed already by weak laws, but none without prestige. A Hungarian minister once said that in politics we shake hands with some men whom we should not be inclined to shake hands with in private life. In political success there is always something theatrical, incalculable, un-

certain; there public opinion values persons whom sober ethics are unable to value: for this reason, in politics we have need of such factors too as our instincts, our tastes, and our judgment would keep us far enough away from outside Parliament. Politics associate numbers of men whom ethics could not possibly associate—and *vice versa*.

Political success, the elements of *leadership*, cannot be calculated either intellectually, ethically, or aesthetically. No one will maintain that, in any European Parliament, with an equal amount of logical, moral, and aesthetic qualities, the merchant has as much chance as the count, the country lawyer as the university professor, the elementary school teacher as the spadassin, the *homo novus* as much chance as the political veteran of asserting himself. But in politics there are certain natural limits to prestige: "Probably," says Bagehot, "every Cabinet contains one or two members who owe their position, not to their personal capabilities or inherent merit, but to their rank, wealth, or even imposing exterior. Yet the highest political offices are not filled by men of this kind, for the holders of those offices have to fulfil a constant round of important and serious duties in full view of the whole world. The Premier, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State, is compelled to explain his policy and to answer for his actions in the Commons, the discrimination of which critical assembly, nurtured by experience and led by traditions, very soon finds out who the person in question is." The limit to the automatism of prestige is the obligation of responsibility and struggle.

However, even here—*caeteris paribus*—in accordance with the law of least resistance, it is easier to obtain recognition of successful activity, if the politician in question brings prestige with him when he enters office.

This psychological restriction manifests itself at East-European elections. Peasant rarely elects peasant, merchant rarely votes for merchant; and it is only in the passing moments of conflicting local interests or a bitter economic fight that the psychological standpoint is relegated to the background. The main psychological principle guiding nomination, even in democracy, is that popularity shall not be detrimental to distance: if there were no such thing as prestige, the majority of constituencies would still elect demagogues. The question of the democratization of the franchise, which sooner or later crops up everywhere, finds two camps opposed to one another, one of which should be somewhat comforted, the other somewhat disquieted, by the general experience that parliamentary elections are for the most part psychological selections, in which the candidates' psychological position—and not demagoguery—prevails. It is the intellect, morals, and aesthetics of the village that are manifested at the election of a constable, notary, teacher. Although incapable, maybe, of replacing either of them in his profession, the peasant has the opportunity of constantly controlling and criticizing these officers, who remain in the place or move to the village where the peasant lives; he daily employs their services in matters with which he is thoroughly familiar; their manner of life and standard does not differ from his. They live in the neighbourhood, and, when they die, they too are buried in the shade of the same acacias at the end of the village. The constable, notary, and teacher are in general elected by the peasant with the same sober intelligence as that with which he selects the land he buys, the seeds for sowing, the family he marries into—just as Mikszáth's peasant selects his scythe-blade, after deep and careful consideration, but according to his conception and appraisal, his head and heart. It is not



so with deputies! The deputy does not come into the peasant's neighbourhood; he appears once every two years, maybe, to give an account of his doings; he is generally a professional politician; his rank in life, his views of the world, his talk, is unfamiliar to the villagers, strange and scarcely intelligible. The eyes of the villagers fail to regard him as commonplace; his quarrels, stinginess, family life, perverseness, pettiness, and his bills are unknown to them; they only see as much as the politician is willing to show them. They hear his unintelligible sayings, with which, speaking from the balcony of the parish hall, he enchants everybody; but they do not hear the rough curses of his private life with which he shakes off his creditors and his mistress, nor the cruelty with which he treats his manservant; they see his contracted brows as he sits in the chamber, but do not see him laughing and talking in the lobby, a quarter of an hour later, with his political foes. The results that might logically be expected from the franchise are frustrated not only by force, corruption, and demagoguery, but by prestige too. The masses invariably elect a portion of the Upper House too, to sit in the Lower House. In parliamentary elections, as in all struggles of motives, the purely psychological element may suppress the intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and economic elements: and though prestige not seldom has authority behind it, at other times it tramples down intellect, morals, aesthetics, and even interest, and helps to victory the refuse of rank, the noble humbug, and the *poseur* who lives by commonplaces.

§ 82. *Demagogues*.—Our proposition concerning dissociation is somewhat gainsaid by the rapid submission, the impulsive reaction produced—mainly in peasants—by all kinds of demagogism. But demagogism does not imply *the Other*. The masses are never so sovereign and so conservative as when they applaud the verbiage of demagogues. A dema-

gogue is an autonomous crowd expressed in a person. Crowds are excitable, but cool down quickly too: and this is of necessity the lot of the demagogue's glory too, whose rank is identical with that of the crowd and who does not merely live—materially and sentimentally—by the crowd. Demagogues are capable of much: only one thing is beyond them—the transformation of the crowd. They can produce frenzy, fanaticism, and narcosis, but not energy and quietism. Demagogues may possess prestige too; but they can only bring it with them from outside: a titled demagogue, a revolutionary university professor, may force his prestige on demagoguery, but the flattery of the people will not create new graftings of *prestige*. True, conservatism too has a demagogism of its own; but all attempts of this kind, which have hitherto always failed, are very soon disarmed. Demagogism inspires in the people an enormous exaggeration of self-importance: and these effervescent feelings spread, not like a spot of oil, but by fits and starts, like a forest fire; and no one knows where they will end or how far they will spread. There is no such thing as moderating demagoguery: its force and its fate alike are activity for activity's sake. It is incapable of creating automatism; it gives rise to no permanency; it fashions concrete beings of its speakers; it does not dissociate or idealize them. A demagogue is a slave to his own words and the instrument of the masses: though a hooligan leader would in vain endeavour to popularize philo-semitic arguments! The success of demagogism does not mean prestige: it means only the predominance of prejudice. The centre of the psychological process is no loyalty to a leader.

§ 83. *The prestige of the executive power.*—An official who is continually made the object of criticism is a bad official. Post-feudal societies require a host of officials whose effectiveness is sentimental, that the people—in such situations

where criticism is too late even in constitutional States, and even if what is demanded of them is a crying injustice—may offer obedience with the insensibleness of habit. The first splendid home of the hierarchy of officialdom was Rome. The higher offices were at first reserved, by virtue of hereditary privilege, to a number of patricians: officials were distinguished and dissociated from those who were not officials by servants, privileges, dress, and solemn greetings. A further decadence of the rational controllability of power is marked by the creation of honorary offices, which in later times were replaced by the bureaucracy of prestige, the *noblesse de robe*, and still more recently by modern officialdom, a class of civil servants abounding in decorations and dignities, but poorly paid. To-day, when the doctrines of equality have apparently found their way even into the most secluded corners of the *corpus juris*, when *bourgeois* decide on questions of life and death, in England, Hungary, and Germany the administrative power is still founded on the prestige of the gentry and junkers. It is not probable, indeed, that after being able to entrust questions of life and death to democratic courts of justice, everyday questions above all should be capable of treatment only by aristocratic refinement: yet the greater part of the work of officialdom consists in the proclamation and execution of State ordinances, and a State organization that would maintain its existence is scarcely conceivable even to-day without psychological instruments. The prestige of the official is the means of giving real life to the administrative and executive intentions of the State. However much the contents of the State ordinances may change, it is doubtful whether physical compulsion and merely intellectual or moral conviction will be sufficient, for some time to come, to ensure the vitality of the law.

The place of the gentry and junkers can be taken by

the *noblesse de robe*, the *court councillor* type, or by the members of a *beamten*-ministry; but in general we may say that, in the simple actions of life, amid the everyday difficulties and quarrels which cannot be comprised in paragraphs, more than anywhere else, prestige has a part to play which nothing else can possibly undertake in its place. Any one who knows life is bound to admit that an administration like that of England, in which prestige is effectual, though its effect is not as a rule detrimental to logic and morality, is far more practical than the French administration, which, while being just as logical and moral, is not endowed with prestige. A far more secondary objective value is that of prestige in the case of officials who are engaged in administering justice and in the economic branches of the State machinery, for these—without throwing their personalities into the scale at all—have ready conceptions to shelter them. However, prestige—a sentimental generalization reflecting on their whole social life—is valued by the latter classes of officials too; in their eyes, too, titles and external ornament are of importance. At its general meeting in 1909 the Hungarian Association of Royal Tax-office Clerks drew up a memorandum addressed to the Minister of Finance, which contained their grievances. Of the eleven points of this memorandum drafted by officials for the most part in needy circumstances, four were exclusively devoted to demands for new titles; above all, all grades demanded the title “Tax-office” to be changed to “State Treasury.”

§ 84. *Bagehot on the prestige of the Governor of the Bank of England.*—The questions of the prestige of the heads of offices are thoroughly discussed by Bagehot in that fine chapter of his *Lombard Street* in which he investigates the psychological prospects of the position of Governor of the Bank of England then proposed. His remarks pass



beyond the bounds of the administration of the Bank of England, and are an excellent description of the universal psychology of official superiority. (a) "The permanent *Governor* of the Bank of England," he says by way of introduction, "would be one of the most powerful men in England; he would be regarded as a prince in the City, far more powerful than the Lord Mayor . . . he would be surrounded permanently by a practically unlimited prestige." Bagehot sees a serious moral danger in the spell of prestige of an office of this kind: "There would be an enormous struggle to obtain such an office," he says, "possessed as it would be of so much veritable power and so much apparent dignity. A high salary coupled with prestige is, so to say, always a danger. It makes vain idle and titled men anxious to obtain the position; and if this post is really to be of importance from the point of view of business technique, and, as a consequence, requires considerable previous study, continual work, and patient and quick judgment, men of this kind must really be detrimental. What is certain is, that it is they who will strive to obtain posts of so splendid a dignity, and that it will require every effort to keep them at a distance. . . . A big bank is the very place where a vain and empty-headed authority, unless he be a man of gravity and methods, must in a very short time cause no end of mischief before the trouble can be detected." The post of Deputy-Governor might safely be a permanent one; "for he would not be a little king in the City, and the office would not possess any corrupting prestige. A wealthy City-man would accept the post of Governor of the Bank without any salary or might even pay for it; but the lesser office, the essence of which is subordination, would have no temptations for him." This is how Bagehot explains the double-edged character of the principle of undertaking or filling the post of a head of

an office exclusively from the point of view of prestige. (b) But his theory of prestige rises to the level of a classical one, when he investigates the prestige of heads of offices, not in the eyes of the outside world, but in those of *his inferiors*. His judgment on this point is so sage and circumspect that it might safely be included in the service regulations of every staff of officials. "It is not necessary," says Bagehot, "that the Deputy-Governor should address the Governor as *Sir*; no advantageous or profitable conversation can be carried on by an inferior, who has to show respect, and a superior, who has to receive respect. The inferior rarely presumes to reject the bad arguments of his superior. And still more rarely is he able to present his case effectively. He pauses, hesitates, does not use the best word or the most suitable illustration, or maybe uses the very worst illustration, and makes a fool of himself. An important business can be satisfactorily discussed only by such persons as can tell each other what they like and in the manner they like best. The report of the speaker must be derived fresh from his brain and not be hidden behind respectful expressions or weakened by hesitation born of homage." When Bagehot demands *equal terms* for every one of the leading persons, of whatever rank, he is expressing his esteem for manly outspokenness, as opposed to the misunderstanding arising from ceremoniousness; and for the solidarity of intellect as opposed to the onesidedness of prestige. Whether compulsory or voluntary, a bowing before prestige in the management of any office probably results in an inferiority of the intellectual results as compared with those shown where such subordination is not the rule.

## PART V

### PRESTIGE AND BRUTE FORCE

§ 85. *Chivalry*.—There are two varieties of chivalry—individual and merely-social. Individual chivalry implies sentiment, merely-social chivalry implies conduct. Individual chivalry displays the internal balance of our instincts of self-maintenance, and, in our dealings with men, gives a nobility born of conscience to our standpoint: it subordinates our forces to our morality and prevents our asserting of energy according to the laws of cosmic energetics. Individual chivalry is a gentle and refined morality, containing a nice aesthetic formalism, a subtle feeling of discrimination, and a readiness of action in face of all sorts of situations; individual chivalry is brave even when not seen, strong when not observed, does not intrude where “pushing” alone can enable it to advance, and never hurts the weak, even when they are subordinate or persecuted. Individual chivalry is wary of insults, and does not waste its original force; it contains something maidenly and modest, a manner deepened into conscience. Individual chivalry does not accommodate itself to situations, moods, or fashions; it listens to internal dictates, which are always the same, and do not change even when the knight is wronged or injured. Professor Goldziher brings us this superb message from the Arabian Desert: “The religion of the Bedouin is the *murūa*. This word would be difficult of

translation. A man practising *murūa* is the same as what Englishmen call a *gentleman*." But we have records of chivalry in the story of the most primitive savage peoples, and of those grades of mankind who have sunk to the lowest depths, and from the nursery. This nobility of individual feeling does not stop even at the bounds of prestige; it strives to assert itself and to hold its own, even where this assertion and holding its own is not of advantage to the prestige of the chivalrous. He does not kick dying lions, nor does he hit servants: he exposes himself to rebuke or even to injury to his prestige, if his chivalry demands such a sacrifice.

In this intimate character of social behaviour due to feeling we have as it were an echo of the primitive ordinance including all men—a moral correction and spiritualization of cosmic energetics and the right of the stronger.

*Merely-social* chivalry—to which the bitter irony of Socrates, Cicero, and Schopenhauer applies—is devoid of this intimate, moral feature. This chivalry may be taken to mean the liberation of the physical energetics morally restrained. By shaking off moral value, a predominant inconsiderateness, akin to that of a fighting hooligan or a parliamentary spadassin, endeavours to secure a psychological position. In a more differentiated stage, this prestige-producing power of fighting asserts itself merely in the restricted circles of those persons who are "*prestige-worthy*"; a count would not fight a duel with his shoemaker, or an anti-semitic student with a Zionist, etc. In the stage of "suitability for duelling," *merely-social* chivalry consists of two factors. One is the *primitive appraisal of force* which is not devoid of a sound seed: that obscure sentiment according to which—independent of time and space—muscular strength must be present in moral effectiveness, in intellectual work, and in aesthetic



effectiveness, strength serving as our protection in many cases where all other means are exhausted. But this primitive appraisal becomes distorted if appearances, and the desire to produce an effect which sets itself above all qualities, thrusts strength into the *foreground*, and brutality tramples down mentality, morality, and aesthetics *merely to prevent people daring to argue against it*. The other factor in *merely-social* chivalry is *theatricality*. This chivalry accommodates itself to the mood of the public from which it expects applause; it uses different means for appearing chivalrous before the Sunday and different means before the week-day public; *and its chivalry ends where the interests of its prestige end*. This *merely-social* chivalry rises in tumult under the weight of injuries done, not to its honour but to its prestige: the most conspicuous wounds—those that show most—are at the same time the most painful ones. It is a chivalry of *situation*, which is not in organic connection with refinement of *character*.

§ 86. *Prestige in war*.—(a) From among stones crumbling to dust the old-world message has been dug out—even Babylon had a special military *corpus juris*. Military “honour” has, from time immemorial, been protected with special sensitiveness. This *corporative prestige* is manifested in the restricted intercourse with civil society, in peculiar ideas of “correctness,” and in the judgment of military offenders by principles of a morality of their own. An Austrian lieutenant in the reserve, whose income is smaller than the pay of an active lieutenant, suffers a temporary loss of his rank. He is compelled to prove that he is earning this minimum salary by a certificate of some civil authority, to be presented every year. For instance, if some one is compelled, by necessity—though only temporarily—to undertake the work of an exciseman in the rank and

file, he is bound to resign his rank as officer in the army—and so on. Up till 1906, Prussian officers were not allowed to go to the stalls or pit of a theatre in uniform. In Great Britain, however, where—for historical reasons—the prestige of the army is of less value, we often meet officers travelling third class. Civil life, generally speaking, defends honour against insults, *i.e.*, express disrespect; but military discipline punishes a mere neglect to salute. Behind all these differences, so oft repeated that they have become commonplaces, it is not difficult to find psychological appraisement. The soldier is the object of peculiar respect even outside the *rayon* affected by officers' casinos and disciplinary rules. The whole village—young and old—feels a particular pride in being allowed to shake hands with the soldier returning home for a holiday; his comrades and his fiancée are proud to walk up the street with him; and men not qualified to serve in the army are ridiculed even by popular songs. In higher circles, too, it is often the military uniform that makes the Don Juan; and it is the source of eminent social and political distinction—as in Germany, France, and Austria. Warlike possibilities and a feeling of gratitude for prowess on the field of battle cannot be the only cause of this prestige of the army, which does not decline very much even during a long peace, when people think of everything rather than of war. We must point again to the sentimental popularity of strength already emphasized in dealing with *merely-social* chivalry. We find an interesting confession relative to this sentiment in Darwin, who admits that, though he feels his judgment is irrational, he cannot help admiring the resolution of the Indian, which enables him to endure the most awful tortures without a complaint; in fact, he must admire the Indian fakir too, who, as a result of a mad religious motive, hangs himself up on a hook thrust through his flesh, and swings in the air. And,

indeed, most men involuntarily feel that, after all, the *ultima ratio* underlying all conceptions and values is nothing but "club law" and uncomplaining holding one's own, courage, and patience. The sentimental popularity of courage and strength is the *associative* element of the prestige of the uniform.

However, the psychological image of strength and courage does not necessarily demand real strength and courage; in fact, real courage and strength cannot obtain prestige, unless at the same time they have a psychological value. From time immemorial, where any effort has been made to avoid contest or to improve its prospects, provision has been made for the *visible weapons* of strength and courage.

With primitive men the shower of arrows was anticipated by terrifying masks, head-dresses, idols, and noise. The location and architectural arrangement of the first fortresses was probably just as much influenced by the endeavouring to make them objectively inaccessible and impregnable as by the psychological hankering after effect, having as its object that the "eagle's nest" should be imposing, and should awe the beholder and keep him at a distance. Of the Seri Indians, who have remained on the lowest level of culture, McGee tells us that the painting of their faces may be distributed into two main groups, according as they desire to appear warlike to strangers or to emphasize the identity of homogeneousness. Accordingly, the faces belonging to the first group are terrible, those of the second group such as allay fear and inspire confidence. Civilized men endeavour to improve the chances of war psychologically, too, by placing stalwart soldiers in the field, by the roar of cannon, by gunpowder smoke, by excessive noise and skill in deployment. To-day all kinds of standpoints help to further the psychological assertion of the soldier; consequently military prestige, which has to work uni-

formly on an unknown crowd of millions, becomes a selfish aim ; terrorization face to face and the unconditional assertion of the sentimental value of strength have ceased to be probable : the ears have become accustomed to the thunder of cannon, smokeless powder has eliminated the confusion due to obscurity, and the bulk of the soldiers never see their enemy or get into the line of fire. To-day the sentimental preparation for a victory in battle is a very delicate matter.

Soldiers are trained to display a behaviour which is not merely objectively, intellectually, and from a military point of view the most important, but at the same time produces—both at home and abroad—the greatest impression of security. Not only those forces are developed which are essential in a military way, but those which are present in appearance, too—in fact, the latter are often developed to the detriment of the former. Military parades, reviews, companies of honour—indeed, in part manœuvres too—are nothing but a striving after effects of perfect inaccessibility, automatic readiness, and disciplined security. Faults and confusions are weighed, not only objectively, but according to their apparent gravity too ; and brightly burnished soldier's buttons sometimes represent the "spirit" of an army. This corporative prestige of strength and courage, the isolated, peculiar life of the barracks and man-of-war, on the one hand, has the effect of inner training, making "soft" men self-conscious, and the self-conscious accurate, while on the other hand, sentimentally, it overpowers the consciousness of civil society and foreign countries. *It is the sentimental value of strength that gives the prestige of the army the associative link, and the exclusive isolation that gives the finishing touch of dissociation to this link.* The prestige of the army or navy of a country has very often proved a powerful ally in war



(the prestige of the English in India, that of the Boer horsemen fighting the English, that of Menelik's soldiers at Adouah, that of the hussars, the janissaries, the Cossacks, the British fleet, German discipline, and, more recently, of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, etc.). We cannot calculate the effect of prestige in calming down a spirit of attack, in preventing the execution of guerilla schemes, internal disorders, in impeding a declaration of war, or how often it has offered a *casus belli*. It generally protracts the conclusion of a war already lost; after the terrible victories of the Japanese by sea and land, the whole of humanity urged the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Japan, but Russia put off the conclusion of peace, crowning the sacrifices already so prodigally made for her prestige by a tremendous collapse. But even in the suffocating hour of the recognition of defeat—*e.g.*, at Campo Formio, Pozsony, San Stefano, and Versailles—we find the fallen endeavouring to rescue the shreds of their prestige.

(*b*) What does the *prestige of the general* mean on the battle-field? In his *Etudes sur les Combats*—an essay on military psychology, Ardent Du Picq declares that Buonaparte attributed three-quarters of success in battle to "moral" forces. What elements constitute these "moral" forces? Habit and mechanicalness, endurance and stamina, are not, in and of themselves, "moral" forces. Enthusiasm for any object or conviction is a moral motive; but the masses love to follow out their object and conviction in a personified form. This enthusiasm attached to a person is the secret of good leadership. It contains two elements—one rational, the other irrational—confidence and prestige. "You were strict, but just," wrote a whilom gunner of his, in 1831, to General Drouot. "You spoke to your soldiers as to a man of your own rank." Golster, a German rear-admiral, attributed the victory of Chusima to the moral

example set by the Japanese officers, to the confidence inspired in the soldiers by their conduct. A severe but just commander, setting a good example himself, is regarded as the secret source of confidence. Confidence is not prestige; it is calmness caused by understanding and approval. But we must not confound the modern role of confidence with its ancient one. On a man-of-war, however enormous it may be, the constant intercourse and the crowding together for a long time in a comparatively narrow space render possible confidence even in a modern leader. But in vast army corps, suddenly mobilized, where the bulk of the soldiers never see the generals and commanders, where reservists called in for the occasion and companies supplemented by such recruits are under the command of an unknown staff of officers, where the plan of campaign is kept a secret and the execution of manoeuvres is scarcely observable, where genius asserts itself in engineers' offices and war councils, not on horseback or at the point of the bayonet, where the rank and file have not the faintest idea why they are marching, why retreating, and why they are not to pursue the enemy in retreat—in modern warfare the soldiers have but little opportunity of showing confidence or mistrust in their leaders. The days when, according to the statement of Buonaparte, the French soldier reflected before he passed judgment on the heroism or abilities of his officers, when he discussed "the plans of campaign and all the movements," have long since passed away. To-day there is only one source of confidence—the fame of success, an objective, simple calculation of probabilities.

With the expansion of the limits of the army, in the obscurity gathering ever more thickly round the decisive factor, confidence is becoming more and more clearly replaced by prestige. Hamilton, when asked by the English

parliamentary Commission as to the cause of the defeats in South Africa, called the attention of the Commission to the new kind of discipline which was able to ingraft into the minds of soldiers the necessity of using every effort to execute the commands of a superior who was far away from them and who might, for all they knew, be dead. But where does the prestige of the generalissimo manifest itself in modern armies? In times of peace, its path is a civil one; it is created by public opinion, as was that of Roberts and Kitchener; and it is propagated by the Press and society. The role of the French general staff in the Dreyfus affair, the rigid obstinacy of the Austrian general staff in refusing all "national concessions" to Hungary, the exclusiveness of the German officers—these are all so many endeavours to dissociate the prestige of the leaders in the eyes of the civil world and foreign countries. According to the immediate leaders, to the divisional-officers Tocqueville sets up a clever parallel between the "blind, accurate, resigned, and always equable obedience" of the soldiers of aristocratic countries, and the "less exact, but more fiery and intelligent obedience" of democratic armies. "The leader," says Ardent Du Picq, "must be perfectly convinced that he has the right to command; it is essential that he should be accustomed to commanding, in order that he may possess the pride of a commander. This is the cause of the strong discipline of armies commanded by an aristocrat." And, indeed, democracy may perhaps some day be able to exist without an army; but an army would hardly be able to exist on a purely democratic basis. Any one who does not force the *species aeternitatis* on conditions which must be regarded after a nice weighing of the distribution of forces, is bound to confess that the invincibility of the German army is due, not only to the proverbial "*Schulmeister*" as to the representative faculty of the staff

of junker officers. This truth will scarcely be pleasing to democratic bias ; but the army does not, after all, exist, develop, and become annihilated in accordance with the teachings of democracy. A good commander, it is true, may be an incapable tactician ; and the armies of Marius were once corrupted by aristocratic amateurs. But—*caeteris paribus*—of tacticians of equal capacity, those are generally more successful who are at the same time good commanders.



## PART VI

### THE PRESTIGE OF INTELLECT

FROM the sentimental world of the primeval forest two sparkling-eyed individuals, members of the host of spiritualized, refining, creative mankind, issue forth—the artist and the scholar. The former moulds beauty and harmony into an expressive form, the latter extracts the essence and creates a conception: in the former imagination glows with colour, and the finest, most peculiar being of the subject bursts into flame; in the latter cooler conceptions are wrapped in dimness and the sentiment of the subject withdraws in humility. Both the creative imagination and the classifying and deductive judgment form a peculiar little island-world, the intellectual material, secluded solitude, and special statute-book of which incite the masses to sentiment, not to conception. The two islands are not far distant from one another; and at times a boat may be seen drifting aimlessly between the two shores.

§ 87. *The prestige of the artist.*—No doubt even the most beautiful loses its charm if it becomes commonplace, and loses a part of its spell in proportion as it becomes less unique. In the seventies even refined connoisseurs did not fight shy of oleographs; and it was not until the walls of hairdressers' saloons and peasant-cottages were hung full of them that they began to turn their backs on them. In

Northern Italy too, with the disappearance of the sentimental enhancement of rarity, jet ornaments become vulgar.

However, this appreciation of rarity is not identical with the prestige due to the distant, the exclusive. The prestige of the artist is of the person and the personal, not the due of mathematic rarity or objective scarcity. It is here a question of the hedonic sentimental value attached by the public to the creator, the artistic ideal, or the creation.

The prestige of the creative artist is then at its highest when the sentimental up-to-dateness of his work or his person is strongest, and the conception of the same least feasible. Of Rostand's poetry it has been said that it is nearest to every man because it is farthest from reality.

With savage peoples it is possible to sharply distinguish the poet's authority from the poet's prestige. In the case of the Esquimos, who fight veritable duels with "squibs," or of some tribes in Australia, where every one creates his own requirements in this article, those excelling in poetry are scarcely likely to be surrounded by the spell of unintelligibility. On the other hand, we have data from New Pomerania (Vierkandt), South-east Australia, and the Andaman Islands, showing that there only a very few chosen persons are engaged in composing poems, and that these persons enjoy considerable respect and admiration. The prestige of oratory is, in the case of certain tribes of Australia and North America, able to secure the chieftainship. But the intrinsic value of art gradually declines as men separate off into orders, and begin to play fast and loose with conceptions, to simulate sentiments, and to manipulate with the dissolving slides of appearances. The Romans—and the humanists—thought poetry was learnable. Rome despised the *histrion* from the bottom of her

heart; while the British public, according to Escott, with its refined habits and thorough familiarity with decorum, is conscious of the presence in the atmosphere of the studio of a smell of a certain social and moral looseness, intermittent indigence, and clouds of tobacco smoke. Art may console itself with the appreciation of nobility and nice sympathy of the chosen few, or with the spiritualization of a whole race, such as the Greek or the Italian; but it would seem as if the intact sentimental appreciation had declined in the minds of the masses since the formation of the first barbarian States.

With the advance of masses and permanency the intrinsic value of art is more and more replaced by the introduction of prestige. Numbers of archaistic humbugs appear on the scene. In the second century of the Christian era a sickly enthusiasm led people back to the older writers of literature. Ennius, Plautus, and Accius became the rage; and it seemed as if Horace, Cicero, and Livy had passed into oblivion. On the other hand, Vergil's unparalleled qualifications for "presentation at court," added to his high-flown, hardly digested idealism, endowed him with a prestige bounding on the ridiculous. When he appeared at the theatre the public greeted him by standing up—a homage due to the members of the imperial house only; and when he entered Rome from time to time he had to run away from the applause of the people—for all the world like a modern *prima donna*. The prestige of this by no means "popular" poet was nowhere so powerful as in the houses of the simplest artisans and tradesmen; during the most trivial amusements of the lower classes, suddenly a fragment was quoted from Vergil, unintelligibly and with false accentuation; he was as widely read as the Bible was in later days; that line of his first caught by the eye was, as later on, in the days of

the Renaissance (Burckhardt), considered as the finger of fate ; and the oracles' answers consisted of lines from the *Aeneid*. Art and poetry live by the prestige of the ancient and distinguished, the distant and inconceivable, the terrible and mighty—continue to live on by their agency in the appreciation of the people, like stars shining by the borrowed light of the sun : just as the artistic ideal itself—what is worthy of imitation, taste and fashion—borrows its prestige in this manner second-hand, from the sentimental value of others. A natural ideal is formed into prestige by a snobbism enthusiastic for what is foreign : the cult of what is most intimate is driven out by the cult of what is most distant, most difficult of imitation. In those Chinese and Japanese studies of the nude which display the Mongol ideal of woman, the colour of the skin is not painted yellow, but a rosy white, and is thus “idealized in the direction of the Mediterranean race.” Henry Borel, who is thoroughly familiar with the Chinese mind, describes how the Chinese portray Kvan-Yin, the Madonna of Eastern Asia. In Chinese pictures this Kvan-Yin does not resemble the other Chinese women in the slightest, wearing clothes never worn by any Chinese woman. Even if we suppose that Kvan-Yin was transferred to China from the Buddhism of India, we may share the just surprise of Stratz, that “this foreign image of a goddess remained for centuries in the midst of Mongolism, became completely naturalized and entirely absorbed into Mongol feeling and thought without acquiring a single Chinese feature.” The artistic foreigner-worship of America and the Balkans is well known. In the first period of modern American architecture, is the complaint of a New York architect in the columns of the *Neue Freie Presse*, “the only appreciation of beauty shown by the American public in buildings is that for the repetition of some



characteristic European architectural monument." Even to-day many members of the educated classes of America judge of the soundness and value of a public building according as it reminds them of some famous European monument of art seen by the snobs during their tours in the Old World. "It was not the imitation that was the trouble, but the aimlessness of the imitation." The important point here is not the distance of space—for in that case the effect would be mutual—but rather the invasion of the artistic by the prestiges of other spheres, the spread of prestige like a spot of oil in the direction of archaism, permanency, and ease of realization.

The Budapest Exchange hides its excited, noisy, Eastern volubility behind rows of Greek pillars; the German waltz and the Bohemian polka did not make headway in their respective homes until the highest circles of Paris had begun to dance them; the masterpieces of Japanese art only began to interest collectors at home after Europe had shown its appreciation of their merits—just as the popular art of Hungary owes its recognition to the appreciation of foreign connoisseurs.

In the word "Maecenas," apart from the appreciative judgment of utility, a certain flavour of forcedness has been preserved. It is with a dull sorrow that the artistic mind feels the disparity of even the noblest patron of art—the lower grade of his understanding coupled with the higher grade of his social position. There is hardly a Maecenas who is entirely exempt from the patronizing gesture of *praesidium et dulce decus meum*; in fact, such exemption is out of the question, for one motive of his patronizing is expressed in this gesture: if this motive were not present among the others, the part of a Maecenas would become merely friendly support, or would itself crystallize into

creation, or, finally, would be content merely to gaze on the infinite varieties of the beautiful.

However, this prestige—the prestige of art, at any rate—is *le prestige pour l'art*. But there is another lower variety of art-patronization, in which art is only the means and prestige the object: *l'art pour le prestige*. Among the inmates of the boxes at a Wagner opera and at the *vernissage*, we see at least as much forced tedium as emotion or spiritualization; the mere fact of appearing there is a debt due to the prestige of the public taking part, and to the splendid list of names in the *Figaro*, to be lost in which is itself a pleasure, not homage rendered to the spell of an artistic experience; this same public, this indiscriminating mechanism of non-experience, forms the bulk of the readers of Wilde and Maeterlinck, Nietzsche and Tolstoy; they select certain watering-places and hotels because they find few people there to honour them by entering into conversation with them; they learn English—not because they have much to say or read in English, but, on the contrary, because Englishmen speak so little; and they go shooting, not for nature's sake, but because it is *distingué*. Formerly the most beautiful pictures and statues found their way to churches, where the eye of the hunchback *lazzarone* beamed as he saw them; now they are taken to exclusive palaces. At the same time most creations of art are branded with the mark of the demand for what is *decorative, new-at-any-price, or old-at-any-price*. And, indeed, what prestige offers to art with one hand through the Maecenases, it takes away with the other through the barbarian taste of customers. We can sympathize with those artists who, being at the head of some court or State theatre, are compelled to select the pieces and the performers in such a manner as to reconcile the artistic and business standpoints to those—of prestige!

Already in the primitive stage creations of art had two objects outside art—utility and charm. Maybe, without utility art would not have been born at all, just as it would not without the need for churches. In its pure form, however, the innate objects of art have never been suppressed by either “customer”; neither man nor God has ever necessarily hindered the artist in his creative development. It is only when the representative faculty takes the place of *man*, and prestige that of *religion*, that the wrinkles of age begin to appear on the face of art.

But prestige arising in this manner has a Hegelian dialectics of its own; it kills itself; ornaments and decorations, the impression of commonplaceness and dazzling brilliancy, all tend to an easy conception, from Egypt to Chicago, particularly since the advance of finance and of technical skill has increased the ease of their production and made them more and more common. To-day it is not the kings' palaces that are the highest buildings, but the “sky-scrapers” of the insurance companies; and the plutocrat has a finer carriage and pair and a more elegantly laid table than the old nobility. It is in “the cultural form of fashion momentarily in force” that the chase begins, the motives of which are described by Ihering and Sombart; the prestige of appearance, the outward spell of expression, flies before the crowd like the hard-pressed quarry; euphuism, brilliance in dress, superb jewellery, piles of books, the *farrago* of titles and names learned by heart—these all become prestigeless, because they are conceivable and imitable; and however rare they may be, *their origin is known, and the way of acquiring them conceivable*: for this reason *the artistic imponderable* comes to the fore as a means of prestige. Songs half uttered rustle like sighs in the pale salons of millionaires; the rigid profile of Goethe and Napoleon's earnestness are beginning to

become *fashionable*; and the City businesses look more like a cemetery than a market. The race for conspicuousness has become a contest of exclusiveness and restraint; even Italians and Jews speak in low tones and scarcely dare to laugh; hotel halls are built over the enormous Persian carpets, between walls practically bare of ornament children and old women doomed to silence pass like shadows to and fro; since the days of the princely diamonds of the Oteros, the competition in brilliance has declined—people prefer to wear pearls, these quiet, silent diamonds; courtesans wear dark tailor-made dresses and scarcely any jewellery. The transference of prestige is most accurately felt by theatrical art, the sensitiveness of which develops evening by evening and becomes nicely conscious of every upsetting of the balance of values; the thundering passion of *tragédiennes* and the declamation of heroic lovers is replaced by a virgin rawness of gesture and words—just as the great historical paintings have been driven more and more out of vogue by the panoramic style of technical triviality. The elegance, the *gravitas* of the Renaissance was followed by the plebeian Caravaggio, the “academic school” by Courbet; and where plebeianism could not penetrate, the canopied majesty of Louis XIV was driven out by that melancholy kingliness of the Spanish Habsburgs bequeathed to us by Velasquez. The artists are no longer auctioneers, but spiritualizers; it seems as if their tools were no longer violins but “mutes”; since the days of Napoleon III people have smiled if any one writes a heroic poem, and even Buonaparte was the subject of ballads and symphonies only: Corneille, Racine, Voltaire were ousted by Shakespeare.

From the artist invited to the soirées of the rich, it is not the perfection of technique of the virtuoso that is



demanded, but something intrinsic, that cannot be expressed in lessons or money, something beyond the pale of thought and understanding. People desire to see the artist dissociated; though it is no longer the imperial wreath of gold of Dante and Petrarch, or the orders and academic laurel of the court painter that dissociates him, there must be care seated on his brow, he must speak little and not be familiar; it is his solitude, not his friendship, that is paid for by the fashionable soirée.

All this is anything but aesthetic appreciation. Prestige has merely become refined and been stripped of its marketable character; but it is still distinguished from the sincerely, merely artistically aesthetic, which does not regard the person, and from pure worship of the beautiful, by the divergency of the main principle.

§ 88. *The scholar's prestige.*—Of the four obstacles (*veritatis offendicula*) which he considers hinder the investigator in his research, Bacon attributes the greatest importance to the slavish imitation of inferior authorities (*fragilis et indignae auctoritatis exemplum*). But the sphere of the scholar's prestige is a twofold one: over against persons who are not scholars it takes the form of a kind of wizardry, among scholars that of a *substitution of causes*. "Everywhere," says Professor Lehmann, "where a less civilized people comes into contact with another possessed of a more developed scholarship, the results of the latter will be regarded as *magic*." This is what happened in the Middle Ages, when the Europeans met the Moors, with whom natural science was eminently advanced; the scholars of the Middle Ages generally resorted to Moorish universities, but the learning they brought with them was looked upon as *magic* by the masses of their compatriots. In 1657 Casper Schott wrote, as of some revolutionary free-thinking: "By *natural magic*

I mean a certain hidden knowledge of the secrets of nature, whereby the person in question, if he becomes familiar with nature and the qualities, latent forces, antipathies or sympathies of the various objects, is able to produce certain effects which may appear strange or even marvellous to all those who are not acquainted with the causes."

The *magician*, the scholar of humanity in its primitive and secondary state, generally plays a very important economic or religious part in primitive societies; this part is then generalized, as, for instance, the smith is in certain tribes the doctor, the conjurer, the pall-bearer of royal corpses, etc. In Africa, Polynesia, Australia, Patagonia, the priest-doctor of the Malayans is endowed with a generalized sentimental position: we may say practically that *magic is the reverse of the division of labour*. A workman is a man who is skilled in *something*; a magician is a man who is a master in *everything* alike. The conception of impossibility is unknown to the magician's lexicon, when he has to assert his personal ability. In magic, sometimes, branches of occupation not yet differentiated or analysed are wrapped in obscuring mist; magic is an empire not yet ripe for the constitutional federalism of the division of labour.

The best definition of the psychological elements of magic, so far as we know, is that given by Frazer, who, in his *Golden Bough*, with regard to sympathetic magic draws the following conclusions, which are remarkably instructive relative to our subject: two main principles may be deduced—the first is, that like creates like, *i.e.*, that the effect resembles the cause, and the second, that things which were once related, but have ceased to be so, continue to act upon one another as if the connection still existed. The first principle means that the savage

can attain any desired effect when he imitates it. From the second he concludes that he may, at his pleasure and at any distance, influence any person, provided he have in his possession any object or part belonging to that person. These fundamental principles show clearly how divergent the magic of savage peoples is from the prestige of scholars. The whole life of a savage is composed of nothing but magic; his philosophy, his knowledge, his art too is latent in it; he endeavours to create effects with it individually; it does not quiet, but engrosses and excites his imagination. He often enlists the works of magic, with a skill amounting to diplomacy, into the service of his instincts; he seems to perform as much of it as he can himself; he has no choice between science and magic. The zenith of learning with the primitive man is magic; the magician is merely the guide of his associating and *parsprototo* logic; there is no alternative; no hocus-pocus, and non-hocus-pocus magic: the magician is merely *primus inter pares*, the obscure authority of primitive logic, the value itself, not merely a power of value. Its mechanism reminds us of its prestige: (a) the effect resembles the cause, (b) survival of contact; but this mechanism is evidently not a hedonism of the mechanism of thought, which might have been a thought appreciated and appraised according to nobility, but the only possibility of the particular stage of development.

The psychological situation is quite other when the co-existence of science *and* magic is possible, when the respect surrounding the magician means the omission of an objectively feasible selection. The hocus-pocus of the Babylonian and Assyrian doctors implies a differentiation of this kind; magic has here an intrinsic psychological object of its own: the Sumerian prayers and enchantments read solemnly over every single sick-bed point to a separate

order of scholars, which possesses an unintentional or intentional *prestige* similar to that of the ancient Greek medical secrets preserved by priestly families up to the days of Hippocrates. The Babylonian and Assyrian scholar, who was astrologer, almanack-maker, prophet, and inventor, the inhabitant of the Brahman monastery, who knows the Rig Veda by heart, and speaks only Sanskrit, refusing to talk in Bengalese, still less in English—these are on the threshold of the scholar's prestige. But all these prestiges contain religious elements, objective restrictions, a want of choice.

The pure prestige of the scholar for his own sake begins with the more developed stage of Greek culture; from this point we can recognize a special *scholar's prestige*, just as we can a special *scholarship*. "Only a Greek could have discovered," writes Professor Fouillée, "that the mathematicians of Sicily degraded science, when they practised it by applying it to machines." But in this Greek "scholar's prestige" there is, in addition, a certain pregnant objectiveness, a philosophical sublimity: that predominance of lucidity which made Greek public life so fresh, did not allow prestige to prevail over value, and the school of Pythagoras is probably the only exception of any importance. As we have seen, Rome was the slave of Greek science; the manifoldness of the Empire and the state-creating permanent, which was the main object of acquiring knowledge, swelled the prestige of the Greek sages, rhetoricians, and grammarians to something irrational, and tore it away from the fundamental value. Augustus actually removed a superior official from office for writing a word as pronounced by the lower classes; the *far figura* still haunting Italy bound the Roman fate of science closely up with prestige.



The Middle Ages copied Aristotle and Avicenna. Of the former and of his sullen arguments on prestige, which shed their light and their shadow alike over many centuries, like some mighty reflector of the Greek world, we have already spoken: to the latter the medical science of the Middle Ages clung as helplessly as a barge does to its tug. Avicenna's medical canon, which saw the light about 1000 B.C., found slavish imitation all over Europe, even after people had learned that it was in no way superior to the other Arabic works on the same subject. These men, explains Sprengel, were not fond of novelties; accustomed as they were to bow unquestioningly in religious matters to the infallible commands of the Church, they were only too pleased to find that they had a similarly infallible authority in scientific matters too. But what Sprengel says is not an explanation, merely a comparison; Lewes adds: In medical science authority always carried great weight with it, because natural science occupied so small a share in it. Where men cannot come forward with proofs, previous cases have to be referred to; and where causes are not at man's disposal, authorities have to be quoted. . . . And man's intellect is so absolutely slavish, so loth to refuse homage to a name it once regarded as an authority, that even in the sixteenth century Scaliger could maintain that no one could be an excellent doctor who was not thoroughly acquainted with Avicenna. Bacon complains bitterly of the exaggerated prestige by which certain Sophists and the old world as a whole impede scientific initiation. But the complaint was far too premature—like the crowing of a cock at midnight. "Even thirty years ago," Professor Le Bon tells us, "the French Academy—in which we should expect to find the highest degree of the critical spirit—published as authentic many hundreds of letters attributed to Newton, Pascal, Galilei, and Cassini, all of which were forgeries

from the hand of a person of very third-rate culture. These letters were full of vulgarities and errors; but the prestige of their supposed authors and the famous scholar who published them was sufficient to make the public swallow anything. The majority of the academicians—including the hereditary secretary—raised no doubts as to the authenticity of these documents until the forger himself admitted that he had fabricated the whole bundle of letters. The halo of prestige thus dissipated, the letters previously judged marvellous and worthy of their supposed authors were branded as wretched even in point of style."

If posterity has accepted as valuable some work of a scholar long crumbling into dust, the writers of literary history are scarcely likely to confine themselves to publishing this one particular valuable work of the scholar in question, but, with the magic logic of savages, will dig out and publish the worthless, wretched, meaningless sister folios of the valuable work too. It will be a bad day for a thinker if he does not present his "methodical" sacrifice in the form of a humble introduction to these publications! Woe to the ingenious crank who presumes to stand on his own legs and does not load his book with references and the correct dose of columns of figures! The modern magician at times shows indulgence even to the thought if the commonplace which hides it is hackneyed enough. A compilation of pandects, however muddling it may be, a compendium of ethics, however little its essence, may hope for prestige, if it only sticks to the old divisions and to those questions for which the men of prestige have a superior answer always ready; a simulation of antiquity of this kind makes it possible for those who are already "within the pale" to overlook the intrusion. The academies, indeed, are to a certain extent justified in protecting tradition and age; they are to a certain extent the

organs of the continuity of science and of the observation of the golden mean, and, as such, are perhaps entitled to the well-intentioned interpretation put on prejudice by Professor Mach. But what are we to say to the "natural science" method pursued, parrot-wise, by the non-academician younger generation? To the pseudo-scientific phraseology in which, it is true, there is no tradition, but just as little youth, and still less depth of thought? Is it a wonder that the style and behaviour for only appearance' sake of these two kinds of scholar, of the old and the young, has an alarming influence on the general public too, which has neither time nor opportunity to dissect the nuances of appearances from earnestness? Is it a wonder that this chase after the apparent, this exaggerated difference of style between life and science, the high colour of the former and the faded hues of the latter, together with the exclusive mechanicalness of congresses and universities, shrouds the idea of scholar entertained by the masses in a prestige reminding us of magic? Professor Le Bon relates the case of Dr. Laporte, who was summoned at night to attend a difficult and dangerous case of accouchement. The doctor had no instrument on him, but delay meant death to the patient. Then the doctor borrowed a suitable tool, differing in trivial details only from his surgical instrument, from a neighbouring workman. But because this tool was not taken from a surgical chest (*chose mystérieuse possédant du prestige*)—the neighbours declared the doctor an ignoramus and an executioner; the papers attacked him; he was arrested by the *juge d'instruction*, and condemned; it was left to the higher court to acquit this scapegoat of prestige—and that only when acknowledged medical authorities had converted public opinion. It is in this dank air of prestige that have

been growing up for centuries those generations which feed and fatten themselves exclusively on the prestige of scholarship, on believing something scholarly or denying something unscholarly. The so-called war of classes is being carried on under the prestige of science; on the one side Darwinism and the theory of races, on the other the inexhaustible periods of Marxist *epigoni* give their illustrious sanction to these rough battles of instinct. But even hollow, idealess negation wraps itself up in the cloak of science. The words of complaint uttered by Pater Antonio Baudini relative to the infidel priests of Rome of the days of Leo X are still up-to-date: "That priest who at this time had no erratic or heretical views about the dogmas of the Church was not reckoned as a *galantuomo* or a *buon cortegiano*." That charlatanical contempt which refuses to accept all well-founded truths—whatever their objective value—that negative pseudo-originality points to mechanical minds just as much as foolish bigotry or affirmative snobbism does. There are many people, among scholars just as much as among the unscholarly public, who have not yet mastered the intrinsic value of thought, or the difference in principle between the character of the science and the apparent. The interest of the general public is guided by brilliant names, not by problems; the lectures of Professor Wagner or Simmel—in themselves brilliant enough—generally fill the biggest lecture-rooms of the Berlin University to overflowing, but only a small part of the audience is really attentive—the others, the yawners, merely sit there ill at ease, that one day, when they are assessors in some small Prussian town, they may be able to say that they attended the lectures of Wagner or Simmel.

Yet in Germany quality is at the bottom of this prestige (*semen scientiae*, as Bacon calls admiration). In America



it is not in every case so. Professor Laughlin, speaking of the world of magnificent university foundations and libraries, complains that professorship brings scarcely any social appreciation, and that a fortunate merchant regards academicians with a sort of disdainful superiority. When it was proposed to entrust Laughlin with the drafting of the report of an important commission, the objection was raised that the report would lose its value in the eyes of business men if they heard it was the work of a professor. If we compare this real appraisal, put before us by Laughlin, a man on the spot, with those "representative" sums we hear of some American millionaires spending on higher education, and with the veritable war carried on in Germany and France against the enticement abroad of a famous professor, we are really compelled to believe that we have here to deal with an *inherited prestige*, that the millionaires are in some measure influenced by the *prestige of the European scholar*, and that many of their foundations are only a psychological stucco borrowed from the *European appreciation of scholarship*.

## PART VII

### PRESTIGE AND ABNORMALITY

§ 89. *The caricatures of prestige.* (a) *Don Quixotes*.—If I propose to myself an object, for the attainment of which my strength appears disproportionately small and my means inadequate, that does not make me pass for a Don Quixote. That the means are only a modest fraction of the object is a simple, everyday story which does not exercise any profound effect on the other people who suffer and are disappointed in the same way. The snowy head of Don Quixote appears in the vicinity of prestige, when the means and exertions employed to attain the object are disproportionately in excess of that object, when the zeal displayed with such determined energy is—as the saying goes—worthy a better fate. It is for this want of proportion that the masses laugh at the windmill escapades of the Knight of La Mancha; that is why he becomes the object of the pitiful smile of the successful and the endeavouring, the cynic and the Philistine. But if we observe carefully, we see *two* Don Quixotes; the one is an eccentric, the other merely a solitary; the one a maniac, the other merely unfortunate; the one worthless, the other only prestigeless.

According to the journal of Maria Bashkirtseff, a foreigner can easily create a salon for himself in Paris,

if he only entertains three friends of his—one from the *haute finance*, a second from the aristocracy, a third from the artist world: the salon is a *fait accompli*. These trifles which bring the salon into being are what the second kind of Don Quixote does not understand—that Don Quixote who has no prestige. The proportion of his strength to his object may be faultless; yet there is a certain disproportion in his every action, something erratic and misplaced; people do not take him seriously, and consider his words theoretical and obscure; in Parliament, in the bank, in the office, at audiences, people pass him over with a smile. And if people content themselves with dubbing him a Don Quixote, this indulgence contains a bitter flavour of—goodwill.

This Don Quixote is not a psychological value. He chooses what he has to say according to his faith and conviction—not according to its associative value. People shrug their shoulders, and ask what this unfortunate creature means by his eternal hobby? For Don Quixote is not up-to-date, is not acquainted with the tension of the moment; he has no *coteries*, no *cliques*; he is guided by conscience, not by psychology; his conduct is not moulded by the *virtù formativa*; he is called raw, awkward, and obstinate. He is that grey-headed child, the *enfant terrible* of his own life, who is always talking of what is the greatest sensation of his mind and not the greatest sensation of—the papers; he advocates the cause of Görgey, when everybody is talking of Kossuth; he is a mar-feast spite of himself, and holds his feasts on weekdays; sometimes he precipitates matters, at others he obstructs—he regards the difficulty of the business, not the clock-hand of patience; sometimes he is a monomaniac, implanting his fixed ideas deeper and deeper; a kind of love binds him to his work, and he has no time to

trouble about anything else; he is a bad politician, but a good thinker; his intentions are pure, but he cannot direct them: some of these Don Quixotes would pass for perfect men, were there no such thing as appearance in the world!

We must be careful to distinguish this kind of Don Quixote from the eccentric, unsystematic, shallow, crotchety crank. And if people for the most part confound them, we should be all the more careful to discriminate. It is not certain that a man who has no prestige is without value too; a man who is not up-to-date is not necessarily a Bedlamite at large: even Jesus had few to applaud Him—but numbers mourned for Him.

(b) *Place-hunters, snobs, and parvenus*.—A man who pursues success without looking right or left, as the Knight of La Mancha pursued his ideal, is a *place-hunter* (Streber); a man who runs after what is just the latest, and chases the sparks of up-to-dateness, is a *snob*; and the man who lives and dies for appearances, as Don Quixote did for his dreams, and runs after them, as Don Quixote did after his dreams, is a *parvenu*. They are all three still *en route*; but it is not the windmills they regard, but the Sancho Panzas: many a score, many a thousand of Sancho Panzas—this is the ideal of the place-hunter, the snob, and the parvenu. “Always walk in company with a crowd,” is the teaching of the old-world rhetorician. It is obeyed by the place-hunter, the snob, and the parvenu. The strongest suggestion is that of the crowd which no one has yet succeeded in assembling.

The efforts of these people are sometimes excessively bustling; their scrambling lacks the quietude of abstraction; at other times their strength is exhausted by forced and clumsy imitation; with the anxious patience of negroes, they desire to plagiarize whole classes, whole nations. If you ask them what piece they are going to see, the toady



will mention Sophocles, the snob Wedekind or Shaw, the parvenu a *théâtre parée*—though the first would prefer a music-hall, the second the reading-room of the club, and the third would prefer to go home—to bed. In the rooms of neither of them will you find the books, furniture, or society which he would choose if he were to follow his *inclinations*. Apart from more or less inspiration of material interests, they are all three fools of prestige—to which they sacrifice friends, love, work, self-esteem; they would like to eat bread-and-butter and potatoes, but they order—oysters; their own intrinsic value offers them no support, and in the hour of a “fall,” they lose their all—for they expect everything from others, nothing from themselves; their hands are not shaken by friends, but people who have common interests or tolerant men of distinction: they desire to *appear, appear, seem*—though without qualities; they have an idiosyncrasy relative to absence.

The final result of their endeavours may be prestige; but the endeavours themselves spoil prestige and destroy distance; and the distance that separates them from men is not able—as long as these endeavours last—to assume the permanent character of a spell.

(c) *The prestige of decadence.*—

“ . . . l'orgueil de promener le plus pâle des fronts.”

ROSTAND : *L'Aiglon*.

Decadence, physical and moral, possesses a prestige where people rave without spiritualization about the spiritual, and where, for this reason, they run after the signs of what is spiritual and are compelled to content themselves—unable as they are to analyse—with the spiritual-like character of the ready analysed, the decomposed: such people search after the idea, which they do not understand, in its body-like shadow—just

as a savage does the life that has stolen away. A pale face, confused talk, peculiar movements, sickness—in weak intellects these things suggest the association of the bodiless, the fragile, and the non-material: this bastard growth of monism looks upon the suffering body as *almost a thought*. “Even the primitive peoples,” says Ratzel, “regarded as most suitable for the priesthood such as were spiritually different to the crowd—epileptics, persons of weak intellect, and those given to hallucinations and lively dreams.” But, in the case of savages, this is merely a want of development, not decadence, a lack of choice, not a granting of advantages. The prestige growths of spiritual *hyper-development* are of a different nature.

In the days of Maecenas, Cotta, and Fabius, more than one man lived by—being pale: “paleness was just as much a necessary trait of the scholar, and above all of the poet, as a beard was of the philosopher.” According to Martial, *when he looked ill, Oppius began to write verses*. It would be trivial to quote examples from modern times to supplement this instance given us by the ancients; but it is noteworthy that the prestige of decadence is not first accepted by those who are themselves sufferers, but by the healthy half-cultured, by those who are out of the beaten track of decadence, and, as far as we have observed, almost exclusively by the young and the strong.

(d) *The prestige of crime*.—The recruiting power of crime is well known. Dora Melegari, an Italian authoress, gives the title *il prestigio del male* to this spell, the melancholy stations of which are marked by the executions depicted in the illustrated papers, by the demand for bits of the hangman’s rope and of the gallows, and by those “prestige-hunting” speeches before the hangman’s work begins, to which Schopenhauer has

called our attention. There are infectious crimes, too; crimes which certain circles or classes not only do not regard as crimes at all, but appreciate with a powerful consciousness—but this is not a question for us now. We find the psychological spell of crime in those Bedouin tribes which, according to Goldziher, “admire and celebrate in song the bloody-handed heroes of the desert” who have distinguished themselves by the commitment of deeds which ordinary morality calls atrocious murders. “There are Bedouin saints,” adds Goldziher, “whom we should be inclined to brand as robbers and highwaymen.” There is the grave of Abu Gōs, an infamous Bedouin robber, which may without any difficulty be visited by every traveller on his way to Jerusalem. This man was a veritable terror to all pilgrims to Jerusalem, without distinction of religion. It was very rarely that a company of pilgrims could escape his “plundering attacks.” And there are numbers of such Bedouin saints. The legendary spell of the *szegény legények* (Dick Turpins) was familiar to everybody in Hungary a generation ago. But the prestige of bandits has probably nowhere assumed such dimensions as in Southern Italy. When General Govone was asked why the people of South Italy demonstrated such sympathy for the *brigante*, he replied that, in his opinion, the poor looked upon the brigand as the avenger of the numberless wrongs inflicted on the destitute by society. In his essay entitled *Il briggantaggio*, Pasquale Villari publishes the statement of an officer from Southern Italy, to the effect that the proletariat regard the brigands as heroes who wreak a legal and glorious vengeance on the despotic powerful: “The peasants of Postiglione, Serre, Persano, and the neighbouring communities, speak with religious reverence of the *beneficent soul* of that Don Gaetano who, while he lived, was notorious as ‘Tran-

chella.' " We can scarcely believe that the decisive factor is the people's appreciation of strength, which makes the "knifing" peasant an authority among his fellows. The Minister Nasi certainly did not commit such crimes as call into action the muscles of the Sicilian peasant, which are judged by an appreciation based on the principle of "cock in the roost," not by the appreciation of the statute-book with its flavour of morality.

The poor man, in particular a peasant, appreciates practice only, and his faith is consequently a faith in persons; he guesses at the morality of codes of law far more relatively than any modern criminalist. He feels and sees—because he must feel and see—what a power prestige has in face of the criminal code. He feels somehow that the gentlefolk are no better than he is, and yet suffer less punishments; he must see the privilege of prestige in the face of the criminal code—this privilege consists in their *being above suspicion*, in many inquiries being not even instituted, or at any rate frustrated, because *prestige does not permit of suspicion or of the birth of the preliminary conditions of an investigation*, and in many things not being considered criminal at all, because the people who are in the habit of doing them possess prestige.

The potentiality of prestige is made complete and is automatically renewed by the notional, adventurous career, rich in surprises, avoiding persecution, capable of unlimited success, of both the *brigante* and the Bedouin saint.

§ 90. *Prestige and mental derangement.*—Prestige is a quality of situation. It is perfectly in harmony with the inner normality of its recipient. Its course is in accordance with every symptom of healthy life.

The mental life of the recipient of prestige may remain quite normal; for it is not this spiritual world that is



abnormal, but the capacity of consciousness—not the reaction, but the impression. This reflection will perhaps be more easily elucidated if we recall the chapters of psychiatry reminiscent of prestige. We see prestige-like *results* in the cases of megalomania, where the patient seems to be affected here and there by recollections of prestige. Megalomania has two forms—paralytical and paranoiac. It can be a clinical kind of *dementia paralytica*. “In substance,” says Professor Kraepelin, “it comprises all the relations of the patient, his capacity of physical and mental work, his knowledge, the position he occupies in the outside world, his estate, his future. Megalomania at first probably remains within the bounds of the conceivable and possible; and people regard it as childishly obtrusive bluster. The patient feels better than ever, remarkably well preserved, and very cultivated; he understands numerous languages, even if at the moment he is prevented by gaps in his teeth from speaking them; and he has lovely daughters. He writes splendid verses, possesses a superb voice, distinguished friends, and magnificent prospects; has converse with refined people only, is very important, may any day make a brilliant match, and enjoys the special confidence of the highest circles. His business flourishes wonderfully and produces a splendid income; but he is sure to considerably enlarge, and to establish branches everywhere; he wins the great prize in the lottery, and has important inventions; he is to deliver public lectures, and to write a book that will be the greatest sensation and have an enormous sale; he is about to build a castle, or to go on long journeys; he intends to offer himself as a candidate for Parliament, to deliver brilliant orations, and before long to be in the Cabinet.” The patient does not notice these contradictions; his mania is confused, composed of fits and starts,

adventurous, and devoid of connection. With the advance of the disease the absurdities become more atrocious; the patient is "an emperor, a god, a Rothschild," "Hercules, millionaire, and diver"; he possesses an enormous empire, enormous wealth, an enormous army, and builds a golden bridge across the ocean.

Two peculiarities of the patient's state show the characteristic divergence of this form of disease from prestige, however rapturous. One is the patient's self-concentration; he applies everything to himself—glory and persecution, wealth and foes. The remains of prestige, which return again and again in the patient's maniacal ideas, and appear alternately capriciously, spasmodically, thickly, and in a variety of forms, are instrumental in character, but the insatiability of the patient, which draws everything to his own person, does not content itself by any means with the remains of prestige of normal life; every person and object in his vicinity, even the most disgusting materials, assume dazzling and dramatic forms, and the confounding of the persons of prestige with his *ego* is only one variety of this form of disease: *no matter what it may be, whether a psychic value or not*, the patient catches at everything that observation or reproduction thrusts into his main consciousness. The other peculiarity of megalomania is that it has no feeling for even *the most manifest contradictions*, and that logic is not absent from the point of view of situation, but is absolutely impossible. The sentimental elaboration is the result of *inner* compulsion, which is not, however, subject to the harmonious command of the organism, as prejudice is, but reflects the symptoms of *dementia paralytica*, and is as it were a precipitate of the morbid anatomy-symptoms of paralysis. In abstract reflection, the intellect analyses:

in megalomania the mechanism of thought itself is resolved into its elements.

Paralytical megalomania differs in many respects from *paranoiac* megalomania, which from our point of view is only a variety of morbid sensitiveness (*Verfolgungswahn*) that may be included under that head. For the patient, every trifle emphasizes the extraordinary importance of his own person, which is the pivot of everything; his origin is mystically distinguished; he is a crown prince, reformer, Messiah, mother of God, divine mediator: it is no use people trying to hide their actions, for he understands by signs and passing smiles, he reads between the lines, receives the homage of kings and God; princesses fall madly in love with him, and Ministers fear his schemes. According to Professor Kraepelin, the common fundamental feature of all these manias is that they are deeply rooted, original, and cannot be shaken. But in true *paranoiac* cases the megalomaniacal ideas remain in the limits of the conceivable and possible. "The disease," says Kraepelin, "does not alter and destroy the essence of the personality, but creates a morbidly falsified *view of the world*. The morbid ideas are systematically elaborated by the brain of the patient, who ingeniously—though by mistaken conclusions—refutes contradictions. Acting by reflection and a decided plan, he is consistently able to determine, will, act, and defend himself." Kraepelin tells us of a simple peasant boy who thought he was an emperor and a Pope, (and who, in a few years, learned tolerably well to read eight living and dead languages, in order to be competent to fill the high office he had been called to. The permanent and unshakeable system of insanity develops without dimming the order of thoughts, will, and action. Only the self-centredness of paralytic megalom-

mania is found in the case of paranoia; but we do not find the unsystematic, material behaviour subject to the whims of chance, or the outward symptoms of the inner dissolution of the nervous system. The paranoiac *view of life* displays a profound change; its attitude towards the persons and events of its surroundings is that of dislocation (Verrückung). It is evident that we shall not find any similarity in point of the peculiarity of the judgment of men between prestige and megalomania in this case either. A paranoiac arbitrarily betrays his attitude towards persons and their actions: the fixed point in his madness is not of the outside world, but inner, a morbid accentuation of his *ego*—the *idea*, not the *object*, is fixed.

So, if paranoiac and, still more, paralytic megalomania has no feature in common with the psychological activity of prestige; if it would be an absurdity to regard megalomania as a caricature of prestige reflected in the *ego*, how is it possible, nevertheless, that megalomania should at all times prefer to derive its material from the phenomena of the prestige of the day? Between 1864 and 1867, when the political tension (Schleswig-Holstein, 1864, Austro-Prussian War, 1866) had reached its height, of the megalomaniacs being treated in the asylum at Berlin, the megalomania of ten referred to the German Emperor; eight patients imagined themselves to be the King of Prussia, five the Emperor Napoleon, three the Prince of Schleswig-Holstein, three the Emperor of Mexico, and others believed they were Prince Bismarck, the President of the Reichstag, Minister of War, President Lincoln, etc. At this period, according to Professor Oettingen, megalomania connected with religion was relegated to the background. We have a similar statement—dating from the same period—relative to the asylum




at Lübeck. "An asylum," says Professor Eschenberg, "is the mirror of the age, reflecting in a distorted shape everything that excites it." The forms of prestige possessing public feeling and predominating in any particular period, compose the material of megalomania just as much as any other lasting and intensive experience of the patient. It is only the grand emotional importance of prestige that is marked by the constant repetition and rich variety with which, as *a material of megalomania*, it inspires even deranged mentality. Not even paranoiac megalomania has anything else in common with prestige but that the former incites *every* emotional quality—a desire for wealth and sexual insatiability, and a wish for the prestige of nobles, inventors, and political leaders.

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